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Foreword
Over the last two years, the Australia Council has 
made a considerable commitment to produce 
quality research that builds our knowledge of the 
arts sector, identifies areas of policy development 
and shares information and insights about the arts 
in Australia. 
This study by Professor Justin O’Connor was 
commissioned by the Australia Council as part 
of a long-running and productive relationship 
between the council and the ARC Centre of 
Excellence on Creative Industries and Innovation 
at the Queensland University of Technology (QUT). 
Our previous collaborations have looked at the 
contribution of creative activities to health care 
and, more recently, an analysis of census data on 
artists’ employment, What’s your other job?, as 
part of our Artist Careers research. The council 
is also a partner with QUT in two current Linkage 
research projects supported by the Australian 
Research Council.
In commissioning this particular study, 
we asked researchers to address the 
following questions:
•	 What unifies the groups of industries 
collected together under the name creative 
industries?  
•	 Are the arts a part of the creative industries? 
•	 What is the input of the arts to the creative 
industries?  
•	 Are they just a subsidised input to the 
creative industries? 
Our impetus is to add constructively to the  
long-running discussion about the relationship 
between the arts and the relatively newly termed 
creative industries. 
Professor O’Connor’s discussion about the 
history of arts funding and advent of creative 
industries is thoughtful and his conclusions are 
stimulating. This study proposes to challenge 
many of our current conceptions, definitions, and 
even policies. This is both welcome and timely as 
an important contribution to the debate and wider 
understanding of this subject. 
Kathy Keele
CEO
Australia Council for the Arts
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Executive summary
This report began in June 2009 with a series 
of interviews with Australian artists and 
intermediaries from across the arts practice and 
policy worlds. Participants were asked what 
they thought about the similarities, differences 
and connections between the arts and creative 
industries.  Initial responses by participants were 
based on the understanding that ‘the arts’ were 
those publicly funded activities and institutions 
such as galleries and concert halls, symphonies 
and literature. Quickly however this moved onto 
the more pointed issues of what is art and why 
the debate had to be more than just ‘the arts’. 
Popular culture and creative industries were also 
about art, and about culture. Maybe there was a 
spectrum – art at one end, commerce at the other. 
But did that mean those outside the arts were less 
creative or less cultural?  And if not, why does so 
much public support for culture go on ‘the arts’; 
surely other kinds of culture were just as, or even 
more, creative, contemporary, forward thinking 
and  exciting? Finally, what did ‘support’ mean 
beyond just subsidy of some kind.
The interviews frequently resulted in fascinating 
discussions on art, culture, creativity and policy. 
However, the fundamental question remained of 
what we meant by ‘art’ and ‘creative industries’. 
All the interviewees were high achievers in their 
fields and had much to say about the goals and 
operations of their businesses or projects. How 
all these different businesses and projects, values 
and aspirations, techniques and products fit 
together under the policy terminology associated 
with ‘the arts’ and ‘creative industries’ is the real 
subject of this report. 
To address this question we provide an historical 
approach to understanding the connections 
between the arts and creative industries. This 
report suggests that the current idea and practice 
of ‘art’ emerged at a particular moment in 
European history, during the rise of capitalism and 
modernity from the late 18th century. Aesthetics 
emerged as a particular humanistic ‘science’ 
charged with understanding this new set of art 
practices and ideas. The report traces some of 
the transformations and debates surrounding 
this idea. The focus is on issues of culture and 
economy, but these cannot be isolated from wider 
issues of state and society. 
The main argument is that ‘art’ as an idea, as a 
set of practices, as a set of experiences, cannot 
be restricted to what is now known as ‘the arts’. 
‘Art’, as with other phenomena of modernity, is 
a mobile term which constantly transgresses 
boundaries and undermines fixed oppositions. In 
particular, we try to show how that old opposition 
of art and popular culture – with its associated 
binaries of ideal/commerce, public/market, high/
low – has always been contested and is now 
mostly threadbare. This has great consequences 
for cultural policy in general and arts policy in 
particular. But if the term ‘art’ can be extended 
into popular culture then arts and cultural policy 
have a legitimate stake in policy-making for the 
creative industries. These industries consequently 
have more than purely economic importance and 
their working context is saturated by cultural as 
well as business considerations. This poses a 
challenge for existing public policy.
 
Arts and creative industries
Since the creative industries initiative was 
launched in Britain in 1998, the relationships 
between the arts and the newly defined creative 
industries have been subject of much debate. 
Out of many questions, two issues in particular 
stood out. 
First, did all these players hang together as a 
sector? Were industrial designers or computer 
game companies working in the same sector as 
record labels, advertisers or TV companies?
Second, what was the value of these sectors 
for policy-makers? If this value was primarily 
economic, as it appeared to be, then the 
question of ‘arts and culture’ became tricky. 
The traditional justification for arts support had 
been their ‘intrinsic’ or ‘non-instrumental’ value 
and their traditional policy instrument was public 
subsidy. Should there then be a clear separation 
between publicly subsidised ‘art and culture’ and 
commercially oriented creative industries under 
the economic purview of industry development 
policy? 
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There were four problems with separating 
arts and creative industries. 
a) Arts as inputs into creative industries 
The evidence from many sources and disciplines 
suggested that the arts had a range of inputs 
into the creative industries. They were generating 
new ideas; acting as a kind of R&D; they 
contributed to a general creativity; they provided 
an institutional infrastructure for new ideas and 
experimentation; they contributed key skills to the 
creative workforce; they attracted creative workers 
to particular locales and enhanced the creative 
atmosphere of place, and so on. These different 
ways of understanding the ‘input’ of the arts need 
much more clarification, and this is a key purpose 
of this report. We do however suggest that the 
‘separate spheres’ policy model is not adequate.
b) Creative industries and common culture
 Creative industries contributed enormously to 
our common culture; it is inconceivable to have a 
contemporary cultural policy that does not take 
into account the central role of commercial culture 
within our everyday lives. The newer ‘creative 
industries’ – not just new cultural forms, such 
as computer games, but new cultural means of 
creation and communication – have complicated 
but not removed this issue. 
c) Creative workers
Many of those working in the arts and creative 
industries – including most of those interviewed in 
this report – see themselves as operating between 
these two spheres. They might work for one or 
the other across the course of a day or week, but 
equally their work, though never receiving public 
subsidy, might be described as ‘artistic’. Indeed, 
those working in commercial culture not only 
value ‘the arts’ but also see their own commercial 
activity as involving high levels of artistic or cultural 
purpose. 
d) The arts are ‘big business’
Publicly subsidised culture turns over millions of 
dollars every month; it employs a vast range of 
people; it purchases and sells business services 
commercially; it involves extensive marketing and 
branding activity; it generates income through 
tickets and sponsorship. Certain areas of the 
arts – think of the international gallery circuit – 
outdo the major luxury brands in attracting the 
disposable income of the very rich. Cities invest 
millions in arts-led cultural makeovers. The arts 
are, or can be, big business. 
All of these issues present challenges to 
contemporary policy makers. On the one hand, 
should the arts be approached purely in terms of 
state subsidy or are there other policy approaches 
better attuned to the commercial practices of 
the creative industries that could be beneficial to 
the arts? On the other hand, should the creative 
industries be approached in purely economic 
terms; if they are central to contemporary culture, 
how should they be supported to enhance this 
cultural contribution? 
 
Arts and creative industries: executive summary 6
Art media design
We argue that one way of recognising that ‘art’ 
as a value operates across the subsidised and 
commercial sectors is to organise the creative 
industries around art-media-design. 
Art covers the predominantly aesthetic symbolic 
products and practices – music, dance, creative 
writing, film, computer games, drama – often 
referred to as ‘content’. It also includes what have 
been called popular culture and ‘entertainment’. 
Media is an essential precondition of art – such 
as distribution, platforms, information, critics 
and marketing – as well as making up a lot of 
its content. But media also carries non-artistic 
content and fulfils other cultural, informational, 
educational, social and political functions. 
Design draws on aesthetic content within a larger 
functional brief – a dress has to be wearable and 
a building stand up. The aesthetic input should 
not be reduced to the ‘look’, the surface allure 
of design. The design and craft traditions share 
with art a history of concern with the relation 
between aesthetics and wider social and political 
responsibilities. Nevertheless, design has to 
consider other functional outcomes.
A new policy vision
Our understanding of art has undergone some 
radical transformations but we should not lose 
it as a central cultural value crucial to a modern 
democratic society. Agencies concerned with 
the arts continue to engage with the creative 
industries agenda so that it does not become one 
concerned solely with economic outputs. 
But intervention requires bold policy steps. No 
longer is ‘market failure’ the only justification for 
public intervention. ‘Market failure’ is not just about 
the failure of arts within the market but about the 
failures of the market itself, the ways in which 
economic forces provide for but also undermine 
and cut against individuals and communities. 
Arts policy continues to look beyond the traditional 
art forms and the large institutions. This is clear to 
many policy makers and commentators though its 
ultimate consequences are less clear. 
We suggest in this report looking to the 
ecosystem as a whole – the spatial infrastructures, 
the educational structures, the legal and technical 
services, the ‘soft’ infrastructure of identity, 
networking and inspiration.  There could be 
a greater collaboration between the agencies 
concerned with art, media and design, as well 
as other social and economic agendas; and a 
new set of understandings, skills and sources 
of intelligence. A combination of cultural, social, 
economic and urban expertise has been growing 
in cities and regions here and across the globe, 
and has been under-utilised by national policy 
makers. 
For arts and creative industries policy to find its 
full voice we have to find new ways of indicating 
success: not just employment, rent increases and 
tax generation but indexes of well being, creativity, 
empowerment and diversity.  This evidence needs 
to be extended from individual participations to the 
wider health of the cultural ecosystem. 
 
A historical overview: outline
Chapter 1 outlines the general scope of the 
issues.
Chapter 2 discusses the emergence of art as a 
distinct area of life and the relation of this to wider 
transformations associated with capitalism and 
modernity. 
Chapter 3 explores the ‘art worlds’ of the 19th 
century city. It outlines the separation between 
‘art’ and ‘entertainment’ and the role of the market 
within this, but stresses that art too was organised 
around particular markets and economic contexts. 
We suggest that while art was clearly part of the 
emergence of a new middle class means of social 
distinction, art was also part of more democratic 
aspirations which are still with us.
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Chapter 4 looks at the emergence of cultural 
policy and the role of arts within this. It suggests 
that art played a pre-eminent, though not 
exclusive, role within this new cultural policy, 
associated with the nation building project of 
the modern state. We also look at how the rise 
of both the cultural industries and modernist 
art undermined the unitary affirmative notion of 
the nation state. The chapter also discusses the 
emergence of public subsidy for the arts and the 
ways in which this tended to fix ‘the arts’ within 
fairly conservative administrative boundaries 
which, in many ways, are still with us.
Chapter 5 looks at popular culture in the 1960s 
and 1970s. It outlines the many challenges 
popular culture presented to a unitary national 
cultural policy and to certain elitist tendencies in 
the arts. At the same time, this popular culture 
could also be seen as an extension of many of the 
aspirations associated with art to wider sections 
of society. Cultural industries, popular culture and 
art began to intermingle in complex ways. We look 
at community arts and the rise of new kinds of 
cultural policy, in particular, the rise of ‘alternative 
cultures’ with an emergent economy linked to, but 
in friction with, both ‘the arts’ and large cultural 
industries. 
Chapter 6 directly addresses the emergence of 
‘creativity’ and the creative industries in the 1990s. 
It suggests that the creative industries combined 
arguments coming from the ‘information society’, 
Schumpeterian entrepreneurialism and innovation 
theory with the increased economic importance 
of sectors involved in the production of cultural 
goods. We look at new ideas in both creative work 
and creative consumption and explore arguments 
that the opposition between economics and 
culture was now over. The chapter considers 
some of the conflicts between creative industries 
theory and traditional notions of art and cultural 
policy, and between creative industries and earlier 
approaches to the cultural industries. We argue 
for the distinctiveness and continued relevance 
of the notion of ‘art’. In doing so, we suggest that 
art is not to be directly equated with ‘the arts’, as 
traditionally defined, but so closely intertwined 
with popular culture that the traditional distinction 
(such as high and low) is redundant. It concludes 
by assessing the policy landscape within which 
these debates have been engaged and the 
challenges for a new forward looking policy. 
Chapter 7 considers how the arts and creative 
industries have been defined by academics, 
consultants and policy makers. It argues that 
creativity is not an adequate way of identifying 
this particular sector and  suggests that many 
of these definitional models reproduce unhelpful 
distinctions between art and commerce, art and 
‘entertainment’, art and functionality. We put 
forward a broad schema of art-media-design 
within which we can better consider contemporary 
arts and creative industries policies.
Arts and 
creative industries
An Australian conversation
Justin O’Connor 
with Stuart Cunningham and Luke Jaaniste
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Introduction
In June 2009 Stuart Cunningham and Justin 
O’Connor conducted a series of interviews with 
people in arts and creative industries. Given the 
necessarily limited number of interviews possible in 
such a diverse field, the interviewees were selected 
for their broad perspective and not just the ability to 
draw on their individual experiences. The interviews 
teased out working practices and opinions from 
a sample of respondents across the practice, 
management and policy worlds.
Eighteen interviews were conducted and 
recorded. The interviewees included individual 
practitioners, micro business operators, curators, 
managers, directors, lecturers and consultants. 
The interviews were conducted mostly face to 
face, with two over the phone, and conducted in 
the second half of 2009. They lasted around one 
hour and were relatively unstructured.
We asked them what they thought about the 
similarities, differences and connections between 
the arts and creative industries. The interviews 
all resulted in fascinating discussions on art, 
culture, industry, creativity, policy and so on. All 
the interviewees were high achievers in their fields 
and had much to say about how their businesses 
or projects operated, and with what challenges, 
goals and aspirations. However, as the interviews 
unfolded it seemed that the fundamental question 
was what we meant by ‘art’ and ‘creative 
industries’. 
Many of the initial responses were couched in 
terms of ‘the arts’ understood as those publicly 
funded activities and institutions with which 
we are all familiar – galleries and concert halls, 
symphonies and literature. Very quickly this 
dissolved into more pointed issues. What is art 
and is it the same as ‘the arts’. Popular culture, 
creative industries – these were also about 
art, about culture. Right? Maybe there was a 
spectrum – art at one end, commerce at the other. 
But did that mean those working commercially 
outside the arts were less artistic or less creative? 
And did artists operate in a world of pure subsidy? 
Surely not. 
There was clearly a lot of ambiguity and 
complexity in this discussion as it unfolded. 
How did all these different businesses and 
projects, values and aspirations, techniques and 
products fit together under the policy terminology 
associated with ‘the arts’ and ‘creative industries’. 
In A historical overview we attempted a historical 
and conceptual clarification of these terms and 
some of the crucial contemporary issues that they 
entailed. In An Australian conversation we attempt 
to give a sense of how these issues appeared to 
these particular respondents. 
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Conceptual confusion?
The most striking aspect of the interviews was the 
confusion around the term ‘creative industries’ 
itself – a confusion heightened when contrasted 
or linked to ‘art’. Those involved in policy or in 
managerial positions knew something about the 
history and implementation of the term – one or 
two very well indeed – whilst the practitioners 
tended to be more hazy about what it might mean. 
The interviewers (and the briefing paper) gave the 
standard definition of 13 subsectors in which ‘the 
arts’ had been included in the creative industries 
by the UK government. Whilst two people working 
in the arts definitely resisted such an inclusion 
(though one of these did so on the basis that it 
was they who had been excluded from the CIs) 
most more or less accepted that in some way art 
and creative industries hung together. 
However, we do not want to give the impression 
that there is a robust definition of the term creative 
industries out there which policy makers sort of 
understood and practitioners only dimly. For two 
reasons. 
First, as argued in some detail within A historical 
overview, there is much conceptual confusion in 
the academic and policy definitions of the term 
‘creative industries’. Indeed it has proved highly 
controversial both in its strict definitional sense – 
what is included/excluded and on what grounds – 
and in its wider conceptual claims. The confusion 
‘out in the field’ is in part a reflection of this. 
Which leads to the second reason. Any policy 
initiative with any real legs has to mobilise a set 
of ideas, narratives and values which have some 
resonance with the people or sector to which it 
is targeted. The idea of ‘creative industries’ has 
in many ways succeeded in doing this because 
it has highlighted some important changes 
in the ways art and culture are produced and 
consumed, where its markets are and how they 
are changing. Whatever its conceptual confusions 
the idea has resonated with those working in 
policy, management and practice in ways that we 
need to understand. 
Within A historical overview we have attempted to 
do this from a historical and conceptual viewpoint; 
here we try to show what sorts of ideas, values 
and narratives are intertwined for our respondents 
with this idea of creative industries. How do they 
understand it, how does it describe or help frame 
their practice? 
One thing is clear: however they interpret the 
import of the ‘creative industries’ this does 
not happen in a space separate from their 
understandings of ‘art’ and culture in general. Only 
one person sought to make an intrinsic difference 
between art and creative industries (which we 
examine below) though quite a few others pointed 
to artificial barriers between them. Which means 
that if we cannot identify a ‘pure art’ distinct from 
the world of markets, industries and commerce, 
nor then can we separate the world of business 
models, labour markets and value-chains from 
artistic and cultural practices and values. 
In short, rather than seeing these different and 
sometimes conflicting views as a sign of the 
conceptual confusion of practitioners we should 
see them as a reflection of the complex and 
conflicted questions around contemporary culture.
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Different sectors?
Intrinsic difference?
One respondent suggested that art was 
intrinsically different from creative industries: 
The creative industries are not part of my way of 
seeing my place in society… In terms of how I see 
visual arts in terms of other creative disciplines, like 
gaming, architecture etc, I feel that it is quite different. 
That’s because we don’t have someone coming to 
us with a set of parameters and a job to complete 
that needs to go in one way. I don’t mean to say a 
designer is compromised by the client on every job 
but limited by client’s requests and budgets and 
even the form of the outcome. Designers are very 
creative, clever people but always have to answer 
to a brief that they don’t set. Even a good brief, 
like Greenpeace asking for inspirational work, their 
work is still mediated by that brief. In my work, I’m 
interested in environment but don’t produce one-
sided work, sometimes it has a darkness to it even 
though it talks about ideas of living in a better world. 
It often pushes you away, does not draw you in [like 
advertising and advocacy material] which are things 
that don’t have the potential to be poetic, cannot go 
beyond the way that we see things now.
It is important to note that here ‘art’ is set against 
examples taken from design, architecture and 
advertising which involve the provision of services 
to clients hence within set parameters. There 
was no consideration here of art’s relation to 
other forms of audience consumption (such as 
television, or pop music, or film), which also make 
up the creative industries. 
This was not a defence of subsidy over or against 
the market. In discussing how visual artists 
worked the respondent was talking about a 
particular market – what in A historical overview 
we have called an ‘art world’ – whose general 
outlines (artist-agent-curator-gallery) have evolved 
over many years. As a successful artist, they did 
not demand subsidy for themselves – though they 
recognised its usefulness for others – but saw the 
main policy task as growing this market: 
I don’t want a grant, give them to others. My work 
is too expensive. In Australia, the market is small so 
galleries don’t make huge sales.
The key policy task from this viewpoint is to  
raise the profile of visual art in Australia – audience 
education – in order to grow the market and make 
‘the galleries more confident to back us’. 
The other respondent who made the art/creative 
industries distinction did so on a similar ‘intrinsic’ 
basis:
I define art as more troubling than [a Kylie Minogue 
concert]. You know what you will get; to me art is not 
knowing. You can make a fortune on Kylie Minogue 
but [your] first three novels – nothing! Bill Henson is 
not a creative industries art person, he’s an artist so 
causes trouble. Creative industries would have the 
girls more clothed or the like.
Here the issue is less about conforming to a 
client’s brief but to prior audience expectation 
(‘you know what you will get’). It is a well 
established view which opposes commercial 
mainstream to subsidised or under-funded, 
marginalised, precarious art. Art ‘pushes you 
away’, is ‘troubling’, ‘goes beyond the way we see 
things now’.
The key claim is that the creative industries as 
‘the market’, cannot produce these things. The 
‘restricted’ market which produces art is more 
precarious and has less money because it does 
not set out to satisfy these obvious needs. The 
standard conclusion is that it therefore needs 
subsidy. In our sample this stark opposition was 
not a common view. It is not that the importance 
of ‘artistic value’ was ruled out, just that such 
a division was too simplistic. Indeed, even 
those who supported subsidy thought it had its 
dangers (as we shall see) and that the potential 
‘commercial’ market for valuable art was much 
bigger than often suggested. 
We would make two points here.
First, because this opposition of art and creative 
industries is frequently characterised as outdated 
and/or elitist it is important to emphasise that this 
view of artistic value as something unexpected, 
something that challenges, something open-
ended or ‘poetic’, is a value most respondents 
shared. It is sometimes encapsulated in the term 
‘creative’ (though this can also mean enterprising 
or using initiative). But this artistic value or quality 
is not restricted to what has been traditionally 
identified as ‘the arts’ nor dependent on subsidy. 
I don’t agree that art cannot be provocative, life 
changing, stimulating, confrontational unless it’s 
outside the mainstream. Take Tarrantino’s movies 
for example; they’re part of the mainstream, but are 
in-your-face-movies.
Arts and creative industries: an Australian conversation 12
Here the word ‘art’ is used to describe film and by 
implication the wider sphere of popular culture. So 
too:
Is a rock festival a creative industry? You could say 
it’s very commercial, but for youth who attend it is a 
creative space.
One respondent routinely discusses games in 
terms of art:
On the surface some games may look like films but 
the core aesthetic of a game is experienced through 
engaging in play – and these dynamics and
rhythms of gameplay give the form a kind of pure, 
almost mathematically visceral aesthetic similar to 
music. It's like the pleasure I get from the Marriage of 
Figaro – yes I'm enjoying the story and the staging, 
but the almost physical thrill I get is from the music. 
The narrative content of many operas can be weak 
and ridiculous, but that doesn't stop them being 
interesting works of art. In the same way I appreciate 
Lucia di Lamermoor for the beautiful coloratura, I can 
appreciate the beautiful, transcendent gameplay of 
a game in spite of any tasteless, violent melodrama. 
And while I'm passionate about opera, the key 
difference for me is that opera was the art form of 
someone else's time, while games represent the art 
form of mine.
Others question the boundaries of established 
arts:
ABC is at an interesting point because we have 
‘artistic’ radio and television programs from drama to 
music etc. But in another way all of its creative output 
should not be seen as something different to arts.
Second, this artistic value was not seen as elitist 
or necessarily inaccessible:
People really respond to art, they step up to it….  
120 000 people went to my show in Hobart over four 
months. The highest figures they ever had at an art 
gallery/museum.  Most of the promotion was word of 
mouth. People do want to go somewhere like that. …
the young children loved my work. They loved being 
in the big dioramas I made…. They respond to my 
work because it’s about them, their environment, 
what’s happening in science and ethics, it’s different 
from what they see in the media yet still has a bit of it. 
That’s why they respond to my art, it’s of it’s time, it’s 
funny yet serious.
The artist adds immediately that such popularity is 
often suspect in the art world: 
That’s bad in the art world, you’re not a serious artist 
if people like your work… Some of the old people… 
are quite elitist. They don’t understand that the arts 
are becoming more important yet less supported, 
more money being put into sport and celebrity 
culture. Stuff that diverts people’s attention from 
what’s happening in the world.
Though our sample would resist the direct 
equation of art with subsidy and established art 
forms, most would endorse ‘art’ in this sense as 
a key value and most agree that there was a role 
for government intervention, including subsidy in 
some form, to ensure this.
The government, instead of reducing funds, they 
need to put money into promoting arts, they only 
have games, films, celebrities – hard to compete with 
them because they have so many economic pay offs. 
Young people need other ideas. 
 
The value of art might be set against the 
‘mainstream’ but not against ‘the masses’. 
 
The new and shiny versus  
the old and boring
One common understanding of the ‘creative 
industries’ is that they refer exclusively to digital 
or electronic media. This was not the case in this 
sample of professionals, apart from one who did 
make this distinction, and linked it to profit-driven 
business. 
I never know what creative industries means, I think 
it means electronic media in a profit making business 
model.
When understood in this way it can produce quite 
defensive reactions from those in older or non-
digital art forms, setting up clear oppositions: art 
is ‘old and boring’; it is live (or at least pre-digital) 
and more expensive; it challenges rather than 
confirms; it does not do it for money. It is therefore 
ignored by the creative industries and by policy 
makers, students and educators who see it as too 
expensive, not fashionable and not likely to make 
a profit. Creative industries are about giving the 
audience what it wants; it is about the attraction of 
the new and shiny, about new media technologies. 
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These are fairly common views in the current 
debates within the cultural media. It is not, 
however, restricted to those feeling edged out. 
From the other side, the Gotterdammwerung of all 
established arts and media under the cleansing 
fire of new digital media technologies is a common 
trope amongst many cultural bloggers. Neither 
view stood out in our (unscientific) sample. 
Though often rather defensive about being left 
behind by the ‘shiny and new’, two ideas are 
worth noting. 
First, that there was real potential for collaboration 
between these older ‘art forms’ and the new 
‘electronic’ creative industries. The skills of the 
writer, according to this view, could be really 
valuable to the film or games industry. There 
were ‘wasted assets’ in the theatre and literature, 
and the creative industries were ‘re-inventing the 
wheel’ or not fulfilling their potential because of it. 
Second, from this point of view the problem was 
the creative industries, not the arts; people from 
the creative industries ‘came and talked but did 
not follow through’. 
Prompted to reflect on what could be done they 
suggested a brokering role for the Australia Council 
or other cultural agencies. The respondent would 
love to see their organisation “appear on the credits 
for a film or a game or something online”. Both the 
perceived sense of being left behind, and the desire 
to engage and contribute are important points. 
On the other hand, some respondents thought 
that the arts dismissed the commercial sector too 
quickly:
I think [creative industries] is probably about design 
and advertising. I imagine people would put us in that 
box as well because there seems to be a divide seen 
by others – a divide between ‘real’ writing and writing 
we do. …We’re seen as commercial because of the 
ads [in our culture guide magazine]. 
These divisions between the arts and creative 
industries were therefore sometimes about 
intrinsic differences but mostly about perceived or 
artificial distinctions between the art/subsidised 
side and the commercial. In the vast majority 
of cases these hard and fast distinctions were 
questioned. Those in the first sector began to 
talk about the evolving art market and those 
in the latter asserted their artistic and cultural 
motivations and concerns. As the interviews 
unfolded it became more clear that the landscape 
of contemporary art and culture is not marked by 
‘high’ and ‘low’, as in art versus popular culture 
or creative industries. It might be marked by the 
challenging and the mainstream, or by good and 
bad, but this did not clearly map onto what was 
and was not subsidised or commercial. 
Different languages?
One respondent saw the distinction in terms of a 
different viewpoint – the creative industries being 
about the economic dimension and the arts 
perhaps blissfully unaware of this, just doing their 
thing.
We see ‘creative industries’ as part of an economic 
process, whilst the ‘arts’ is more about an outcome, 
e.g. painting, performance. So creative industries 
help us to improve… building into economic 
practices and processes, with the capacities to drive 
employment outcomes. The artistic arena does 
not sit nearly as well with this thinking. That’s the 
difference for me.
A slightly different version of this sees the Arts 
Boards concerned with the economic/policy 
outcomes and the artists again somehow 
reluctant to talk about markets:
The arts are part of creative industries because they 
are in business of selling tickets, experiences, with 
KPIs [key performance indicators] often around 
attendances even though market cannot support 
them totally. Arts are an industry… Yet there is a 
different view from boards [of arts organisations] than 
from artists. Boards are dealing with KPIs, so look at 
increasing revenue... But within the arts, practitioners 
are reticent to view their work as commercial…
These views might suggest a division of labour 
between artists and policy-makers/managers, 
where the artists concentrate on what they do 
with little concern for where the money comes 
from or how it is justified. However, though this 
might occur within the subsidised sector it does 
not apply within the commercial sector; and we 
certainly cannot restrict the concept of artist to 
the subsidsed sector. These views do however 
speak of some complexities and tensions within 
the creative industries between economics and 
cultural values, to which we will return; they also 
point us to that ecology within which subsidised 
and commercial activities can be intertwined and 
co-dependent.
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A mixed economy 
Given this it is no surprise that most saw the arts and 
creative industries as part of the same thing. The 
term ‘creative industries’ was not overly associated 
with ‘digital’ – though that was clearly an important 
topic it was mostly assumed as part of the landscape 
in which the whole sector works. For the most part 
the term was taken to imply a stress on the economic 
or market dimension, and the need for artists and 
policy-makers to accept and deal with this. 
 
Money and meaning
Many of the artists in the sample refused the 
traditional opposition between art and markets, 
making a living and making meaning: 
Just because word ‘industry’ or 'industries' is used, 
doesn’t mean we are not making art.
The clichéd view of artist is no longer the case – 
many are now very savvy and can handle money.
I’m in a strange position with the traditional art 
community, I have a reputation for being expensive. If 
artists are smart, that’s where you want to be.
Arts agencies talk about commercial /non-
commercial as if it’s important, but this is not a clear 
distinction because commercial imperatives can drive 
the arts, such as the focus on increasing revenue etc.
The more traditional arts sectors are themselves a 
mixed economy:
Take the visual arts: there is an interplay between 
emerging artists and the role of commercial galleries. 
One of my friends, a gallery owner, says gallery 
owners give resources and nurture new artists. 
Established artists say commercial players enabled 
them.
Art is both commercial and non commercial and 
subsidised for various reasons. For instance, 
documentaries tell local stories but are often non-
commercial.
The arts are an industry in its own right with cultural 
values.
[There is] some elitism in traditional arts; it’s crude 
to have engagement with commercial enterprise. It’s 
ridiculous because the arts industry is a commercial 
enterprise. They are marketed, a marketed product, 
but they won’t use those terms. If we treated that as 
reality, artists should be paid more.
This mix of the commercial and the subsidised, 
the ‘industrial’ and the ‘cultural’ does give rise to 
some reservations or caution.
In my experience I’ve never seen a distinction 
between arts and creative industries. I work with 
fine artists and understand they have different 
approaches, so maybe some have a reluctance to be 
seen from commercial perspective.
The arts are part of creative industries because they 
are in business of selling tickets, experiences, with 
KPIs [key performance indicators] often around 
attendances even though market cannot support 
them totally. Arts are an industry... But within the 
arts, practitioners are reticent to view their work as 
commercial…
[A difference between arts and creative industries?] 
It depends on how you define industry basically. If 
its about cultural activity that is industrious, creates 
product, then there’s no divide. But if it’s about 
cultural activity which is commercially viable, then 
there is a divide.
These reservations should not necessarily be 
seen as backwards-looking or precious – they are 
tensions and ambiguities that remain important 
to both the identity of artists and to many creative 
businesses. 
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Finding a balance 
For many the working life of the artist involves a 
mix or balance of many different elements:
There are sometimes pure pieces of arts activity, 
but with things I’ve done, such as running venues, 
cultural destinations or tourist sites, I can’t say there’s 
the arts bit. You have to say there’s the arts bit, the 
tourist bit, and the entrepreneurial bit... 
I have multiple areas of operation. I know how to 
speak the language necessary for each group of 
people I deal with, I recognise my markets. I’ve 
got to this point by sitting on the fence, so all are 
comfortable working with me. I think falling into 
special categories is limiting for artists. It’s very 
complex really.
For others these ‘bits’ are more distinct, 
depending on who they are working for:
I work two half days a week for [an independent 
media outlet], and when doing that I’m a market 
contractor for [a commercial firm]. As part of my 
freelance work, I write for [a national media outlet], 
do arts reviews and also some consulting. And I work 
for [major building and public space developer] at the 
moment, telling what interesting things they could 
build on their roof.
These ‘bits’ might also include ‘less’ or non-artistic 
work:
I think it’s slowly becoming more acceptable for 
artists to work in other areas [although] people do 
worry they won’t be taken seriously as practitioners 
if they have to do other work to generate income. 
Some have projects they put their names to, and 
others they do not put names on. We need more 
awareness of this dynamic, and teach practitioners 
how to balance and manage that.
Most artists will do work in whatever context. Reality 
is many are doing multiple jobs and often mixed 
with non-arts work for income reasons. Depends 
on what kind of artist they are. Consider the music 
field: classical musicians are narrower in their work, 
either performance or teaching, not what they see as 
commercial. Others outside classical are more varied. 
Some of the classical musicians run private studios 
teaching etc – which is in itself a commercial activity.
As evidenced by many other studies, artists 
were frequently working in a mixed economy of 
subsidised and commercial, and of artistic and 
non-artistic work. 
This subsidised/commercial binary does not 
describe two distinct sets of practices, nor two 
sets of values – artistic and profit driven. As we 
have seen they overlap in quite complex ways 
which make the boundaries fuzzy:
If we talk about the subsidised and commercial 
aspects of the creative industries, then in reality 
there is at least one more category: a large amount 
of activity is not in framework of subsidy but not is 
commercially viable either. A lot of it is self-subsidised 
through other work.
Most saw their interconnection and felt they 
needed to be managed as a whole, as an 
ecosystem:
Seems to me to be more intelligent to think of the 
arts and creative industries as one thing because 
they are interwoven. I think it is still the case that the 
commercial end of creative industries benefits from 
some of the subsidised activities in terms of what’s 
possible and it’s also true that on the funding side we 
need to find ways to move artists on from funding. So 
better to talk about them together. If you do, where 
does the conversation sit? Who is running it, what’s 
the hierarchy of relationships, how do they talk to 
each other?
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Art and design: separated at birth?
Having noted this mixed economy, when asked 
how they understood the term ‘creative industries’ 
some respondents, as we have seen, suggested 
it might be about design, architecture, advertising 
and other (often business-to-business) services. 
Rigid distinctions between art and creative 
industries were mostly rejected but the designers 
interviewed (echoed by some artists) did want 
to make a distinction between what they did as 
designers and what artists did. 
I feel that [the visual arts] are quite different [from 
creative industries]. That’s because we don’t have 
someone coming to us with a set of parameters and 
job to complete that needs to go in one way. I don’t 
mean to say a designer is compromised by the client 
on every job but limited by client’s requests and 
budgets and even form of the outcome. Designers 
are very creative, clever people but always have to 
answer to a brief that they don’t set. Even a good 
brief, like Greenpeace asking for inspirational work, 
their work is still mediated by that brief. In my work, 
I’m interested in environment but don’t produce one-
sided work, sometimes it has a darkness to it even 
though it talks about ideas of living in a better world. 
It often pushes you away, does not draw you in like 
advertising and advocacy material which are things 
that don’t have the potential to be poetic, cannot go 
beyond the way that we see things now.
From the point of view of those involved in the 
arts, creative industries have different motivations: 
for example, designer versus artist. Graphic 
designers are usually working for a client; money 
for service. This is different for artist and patron, or 
the commercialisation of their art. The caveat on 
this is you could have a designer that approaches 
the condition of art in some way – treated now as 
piece of art rather than graphic art – so things can 
transmute from one to other. The artist’s motivation 
is to transcend the relationship around creativity, 
hard to express properly – to go beyond the 
designer who is looking at working creativity into a 
particular transaction – the artist does something 
over and above that, not the traditional mode of 
something being bought or sold even though there 
is some commercialisation aspect, but distant 
from the creation. I’m talking as a designer; it’s 
probably different for music etc. Design is intensely 
commercialised at one end of spectrum, and 
approaches art at the other.
Designers usually work within constraints from 
market, client, with the product needing to be right.  
The artist does not necessarily have this. Like pure 
research versus applied research, pure science 
versus applied science.
When somebody comes to me for a job I ask them, 
are you a designer or an artist?
The meanings at play in these quotes are 
complex; in A historical overview we show how 
they go back right to the emergence of the idea 
of ‘art’ and ‘artist’ during the Renaissance, and 
increasingly from the 18th century onwards. The 
distinction was not immediately about ‘pure’ art 
versus commerce but between ‘pure’ (that is 
autonomous) art versus ‘applied’ art – with the 
terms of that application usually set by someone 
other than the artist or designer (therefore 
‘heteronymous’). 
In traditional conceptions of art which valued 
its autonomy above all (versions of 19th century 
romanticism or 20th century modernism, for 
example) this usually means that applied, craft-
based or decorative art is compromised. But 
there have been strong opposing tendencies 
which have stressed the social role of art and 
design, that it was there to respond to, enhance 
or help shape the emergent life of modern society. 
The traditions stemming from the Arts & Craft 
Movement, through Art Nouveau, Bauhaus, Art 
Deco, Constructivism and to the International 
Style in architecture, have all been attempts to 
do this. In performing this task the designer/artist 
necessarily has to respond to what are perceived 
to be the socio-historical parameters within which 
this new design must take its place. Even the 
most autonomous ‘master-builders’ of modernist 
architecture insist that they are conforming to, or 
anticipating the future requirements of the modern 
city. 
A designer is… limited by the client’s requests and 
budgets and even form of the outcome. Designers 
are very creative, clever people but always have to 
answer to a brief that they don’t set.
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From a designer's perspective this is not always a 
problem rather this is the problem to which their 
skills and vision are to be applied: 
The designer… is looking at working creativity into 
a particular transaction. 
Designers pride themselves on dealing with 
solutions to functional problems. Some of these 
are set tight – a logo, for example – and some set 
more widely – a new public space or an integrated 
communications strategy. It’s the willingness to 
engage with these problems within the constraints 
of ‘requests, budgets and…outcome’ that for one 
respondent marks off the job-seeking artist from 
the designer. 
But most artists also find themselves working 
for a client; they might have more ‘wriggle room’ 
than designers but they mostly have to conform 
to a brief. Film music, copy writing, public art, 
photography, illustration for example, all have set 
parameters. This is even more so when it comes 
to music for toys, adverts and games, or voice-
overs, acting theme-park characters, or filming 
inserts for commercial websites and so on. Very 
few artists work outside constraints – and many 
thrive on them! On the other hand certain graphic 
designers (Peter Saville), or celebrity fashion or 
product designers (Philippe Starck) and so on 
have much more autonomy than many artists. 
Hence the caveat above:
[that] you could have a designer that approaches 
the condition of art in some way – treated now as 
piece of art rather than graphic art – so things can 
transmute from one to other.
The key polarity however remains that between 
‘problem solving’ and free exploration, between 
functionality and intrinsic meaning. It is a spectrum 
more than a binary or hierarchy: design may 
‘transmute’ into art, but many designers reject the 
designer-as-artist image often associated with the 
1980s. 
Design thinking… is using the skill set of design not 
to just supply gloss at the end of the development 
of product, but to define what the product or 
service can be right from the start and use design 
as a framework. It could be put as stylists versus 
designers.  Any kid with photoshop could be a stylist.
I get annoyed when architects think of themselves 
as part of an arts rather than a design faculty. It’s 
demeaning to the rest of design. Industrial design is 
profoundly more affecting than architecture. Only five 
to seven percent of buildings are built by architects, 
whereas industrial design changes the way cars, 
ipods, computers, buses etcetera work. The 
intellectual reach for higher ground from architects 
is, I think, largely unfounded; or rather other design 
disciplines have the same intellectual reach, but not 
as powerful a part of the profession.
The ‘constraint of the brief’ is not quite the same 
thing as saying “designers are usually working for 
a client; money for service”. The tension between 
economics and culture that we saw with artists 
also operates for the designer. There are jobs you 
would rather remained anonymous, to get the 
money (some have projects they put their names 
to, and others they do not put names on) and 
there are ones where you put more of yourself 
than simply cost-benefit. The problem lies not in 
the external brief – which is what the designer 
is about – but in the client’s limited vision or the 
allotted resources not being sufficient to the full 
demands of the job in hand. And of course artists 
too chafe under similar conditions.
The broadening of ambitions for design…could also 
include the shape that government takes and citizen’s 
engagement with those things. That’s why design 
has a huge role to play, to rethink what government 
and citizens are. Culture in Raymond Williams’ sense 
rather than cultural production. There is something 
in design (which could be tested in music) that is 
different from the production of art because it is 
concerned with cogs, wheels, oil. Whether it’s lived 
culture or industrial process. Art is not like that except 
for commenting on it, its not same motivation from a 
creative point of view.
This tension between economics or lack of vision 
and the full possibilities inherent in the problem 
to be solved (a new house, a new city, an internet 
application, a game narrative) is also as old as 
modernity itself – where profit was very often 
seen as coming before clear vision and rational 
planning. Many working in the tradition of modern 
design saw their role as in part transformative 
of the social realities to which they sought to 
respond. Some design traditions – modernist 
architecture, city planning, constructivist 
signage, social network platforms – could be 
radically utopian, seeing only a future society as 
capable of acting on its ideas. Here again design 
comes close to the aesthetic tradition which 
stresses the uselessness of art in the face of an 
instrumentalised and inhuman society. 
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Designers navigate the spaces in which they 
must make a living just like artists do; both would 
sometimes prefer to do a job anonymously. But 
like those artists working within a commercial 
setting, there is great scope for quality work. 
Business clients are not to be characterised 
in terms of some uniform bottom line; the 
permeation of design within product, branding, 
marketing, office interiors, logistics and so on 
is extremely sophisticated. Businesses are also 
judged by consumers, other businesses and 
design professionals in ways that have direct 
impact on their image. The different ‘design 
worlds’ have the constraints and ethics of many 
more ‘artistic’ communities of practice. Equally 
designers work for public agencies with wider 
remits than the shareholders and set within other 
kinds of constraints. And designers also employ 
‘artists’ in areas where the symbolic dimension 
is concerned with the dynamics of allure, feel, 
experience etc. Many design jobs employ fully 
autonomous artists as well. 
In this sense there are strong homologies and 
interconnections between art and design, just 
as there are areas which clearly mark them off. 
The functionality of design is not necessarily the 
same as its commerciality, though obviously 
the latter is a constraint on the former. But 
similar things could be said about much artistic 
practice. The contemporary field of design is 
not only vibrant because of the rise of design 
inputs within business to business services (a 
dynamic discussed in A historical overview) 
but also because – perhaps in response to the 
overstressing of art’s uselessness – it holds out 
the possibility of solving some real problems in an 
elegant way. 
The arts and creative industries cannot be 
mapped onto art versus client services – 
because these services do not characterise the 
production of culture direct to market (audiences, 
consumers). But design does indicate the sorts of 
distinctions within the creative industries which we 
need to acknowledge. Similar arguments can be 
made for the area of media and communication, 
though this was not broached in any great detail 
in these interviews. It is for these reasons that 
A historical overview talks about the creative 
industries as art-design-media. 
Finally, though the designers in the survey saw 
themselves as part of the ‘arts and creative 
industries’ they also saw a role for a distinct 
design strategy and in two cases a distinct design 
agency – along the lines of the British Design 
Council. There was a need for better education of 
the public and government:
We have concerns about decisions made in public 
competitions for architecture – they do not always 
pursue progressive options; the more safe pathway 
is taken. So there is a potential to be progressive 
but it’s not taken as done in other countries. For 
example Copenhagen – amazing public architecture 
supported and financed by government. Not here.
My thought is that the greatest need for investment in 
arts and design in Queensland is in the education of 
the general public. We face issues of the appreciation 
of the value of design and art. Newspapers no longer 
represent any design discourse.
Design is caught between ‘art’ and ‘industrial design’, 
where the latter is seen as too commercial and the 
former too ‘arty-farty’.
I can’t imagine an Arts Council would deliver on 
applied design except in a side way, such as curating 
an ‘art’ of car design…We don’t have an equivalent 
to the UK’s Design Council. Feels to me that’s not the 
Australia Council’s role. If I compare the Royal Society 
of Arts to the Design Council, I see two different 
agendas, though they may slightly overlap. Two 
different missions. The Royal Society commissioned 
the first public exhibition of art in UK in around 1700, 
the Design Council is very different, industrially lead. 
I would say in the Australian context, Kim Carr’s lot, 
industry innovation councils and so on, should get 
behind design. It’s frustrating that they don’t come 
from a design perspective that much.
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Subsidy
The issue of subsidy came up repeatedly. We did 
not set out to probe the complex policy debates 
around this issue but covered it in so far as it 
related to the main issue of arts and creative 
industries. For many commentators the distinction 
arts/creative industries is co-terminus with 
subsidy/market. This was a minority view in the 
sample, who mostly saw it in more complex terms. 
Many – including practicing artists – were keen to 
stress that ‘industry’ can describe what the arts 
did – or should do – as much as the commercial 
sector. But there was also a recognition that the 
market could not deliver everything.
[A difference between arts and creative industries?] 
It depends on how you define industry basically. If 
it's about cultural activity that is industrious, creates 
product, then there’s no divide. But if it’s about 
cultural activity which is commercially viable, then 
there is a divide.
This is not about ‘the arts’ versus the rest but 
about the need to support those things that 
are not commercially viable, either as good in 
themselves and/or as an essential part of the 
whole creative ecology. 
[The] Australia Council and Screen Australia exist…
to pick winners not identified by the market….Ten 
Canoes – the market did not appreciate it…. It would 
not have been driven from a commercial perspective 
despite it doing well through critical acclaim. 
Art is both commercial and non-commercial and 
subsidised for various reasons. For instance, 
documentaries tell local stories but are often non-
commercial.
In my situation I’ve had good support from funding 
agencies, my argument is I produce work that does 
not make objects, so therefore no market as such 
in a commercial sense, I work in public spaces. So 
I receive support. I think it is the sort of work they 
should do, support works that are not about long 
term commercial gain, but have immediate gain for 
communities. So I have been able to experiment in a 
way I couldn’t do in a commercial world.
In general there was an acceptance of subsidy in 
some form, but the respondents also identified 
real problems with it.
Downsides to subsidy
Many saw the importance of subsidy in start-up 
but thought that in certain cases it could lead 
to dependency. Some respondents suggested 
it kept them from moving outside into new 
challenges and markets. 
I know artists who had grants, went into lecturing, 
never exhibited in real world. That happens with 
grants, artists who redefine objectives and continue 
to get grants.
I think it is still the case that the commercial end 
of creative industries benefits from some of the 
subsidised activities in terms of what’s possible and 
it’s also true that on the funding side we need to find 
ways to move artists on from funding.
For success and creativity industry needs new 
ways of resourcing… [subsidy] has not produced 
the quality expected....The opportunity to pursue 
different [funding] models is there now, but resisted. 
Subsidy should be part, but perhaps not as it is at the 
moment. We need to use different ways of generating 
income for smaller companies/individuals using 
subsidy model, gradually phasing out subsidy…
[like requiring them] after three years…to attract 
sponsorship.
Going out into the market is seen by many 
respondents as having a positive effect rather than 
compromising ‘pure art’ for money. 
 
Being in the market is good for new magazines 
because they are answerable to readers…a good 
magazine is one who knows its audience. Being 
exposed to an audience means you have to do a 
good job. Here’s one sent to me [holds up magazine], 
I guarantee it won’t come out again. Too expensive, 
not funded, has ads, no definition. If they lose their 
start up money, it could be a useful lesson: next time 
go for a cheaper start.
The market in this view provides crucial 
information, but it is not absolutely determinant, 
nor is advertising revenue, which has to be chosen 
carefully.
We’ve always been low cost, so smaller risk. We have 
said no to advertisers and are still running. Some 
people think if they buy an ad, then we will write an 
article: like a festival recently, related to an album 
release, bought a banner ad and thought  
we’d automatically write CD review. We would never 
do that.
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Some also felt they could manage this relationship 
between commercial and creative concerns.
Because of my background in media and publishing, 
I’ve always tended to be closer to the commercial end, 
I’m more conscious of the role the private sector can 
play in creative work, I’m not prejudiced, as long as it’s 
administered fairly and relationships managed well, 
there’s great potential for benefit on both sides. A lot of 
my work has been mediating between those two sides.
Others noted that the application and reporting 
procedure were often very cumbersome, not like 
going to private sector.
I’m a pragmatist and never gone for funding, because 
the times I have gone for quick grant, e.g. one for 
$500 – the application was twelve pages long – 
nothing quick about that. Whereas I picked up phone 
and called someone I know working at a clothing 
label and they gave me $1000, one phone call.
There were some who preferred not to apply for 
grants because they felt they might lose control.
We have not applied for grant funding in case of 
restrictions. [We tried doing editorial work for a 
magazine financed by the city]. It was an exhausting 
checking process. This could introduce a filter 
between us and the audience.
No [we would not accept a grant] because we want 
to keep control. We can create strange intelligent 
writing, which may not be allowed.
I would get a commercial partner rather than 
working with government, especially because of 
compromises that have to take place.
These are all common complaints and are 
certainly not restricted to Australia. Though 
some might be more valid than others, from our 
perspective the key points are that support for the 
arts is not simply about the defence of subsidy, 
and that the creative industries agenda is not seen 
as simply the pursuit of commercial profit as a 
replacement for that subsidy.
Did the creative industries 
challenge subsidy models?
There were some serious structural objections that 
suggested that the current subsidy might need to 
catch up with or reflect transformations currently 
underway. Some suggested subsidy was locked 
into particular art forms and created bureaucratic 
barriers to new genres or, worse, suggested that 
anything outside of these was not art. The games 
industry was frequently cited in this context.
Yes, the Australia Council is structured around 
traditional art form boards. Now, games developers’ 
projects theoretically fit with Australia Council support 
and should get funded. But it doesn’t happen.
What is the cultural contribution to Australia of 
Australian computer games manufacturing and 
distribution? I think it is significant, there’s probably 
more Australian audience for games than other 
screen-based pursuits…In the shift to restructure 
support for the film/TV industry we create Screen 
Australia and new tax-based incentives. Games 
associations at the same time asked for support, but 
this didn’t happen. 
Our games exports are significant, greater than 
feature films, yet this sits outside cultural policy, and 
commercial music pretty much the same, yet it is key 
to what it is to be Australian.
I think there are great games made in Australia, but 
people don’t get funding to go on and make more.
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Whatever the factual basis of these claims (and 
the issue of games funding is too big to explore in 
this document) the questions raised here reflect 
current debates around the purpose of both 
arts and ‘creative industries’ based funding. If 
the former is about ‘intrinsic value’ and the later 
‘economic’ or instrumental value then games 
might be covered by a spectrum of agencies from 
the Australia Council to Austrade. It is clear from 
these quotes however that many see support for 
commercial cultural industries as involving both 
economic and cultural policy objectives. This is 
something film support agencies, for example, 
have constantly had to wrestle with. The creative 
industries agenda might give renewed emphasis 
to those cultural activities (existing and emerging) 
which are implanted within more commercial/
industrial frameworks – but it clearly does not 
override the cultural imperatives around ‘national 
identity’ and other cultural policy concerns.
For others the problem is not just art-form 
categories, but also the kind of mixed economy in 
which they operate.
I founded another magazine with creative industry 
content, and a music and fashion magazine; through 
all of those projects and others, I pulled the focus 
out a bit and realised that it’s an ecosystem e.g. 
musicians need film makers, artists need fashion 
designers, these people usually socialise together 
and share ideas.
These sorts of fast-moving and ‘promiscuous’ 
collaborations and projects are often viewed by 
the respondents as not well served by the art-form 
based subsidy system. 
In response it should be noted that the term 
‘subsidy’ is more complex than simply grant-
giving. Apart from grants to individual artists and 
larger organisations public money is given to 
projects which employ artists. That is, they work 
within the subsidised realm but not on the basis 
of grants but more commission or competitive 
tender. The growing levels of public investment, 
private sponsorship, business to business 
services and new digital platforms have increased 
the possibilities and complexity of the market – 
and the need for creativity in navigating it.
Anyone in creative industries should apply creativity 
to everything they do, not just the art. We bought a 
warehouse, we lease it out, we pay rent here as this 
is our workplace. I could have gone bigger and taken 
on more profitable projects, but it meant I would have 
had to become like an architect’s or designer’s office, 
all those things. I prefer to fly under radar, keep low 
scale and employ when there’s projects, so I don’t 
have many overheads yet still dealing with major 
works.
We have seen that the subsidised arts are also 
sometimes described as important feeders 
into creative industries businesses, or else they 
should/could be. Furthermore, the subsidised 
arts can also be employers of creative industries 
firms and personnel (who contribute to large-
scale performing arts events for instance). The 
relationship might, or should, work both ways – 
between the subsidised arts and (other) creative 
industries.
For many these different kinds of mixed 
economies mean that grants miss their target; 
more crucially they cannot deal with the mix of 
profit and non-profit. 
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Profit/non-profit
Here also the arts/creative industries binary is 
frequently mapped onto profit/not-for-profit. It 
is important to be clear here that institutions in 
receipt of grants can (and do) generate surplus, 
indeed they are encouraged to do so, operating 
on a commercial basis within a framework of 
‘artistic excellence’. There is currently a lot of 
debate about the impact of subsidy on wider 
markets; on how far institutions should have 
freedom to use grants; about the grounds 
on which such decisions are made and the 
mechanisms of distribution. We cannot touch 
on these here. Amongst our respondents there 
was a strong sense that grants could lead 
to complacency and dependency. However, 
they did not call for a free market approach so 
much as a new configuration between subsidy 
and commercial operations. This was a strong 
interpretation of the creative industries agenda.
But within the arts, practitioners are reticent to view 
their work as commercial… This is a problem and 
a powerful discourse, embedded in bureaucratic 
structures in the arts in Australia… There’s a need to 
evolve, not a free market approach but some leeway 
needed.
This in-between approach to subsidy and 
market, not either/or, is a common view amongst 
respondents. 
The arts funding structure puts people in a situation 
where, if applying for funding, they have to decide 
if project is for artistic integrity and for social and 
artistic deliverables, or…developing a business.
For others, and in terms of the larger grant-
receiving organisations, there should be less 
strings attached to the grant money but less 
guarantees also.
An alternate model would be the example of a young 
company receiving subsidy… after three years they 
needed to attract sponsorship for work, and they 
must seek this. Maybe access international work 
and money. If that worked, whoever was overseeing 
the creative industries, after a period of years they 
may judge eligibility for upfront money, get five years 
subsidy in one grant. Companies need to be aware 
that this is coming, either further subsidy or the 
stopping of funds. Five years is a fair time to do this. 
There should be no restrictions on the use of upfront 
money, in the ways used to generate income.
The plea is not that subsidy be stopped, but that it 
recognise the realities of the mixed market across 
the arts and creative industries. The alternative to 
this recognition – and this was strongly expressed 
by a number of respondents – is that, on the one 
hand ‘the arts’ are artificially protected and on the 
other, this hybrid, mixed culture is left to its purely 
commercial self. This distinction is frequently 
challenged under the rubric of the creative 
industries agenda – as A historical overview tries 
to outline.
If we talk about the subsidised and commercial 
aspects of the creative industries, then in reality 
there is at least one more category: a large amount 
of activity is not in framework of subsidy but not is 
commercially viable either. A lot of it is self-subsidised 
through other work.
Why should an artist selling work at the Sherman 
Galleries get funding from the Australia Council to 
develop a new exhibition?
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New policy tools, 
new policy rationales
As we have seen, a range of ‘marketplaces’ or 
social-cultural-economic contexts contribute to 
this ecosystem, from patronage to clients, and 
mass consumption to DIY/amateur/volunteer 
networks. Multiple interactions and identities exist, 
with freelancers and businesses engaging in profit, 
not-for-profit and socio-communal activities. In 
this perspective the arts and creative industries 
are brought together in terms of a common 
infrastructure – that supports the full spectrum of 
commercial and non-commercial – and the bits 
that fall in between. 
I don’t think either system [subsidy/commerce] really 
works. I don’t think they value creativity and emerging 
creative arts. The only way, I think, to bring them 
together would be to address some of the structural 
issues, like the hard infrastructure that they all need to 
flourish. The approach needs to be some other way, 
not about funding – my perspective is lots get funded 
that shouldn’t be. I’d rather talk about investing in 
infrastructure, a lot of what artists need is the same 
as what the creative industries need.
This shift to a mixed economy or ecology, to the 
language of investment, to the elaboration of new 
financial and economic development tools for this 
sector and so on – all are very much part of the 
creative industries policy agenda. But this brings 
its own challenges.
Our respondents had many ideas about what 
this sector might need: infrastructure, especially 
spaces, business and facilities; training and 
support for micro-business models; business and 
professional skill development; and increased 
digital literacies. (We should note in passing that 
many of these are already in existence.)
[A] lot of what artists need is the same as what 
creative industries need – such as space to work and 
space to exhibit and perform. Less obvious things 
too like business skills and professional skills… And 
we need more creative industries-focused skills 
development programs.
There are emerging artists who are able to deal with 
the funding sector as it is – people who build long 
term careers out of this. For the rest, probably we 
could fund different types of infrastructure rather than 
individual artists… Also venues and real estate is very 
expensive; finding ways of addressing these would 
help.
In Australia, you reach a certain point then there are 
no more opportunities for you here. So you need 
opportunities to grow your business knowledge 
and maybe an opportunity to feel you belong to an 
industry. These are ideas about soft infrastructure 
rather than spaces. Perhaps we need to make 
some of the spaces we have more accessible, when 
spaces are developed, creative industries should rate 
higher.
People need an incubator program, even office 
space – bread and butter things needed, advice on 
intellectual property etc. More hand holding on the 
business side.
Let’s have mentoring master classes by people who 
know the business. That’s essential, people who 
know the business and also people who appreciate 
the contexts creatives work in today, who understand 
not everyone is looking for a massive market, or that 
traditional forms of media no longer have the same 
power, so traditional marketing doesn’t work.
We tend to have high creativity and innovation 
in pockets of television, music, film, arts and are 
well positioned globally. So we need to stimulate 
the sector, for example through grants, tax-based 
incentives etc. What has been lacking is how to get 
capital. Australians don’t invest well in intellectual 
property.
The venture capital community here does not 
invest in certain aspects of creative industries, so 
government funding is often the only option.
From this perspective the creative industries 
agenda is not about cutting government 
subsidy but finding new policy tools to support 
the creative ecology as a whole. But these are 
complex instruments which most likely involve 
the collaboration of a range of different agencies, 
which is never easy. 
To solve the problem I think more inter-agency 
co-operation is needed… such as trade and 
arts working together. But there is duplication of 
effort, lack of co-operation between branches of 
government, between federal and state government. 
We need more partnered schemes or projects.
State government agencies trip over each other 
and at federal level things are divided into different 
portfolios.
Competition [for funds from different government 
bodies] reinforces silos in terms of policies and funding.
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In some cases – design certainly, but maybe 
games also – there is a lack of relevant agencies 
that can properly address these issues. One 
respondent suggests there is a dearth of 
institutions to underpin such collaboration:
NESTA [National Endowment for Science, 
Technology and the Arts] can exist in the UK 
because of a different ecology, e.g. there’s always 
been strong design institutions in UK – so NESTA 
can sit in middle with the right components around 
it – we don’t. We could not have in Australia a NESTA 
funding collaboration, say, between Imperial College 
and Royal College of Arts…We don’t have a Royal 
College of the Arts or design institutions, or Victoria 
and Albert Museums – so we need to address the 
poverty of our institutions. 
The UK history is often cited as being more 
‘holistic’ in its approach, not separating arts and 
creative industries. The culture of collaboration 
in the UK is ‘really mature, no one worries about 
their own identity’. But Creative Nation was also 
mentioned, as ahead of its time in terms of cultural 
policy, especially its recognition of new media 
technologies and its willingness to bring different 
portfolios together, in the manner of the DCMS. 
When Keating did Creative Nation in ’94, you had 
a mandate from the Prime Minister for a nexus 
between communications and the arts in a portfolio. 
It was a time of trying to drive agenda that said there 
were big changes on the communications front, 
and unfortunate if the arts were left behind. Good 
point. My view was that that was important, having 
communications and arts working together, so 
the whole digital area had logical connection. The 
problem now with change of government [Howard 
to Rudd] is the world has moved on, the arts are 
no longer high policy priority for Labour. The arts 
are barely mentioned in terms of policy debate. 
Communications moved away from arts and once 
again segregated… Conroy gets communications 
with broadband and film agencies, so what Labour 
have done is create a new divide. You’d think that the 
history of communications and arts working together 
over different governments, bringing in the creative 
industries in a meaningful way, should lead to positive 
outcomes rather than separation.
For one the Australia Council has also retreated 
from an engagement with commercial culture, 
which hinders its contribution to this process:
For various reasons, two main areas in the Australia 
Council in its earliest days – the film and television 
board and the architecture and design interests – 
were lost to it. Film has spun off to the Australian 
Film Commission and architecture and design was 
abolished. If both were still there we would have 
a very different debate around commercial/non-
commercial.
As we have seen most respondents do not see a 
chasm between arts and creative industries, and 
view culture and commerce as intertwined. One 
quoted a literary man from the 1890s, who saw 
‘no distinction between culture and commerce’. 
The problem is that government does. 
Part of the question of policy ownership or 
collaboration is what grounds there are for this 
collaboration, what kind of narrative will underpin 
its vision, what will sell it to government? 
So from one perspective the creative industries 
agenda is about widening an ‘arts policy’ into a 
‘cultural policy’.
What’s the difference between cultural and creative 
industries? Tricky question. The distinction is 
unpleasing, want to go back to notion of cultural 
policy more than just arts policy.
For others, however, the creative industries 
agenda is an attempt to get government to take 
them seriously, which means using the economic 
argument. 
[The cultural argument] is a dangerous one, we 
stayed away from [it] in the [digital industries] action 
agenda process. Because it has been tried, it’s hard 
to win and kind of an ever smaller race to get grants. 
So we tried to make argument from an industry and 
commercial basis. That we need to pick up on growth 
as sector increases. Kind of a new manufacturing 
sector in some ways, but intellectual property based. 
The cultural argument was already tried by film and 
television and they found it tough. It will get some 
funding – but what we want is an industry recognised 
as important in its own right, not just because of 
cultural issues.
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It is clear that the ‘arts and creative industries’ 
involve subsidy, unpaid and commercial activities, 
and that they put into play artistic and cultural 
as well as economic values. How the different 
dimensions of such a policy agenda are put 
together – and even recognised as such at 
government level is not easy. The ‘creative 
industries’ agenda has brought with it arguments 
for employment and wealth generation, that it 
represents a future industry or a major source 
of innovation across the economy. But it has 
also been used to stress the mixed ecology of 
artistic and cultural production and consumption, 
where markets and different forms of subsidy and 
investment are required. These two approaches 
are not implacably opposed, but nor are they 
seamlessly united. 
It is not just about collaboration or dealing 
with complexity, but the values at play in such 
policies. Economic versus cultural, artistic versus 
commercial is too stark, too simplistic, but within 
this new complexity there are conflicts, different 
interests which need to be brought out. 
As one respondent said: 
So it’s better to talk about [the arts and creative 
industries] together. If you do, where does the 
conversation sit? Who is running it, what’s the 
hierarchy of relationships, how do they talk to each 
other?
This is perhaps where we need now to start.
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Chapter 1 
What is this report about?
Background
As presented in An Australian conversation 
this report began in June 2009 with a series of 
interviews with artists and intermediaries from 
across the practice and policy worlds. We asked 
them what they thought about the similarities, 
differences and connections between the arts 
and creative industries. The initial responses 
were couched in terms of ‘the arts’ understood 
as those publicly funded activities and institutions 
with which we are all familiar – galleries and 
concert halls, symphonies and literature. Very 
quickly this dissolved into more pointed issues: 
first what is art and then why it had to be more 
than just ‘the arts’. Popular culture, creative 
industries – these were also about art, about 
culture. Right? Maybe there was a spectrum – art 
at one end, commerce at the other. But did that 
mean those outside the arts were less creative 
or less cultural? Surely not. And if not why was it 
that all the money for culture went on ‘the arts’; 
surely other kinds of culture were just as, maybe 
more creative, contemporary, forward thinking, 
exciting? But then again, we don’t want subsidy. 
But what did ‘support’ mean if it did not mean 
subsidy?
The interviews frequently resulted in fascinating 
discussions on art, culture, creativity and policy. 
However, at the end of the interviews it seemed 
that the fundamental question was what we 
meant by ‘art’ and ‘creative industries’. All the 
interviewees were high achievers in their fields 
and had much to say about how their businesses 
or projects operated, and with what goals and 
visions. How all these different kinds of creative 
projects and businesses fit together is something 
we will discuss in this report but it is also a 
subject for a future report. How all these different 
businesses and projects, values and aspirations, 
techniques and products fit together under  
the policy terminology associated with ‘the arts’ 
and ‘creative industries’ is the real subject of  
this report. 
In order to address this question we took a 
more historical approach to understanding the 
connections between the arts and creative 
industries. Whilst we have tried to achieve clarity, 
we also acknowledge that we have made some 
seemingly clear-cut issues more complicated. 
Hopefully this will be seen not as arcane  
hair-splitting but as a necessary condition for 
a mature and sophisticated arts and creative 
industries policy debate.
This report suggests that the idea and practice 
of ‘art’ we use today emerged at a particular 
moment in European history, during the rise of 
capitalism and modernity culminating in the late 
18th century. Aesthetics emerged as a particular 
humanistic ‘science’ charged with understanding 
this new set of art practices and ideas. The report 
traces some of the transformations surrounding 
this idea and the debates to which these gave rise. 
The focus is on issues of culture and economy, 
but these cannot be isolated from the wider state 
and society. 
The main argument is that ‘art’ as an idea, as a 
set of practices, as a set of experiences cannot 
be restricted to what have now become known 
as ‘the arts’. ‘Art’, as with other phenomena of 
modernity, is a mobile term which constantly 
transgresses boundaries and undermines fixed 
oppositions. In particular we try to show how 
the opposition of art and popular culture, with its 
associated binaries of ideal/commerce, public/
market, high/low has always been a contested 
one and is now mostly threadbare. This has 
great consequences for cultural policy in general 
and arts policy in particular. But if the term ‘art’ 
can be extended into popular culture then arts 
and cultural policy also have a legitimate stake 
in policy for the creative industries. These latter 
consequently have more than purely economic 
importance and their working context is saturated 
by cultural as well as business considerations. 
This poses a challenge for existing public policy.
Arts and creative 
industries: what’s at stake?
In the ten years since the creative industries 
initiative was launched in Britain in 1998, the 
relationships between the arts and the newly 
defined creative industries have been subject of 
much debate. The initial definition of the creative 
industries deliberately included the traditional arts 
with the ‘classical’ cultural industries (broadcasting, 
film, publishing etc.), design-led industries 
(architecture, craft, design, advertising, fashion) 
and so-called new media (software, computer 
games and electronic publishing). Out of many 
questions two issues in particular stood out. 
First, did this sector hang together as a sector? 
Were industrial designers or computer game 
companies working in the same sector as record 
labels, advertisers or TV companies? This was not 
so straightforward because even if practitioners 
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initially rejected or ignored the label (“I’m not a 
creative industry, I’m a photographer”) policy 
makers and theorists were intent on grouping 
them together: indeed, these same practitioners 
now routinely (if sometimes tentatively) refer to 
themselves as creative industries. What was it 
that they shared? Though involving very disparate 
kinds of skills, business practices and industry 
structures, there seemed a common thread 
running through all these sectors. Obviously 
there was ‘creativity’, but as we shall see, this 
was never quite enough (“is science not creative 
also?”). Others used the terms ‘symbolic’, 
‘cultural’ or ‘expressive’ value, or described 
them more generally as ‘experience’ ‘identity’ or 
‘attention’ economies. These are all terms that had 
traditionally been reserved for ‘art and culture’. So 
on the one hand the inclusion of ‘the arts’ made 
perfect sense; on the other hand however, weren’t 
the arts somehow different?
Second, what was the value of these sectors 
for policy-makers? If this value was primarily 
economic, as it appeared to be, then the question 
of ‘arts and culture’ became tricky. Their traditional 
justification had been their ‘intrinsic’ or ‘non-
instrumental’ value and their traditional policy 
instrument was public subsidy. Should there then 
be a clear separation between publicly subsidised 
‘art and culture’ and commercially oriented 
creative industries under the economic purview of 
industry development policy? 
There were four problems with separating 
arts and creative industries 
a) Arts as inputs into creative industries 
The evidence from many sources and disciplines 
suggested that the arts had a range of general 
and specific inputs into the creative industries. 
They were generating new ideas, acting as 
a kind of research and development; they 
contributed to a general creativity; they provided 
an institutional infrastructure for new ideas and 
experimentation; they contributed key skills to the 
creative workforce; they attracted creative workers 
to particular locales and enhanced the creative 
atmosphere of place and so on. These different 
ways of understanding the ‘input’ of the arts need 
much more clarification, and this is a key purpose 
of this report; but it suggests that the ‘separate 
spheres’ policy model is not adequate.
b) Creative industries and common culture
The creative industries themselves contributed 
enormously to our common culture; it is 
inconceivable to have a contemporary cultural 
policy that does not take into account the central 
role of commercial culture within our everyday 
lives. This notion has been central to cultural policy 
and cultural studies for over half a century, and 
continues to inform ‘cultural industries’ policy on 
broadcast media, film, publishing and so on. The 
newer ‘creative industries’ – not just new cultural 
forms, such as computer games, but new cultural 
forms of creation and communication – have 
complicated but not removed this issue. 
c) Creative workers
Many of those working in the arts and creative 
industries – including most of those interviewed in 
this report – see themselves as operating betwixt 
and between these two spheres. They might 
work for one or the other across the course of a 
day or week, but equally their work, though never 
receiving public subsidy, might be described as 
‘artistic’. Indeed, those working in commercial 
culture not only value ‘the arts’ but also see their 
own commercial activity as involving high levels of 
artistic or cultural purpose. 
d) The arts are ‘big business’
‘Publicly subsidised culture’ turns over millions of 
dollars every month; it employs a vast range of 
people; it purchases and sells business services 
commercially; it involves extensive marketing and 
branding activity; it generates income through 
tickets and sponsorship. Certain areas of the 
arts – think of the international gallery circuit – 
outdo the major luxury brands in attracting the 
disposable income of the very rich. Cities invest 
millions in arts-led cultural makeovers. The arts 
are, or can be, big business. 
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A challenge to policy makers
All of these issues present challenges to 
contemporary policy makers. On the one hand, 
should the arts be approached purely in terms 
of state subsidy; are there not other policy 
approaches more attuned to the commercial 
practices of the creative industries that could be 
beneficially applied to the arts? On the other hand, 
should the creative industries be approached 
in purely economic terms; if they are central 
to contemporary culture how should they be 
supported in ways that enhance this cultural 
contribution? 
If ‘the arts’ are not just seen as a subsidised 
‘input’ into the commercial creative industries 
but very much intertwined with them, what might 
such an arts policy look like, one that mixed public 
sector investment with commercially oriented 
‘industry’ strategies? This is not just a question 
of policy tools – new forms of ‘smart finance’, 
increased R&D, new technologies – but of how 
‘the arts’ relate to contemporary culture. At the 
same time, it demands that creative industries 
policy engage with the cultural dimensions of 
these creative industries as well as the purely 
commercial. 
To address the question in this way might go 
someway towards improving the relationship 
between the arts and creative industries policy 
discourses in Australia. These last emerged in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s (as cultural industries) 
and directly fed into the Creative Nation initiative. 
In the last decade however they have tended to 
be defined in a much more economically oriented 
fashion (see chapter 6).
Certainly ‘on the ground’ such polarisations may 
be much less marked, as creative producers and 
companies move within a complex ecosystem of 
profit and non-profit (and all spaces in-between) 
activities. Equally, local policy makers are involved 
in pragmatic accommodation with the various 
cultural, economic and social dimensions of these 
sectors. But at federal and state levels there are 
clear rifts between these two policy agendas that 
also engender mutual distrust. 
These questions are not just about statistical 
definitions, nor pure policy pragmatics. The 
presence of ‘the arts’ in the creative industries 
debates raises fundamental questions of value – 
of instrumental or intrinsic worth, of the use of art 
and its justification for public spending, of the role 
of commerce in culture – just as some versions 
of the creative industries idea question the very 
necessity and relevance of art itself. These make 
discussions quite fraught, and heavily-laden words 
pile into each other spilling historical baggage 
everywhere. 
Inevitably the notion of creative industries, with 
their close links to new technologies and emergent 
social and cultural forms, are associated with the 
new and the innovative; we look to them for the 
emergent outlines of the future. At the same time, 
they come at the end of a long history of similar 
hopes and fears for past and future; what are 
we losing, what are we trying to achieve? It is for 
this reason that we have taken a more historical 
approach to the question, trying to situate the 
origin of contemporary debates within a much 
longer tradition.
The usefulness of art
Clash of binaries 
Approaching the question of the multiple relation-
ships between arts and creative industries needs 
more clarity. Recent reports dealing with this issue 
have used words such as ‘culture’, ‘art’, ‘the arts’, 
‘aesthetics’, ‘publicly funded culture’ often inter-
changeably; they have used ‘cultural industries’, 
‘creative industries’, ‘commercial culture’, ‘popular 
culture’, ‘mass culture’, ‘entertainment’ similarly. 
It is not simply a matter of definitions; all these 
terms come with complex historical connota-
tions operating in ways that can make the debate 
both passionate and completely self-referential. In 
order to help make these debates more open to a 
productive exchange with each other, we need to 
trace the historical genesis of these debates, how 
they have changed and what future they might 
hold out for us. 
The clash of these two sets of concepts tends to 
be around binaries such as culture/economics, art/
market, intrinsic/instrumental, and in terms of elitist/
populist, critical/passive, heritage/contemporary, 
depth/shallowness, contemplative/active, mind/
body, analogue/digital and so on – a debate 
therefore involving some of the fundamental 
questions regarding the ways we do or should live. 
This report outlines how these questions have been 
raised in relation to the public policy issue of the 
relationship between arts and creative industries. 
It offers a way of getting beyond these binaries; to 
place the debate on grounds more appropriate to 
the complex issues that confront us. 
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Use or ornament?
One of the main themes around which this 
debate has been conducted in recent years has 
been the opposition between the ‘instrumental’ 
function of art (usually economic or social) and 
‘art for art’s sake’, that is, art as completely 
self-sufficient and needing no other justification 
than its own enjoyment. In fact ‘art for art’s sake’ 
was a particular historical position taken by a 
limited number of artists/critics, mainly in France 
and England, during the second half of the 19th 
century. It took some tendencies in aesthetic 
theory (which we will discuss below) to an 
extreme position; it certainly was not generally 
representative of art practice or theory at that 
time. From romanticism through social realism 
right through to modernism and on to the present, 
the idea that art is created separately from society 
in some ideal realm, or that it should have no 
consequences for that society, has been explicitly 
rejected. ‘Art for art’s sake’ certainly does not 
inform contemporary art history or theory; indeed, 
it is usually presented as a very particular product 
of its epoch and social milieu. 
Of course the ‘pure’ enjoyment of art – of colour, 
line, sound, rhyme or movement – is a real feeling; 
but the social spaces and the kinds of subjectivity 
that allow enjoyment of these things in such a 
way are themselves part of a wider historical 
development. Aesthetic enjoyment apart from any 
‘use’ is a phenomenon of more modern European 
history1. ‘Art for art’s sake’ cannot be understood 
otherwise than as one kind of response to modern 
industrial society, and the people making such 
claims are equally products of that very same 
society. 
‘Art for art’s sake’ was but a small part of a 
wider and still powerful feeling that art involved 
some universal value that transcends historical 
circumstances. Its ‘use’ was to deepen our 
humanity, to reflect on our common fate. At 
their best, artists transcend their own time and 
space to speak to all other such products of art 
through the ages; they speak through their own 
time but achieve a human universality in which 
we all (potentially) share. This approach has a 
very long history, going back to the 18th century. 
It informs the idea of a canon of great works as 
well as that sweeping historical narrative which 
arranges collections of artefacts stretching back 
to Neolithic times into ‘the story of art’. The first 
Minister of Culture in any European country was 
the Frenchman Andre Malraux, and his idea of 
‘the imaginary museum’ presents this historical 
narrative of art as the foundation of modern 
European cultural policy. Art is a universal and 
privileged symbolic act that both encapsulates 
the culture within which it is born and goes 
beyond it towards the universal human. It can do 
this because the artist is someone possessing a 
spark of creativity that puts them in touch with this 
universal; and we who look properly can discern 
this kernel of great art in all symbolic artefacts.
From this perspective, to suggest art should be 
put to some other (economic, political, social 
welfare) use – rather than this most important 
possible use – is to commit an act of historical 
vandalism for which future ages will condemn 
us. It is against this narrative, not the rather 
circumscribed notion of ‘art for art’s sake’ that the 
charges of ‘instrumentalism’ must be weighed. 
The end of idealism?
In A historical overview we outline how this idealist 
view of art has been criticised, and indeed, how 
the notion of art that informs cultural policy has 
also changed. This has important consequences 
for the arts/creative industries debate. In short 
it questions what now counts as ‘art’ and why 
we value it – more pointedly, who gets to do this 
‘valuing’. In the 1970s and 1980s work within art 
history, literature, philosophy, cultural sociology 
and cultural studies all contested the idea that 
there was some eternal human capacity called art 
or creativity (here in the sense of artistic drive or 
capacity). In 1980 Janet Wolff wrote two densely 
argued books that summarise these arguments. 
She showed how art is simply a particular kind 
of labour in a particular kind of socio-economic 
structure and has to be understood in these 
terms and not as a local exemplar of a universal 
capacity2. In 1990 Tony Bennett, coming from 
cultural studies, systematically dismantled 
the claims of art and aesthetics to have some 
transcendental insight into a universal truth 
of history, positioning them squarely in their 
economic, social and political context of the 
rise (and fall) of the middle class and the liberal 
democratic nation-state 3. 
It is now a commonplace notion in humanities 
disciplines that ‘high art’ was and is the culture of 
the elite, used by them to legitimate their position; 
that the ‘canon’ is simply the choice of this social 
group; that ‘art’ is merely one ‘sub-culture’ 
amongst all other kinds of cultural consumption; 
that art’s educative function is at best patronising 
and at worst an insidious elitism. These beliefs 
are by no means confined to academia. One of 
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the problems facing most cultural policy and arts 
funding agencies today is the sense that their 
legitimacy is unclear. Though in fact arts funding 
still gets high ratings from public opinion, the 
grounds for that public funding seem contested. 
The arts might be good in general but who 
decides what gets funded, and by what means 
are these funds distributed? It is in this context of 
uncertainty that the issue of ‘usefulness’ arises, 
and the creative industries discourse is usually 
taken to represent a clear statement that this use 
has to be ultimately defined in economic terms. 
This report attempts to explore the current 
debates on this issue and to provide better 
grounds on which this legitimacy can be 
discussed. It tries to do so not by dismissing the 
arts or rejecting the creative industries, but by 
rethinking the two together. It does so in order 
to form a productive relationship that responds 
to the changing context within which artists, 
intermediaries and policy makers work.
Rather than isolate ‘the arts’ in a distinct policy 
space of public subsidy, or leave the creative 
industries in the realm of purely commercial 
industrial considerations, this report for the 
Australia Council proposes a productive 
collaboration of policy stakeholders in the arts and 
creative industries in order to create a new kind of 
creative industry strategy.
 
Summary
Chapter 2 discusses the emergence of art as a 
distinct area of life and the relation of this to wider 
transformations associated with capitalism and 
modernity. 
Chapter 3 explores the ‘art worlds’ of the 19th 
century city and the some of the debates to which 
this gave rise. It outlines the separation between 
‘art’ and ‘entertainment’ and the role of the market 
within this, but stresses that art too was organised 
around particular markets and economic contexts. 
It suggests also that whilst art was clearly part of 
the emergence of new middle class strategies of 
social distinction it was also part of a wider set of 
more democratic aspirations which are still with 
us.
Chapter 4 looks at the emergence of cultural 
policy and the role of arts within this. It suggests 
that art played a pre-eminent, though not 
exclusive, role within this new cultural policy, 
associated with the nation building project of 
the modern state. We also look at how the rise 
of both the cultural industries and modernist 
art undermined the unitary affirmative notion of 
the nation state. The chapter also discusses the 
emergence of public subsidy for the arts and the 
ways in which this in turn tended to fix ‘the arts’ 
within fairly conservative administrative boundaries 
which, in many ways, are still with us.
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Chapter 5 looks at popular culture in the 1960s 
and 1970s. It outlines the many challenges 
popular culture presented to a unitary national 
cultural policy and to certain elitist tendencies in 
the arts. At the same time this popular culture 
could also be seen as an extension of many the 
aspirations associated with art to wider sections of 
society. In the process cultural industries, popular 
culture and art began to intermingle in complex 
ways. The chapter looks at community arts and 
the rise of new kinds of cultural policy; in particular 
it charts the rise of ‘alternative cultures’ with an 
emergent economy linked to, but in friction with, 
both ‘the arts’ and large cultural industries. 
Chapter 6 directly addresses the emergence 
of ‘creativity’ and the ‘creative industries 
in the 1990s. It suggests that the creative 
industries combined arguments coming from 
the ‘information society’, Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurialism and innovation theory with 
those that suggested the increased economic 
importance of those sectors involved in 
the production of cultural goods. It looks at 
transformations in ideas of both creative work and 
creative consumption and explores arguments 
that the opposition between economics and 
culture was now over. The chapter looks in 
detail at some of the conflicts between creative 
industries theory and traditional notions of art and 
cultural policy, and between creative industries 
and earlier approaches to the cultural industries. 
It makes an argument for the distinctiveness and 
continued relevance of the notion of ‘art’. In doing 
so it suggests that art is not to be directly equated 
with ‘the arts’ as traditionally defined, but that it 
is closely intertwined with popular culture in such 
ways as to make this traditional distinction (high 
and low etc.) redundant. It concludes by assessing 
the policy landscape within which these debates 
have been engaged and the challenges for a new 
forward looking policy. 
Chapter 7 takes a detailed look at how the arts 
and creative industries have been defined by 
academics, consultants and policy makers. It 
argues that creativity is not an adequate way of 
identifying this particular sector. It also suggests 
that many of these definitional models reproduce 
distinctions between art and commerce, art 
and ‘entertainment’, art and functionality that 
are unhelpful. The chapter puts forward a broad 
schema of art-media-design within which we can 
think contemporary arts and creative industries 
policies. The chapter concludes by identifying in 
general terms in which such a policy might consist. 
1 Similarly, the demand that art be purely for itself can be deeply political act, whether in counter-reformation Italy, or Dickensian 
 utilitarian England, in Franco’s Spain, or Stalinist Russia. 
2 The Social production of Art. Basingstoke: Macmillan (1981); Aesthetics and the Sociology of Art. Basingstoke: Macmillan (1983)
3 Outside Literature. London: Routledge (1990)
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What is ‘art’?
The idea that art is rooted in particular social and 
historical circumstances, and that its nature and 
function change with those circumstances, is not 
at all new. In fact we might say that the modern 
idea of ‘art’ itself emerged at the same time as 
the modern idea of ‘history’ – in the 18th century. 
Both came from a recognition that the world 
changed and that customs, beliefs and institutions 
changed with them. The role of artists was to give 
new forms to these new times, knowing that they 
could draw on but not simply repeat the ‘classical’ 
forms of antiquity. The idea of art has complex 
links with ‘enlightenment’ and ‘modernity’ (a 
word not coined until mid-19th century, along with 
capitalism), both of which bring new conceptions 
of knowledge and history. The key point is that our 
own ideas of – and indeed the very words – ‘art’ 
and ‘artists’ emerged in quite recent historical 
circumstances. We cannot read our current ideas 
of art and artists back through history in the way 
that has been done by traditional art history; and 
we must also acknowledge our definitions might 
need to change. 
The symbolic practices which we call ‘art’ have 
historically been intertwined with ‘magic’ and 
‘religion’ (whose boundaries themselves are by 
no means hard and fast). Both of these involved 
ways of understanding the world and trying to 
change or affect it for human purposes. Ritual in 
this sense is a form of technology. In this sense 
too religion, science, art and technology (not to 
mention magic and alchemy) were part of the 
same attempt to understand and change the 
world, and they remained closely intertwined 
until the 18th century. Faculties of ‘the arts’ taught 
mathematics, astronomy, theology, ethics and so 
on well into the 17th century. The magician John 
Dee appointed by Elizabeth I used state of the 
art mathematics in his astrological charts just 
as Kepler, the great astronomer, applied himself 
to the alchemical tasks set by the Holy Roman 
Emperor Rudolf.
Symbolic forms and rituals were also used as 
‘social technologies’; religion did not just explain 
the world or attempt to sway obscure forces, it 
was also used to organise societies and set forth 
the principles on which they should work. The 
medieval church’s organisation and control of 
learning was accompanied by a sophisticated 
understanding of the social power of ritual as a 
form of heightened communication, using images, 
sounds, rhetoric and movement4. 
The word ‘art’ relates to ‘artefact’ and to ‘artisan’; 
it is a specific skill, or handicraft or technique, 
which in turn relates to the Greek techne, the root 
of our word technology. It is in this sense that 
we talk of the art of war, or diplomacy, or horse 
riding – difficult skills needing to be mastered. 
It is out of these various skills and forms of 
practice, often regulated by specific institutions 
such as guilds, that ‘the arts’ and ‘the artist’ as 
we understand them began to emerge in the 
15th and 16th centuries. This emergence however 
involved a process of separation of ‘the arts’ from 
many other social practices (such as science 
and religion, but also from ‘everyday life’) and of 
the ‘artist’ from mere artisans, handicraft and 
common labour. 
But before we jump to the conclusion that this 
is some elitism or humanist idealism, or that 
we can simply write this history in terms of the 
development of technology and division of labour 
– as with certain forms of innovation literature or 
evolutionary economics – we have to understand 
how those societies understood or rather lived 
their relationship to the spiritual and physical 
world. These societies were fundamentally 
different from our own: and just as reading 
symbolic artefacts for traces of ‘artistic’ merit is 
now seen as a-historical, so too we should resist 
reading them simply as containing the seeds of 
(or impediments to) future socio-technological 
advances. 
The uses of ‘art’ and the nature of those who 
produce it are embedded in their own particular 
social and cultural worlds; neither our ‘art’ nor our 
socio-technological ‘utility’ can be read back into 
these worlds. This applies as much to the ancient 
Greeks as it does to indigenous Australians. What 
this encounter should give rise to is the question: 
how, in our society, did art become separate from 
other forms of knowledge and practice?
The emergence of ‘art’
The answer is bound up with that of European 
capitalism and modernity. How it is bound up is 
crucial for current debates about the nature and 
function of art. There are five broad areas in which 
the emergence of art has been discussed.
Technology, media and society
The recognition of the profound impact of the 
Internet and digitalisation on contemporary society 
and culture underlined the crucial role played by 
Chapter 2
The emergence of art in modernity
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media. These new technological media do not just 
have consequences for the ‘transmission’ of art, 
at the same time they affect its content (‘medium 
is the message’). Not just content; the ways art 
has tried to understand and organise the world, its 
ways of making and doing, and thus its relations 
to the rest of culture and society, are challenged – 
some would say fatally.
We have already suggested that art/ritual/
religion/technology might be intertwined in other 
societies; how did they come to be separated and 
recombined to different effect in our own?
We can start with the key technological 
development, the establishment of the first printing 
press in 1450. Its impact is one of the touchstones 
of our culture, and is constantly invoked in current 
debates about the Internet. When Victor Hugo, in 
Notre Dame de Paris, wrote that the printing press 
was the cathedral of the modern age he was 
suggesting not just a technology of reproduction 
but a new way of organising our understanding of 
the world and our place within it. 
The printing press had its most basic impact on 
the control of information. Not only did it allow 
the flow of new and recovered learning we know 
as the Renaissance, the proliferation of copies 
of the bible (also increasingly translated into 
the vernacular) meant that the church could no 
longer mediate the word of God. The link between 
printing and the protestant reformation was that 
everybody and anybody could now read the bible. 
The local world of the cathedral, with its visual 
symbolics (including the shape and proportions 
of the building) gave an account of good and evil, 
the seasons, and the progress of life and death 
and beyond. Cathedrals and churches structured 
and punctuated local life. They gave way to the 
reading of books produced beyond the local 
horizon – previously a privilege of the priesthood 
and organised by the Church. The vernacular bible 
and growing literacy made feasible by printing 
(why would you read if there were no books) gave 
rise not only to the Reformation but also that 
expanded sphere of communication we see as the 
basis of modern democracy. 
The technology of printing gave rise to new social 
technologies. With the addition of woodcuts, and 
later engravings, printing facilitated the expansion 
of the technology of writing that had been a 
scarce and controlled resource since ancient 
Sumer. This was action at a distance, as Ricci the 
famous Jesuit missionary to China wrote: “the 
whole point of writing something down is that your 
voice will carry for thousands of miles, whereas in 
direct conversation it fades at a hundred paces”5. 
Printing took this to a new level; if it increased 
the democratic circulation of information, it also 
facilitated the establishment and management 
of those complex social entities we know as the 
nation-state. As such it also has to be linked to 
those other forms of communication with which 
they worked – roads, waterways, postal services, 
and the organised exchanges of the market 
economy.
But Hugo’s image recalls the famous line by Hegel 
that reading the morning paper is modern man’s 
substitute for Morning Prayer6. This suggests 
that the kind of social cohesion based on mass 
printing was very different from the collective 
participation of the Catholic Communion. Though 
public reading could remain oral and collective, 
the act of reading alone and in silence produces 
a distinct form of the subject, opening up an 
inwardness upon which much of our sense of the 
rational individual citizen is based. The challenge 
to established traditional sources of authority was 
thus also part of a new kind of social organisation 
that called for individuals with a new kind of 
subjectivity.
In this sense the new print media contributed to 
a radical transformation of European society and 
culture. 
Markets and commodities
The invention of printing had such an impact 
because of the prior emergence of a developed 
market economy in Europe. Guttenberg’s was a 
(failed) commercial operation, and the ‘book trade’ 
was always rooted in the market. The separation 
of ‘the arts’ into distinct practices thus takes place 
within the context of a new and expanding market 
for symbolic products.
Symbolic artefacts can be seen as part of a 
wider system of religion, magic and ritual, and as 
such they often had sacred qualities giving them 
a certain distance from everyday life. Benjamin 
called this sense of distance an ‘aura’. However, 
from Neolithic times there was trade or exchange 
of these artefacts. They formed part of what Arjun 
Appadurai calls a ‘gift economy’, exchanges of 
precious objects whose value was not based on 
a money equivalent – what we call commodity 
exchange – but on their wider social value7. 
Complex social codes governed the mutual giving 
and receiving of these singular objects. Such gift 
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economies marked much of the trade in symbolic 
artefacts up to the early modern period, where 
the rich and powerful would exchange precious 
objects (and sometimes precious artisans). But 
there was also a more commodity-based trade, in 
which symbolic artefacts were bought and sold for 
money in markets (often ‘decorative’ items such 
as metalwork, jewellery, glass and ceramics, and 
but also religious souvenirs). In fact bronze casting 
was the first mass reproduction technology, 
and medieval Chinese porcelain production was 
organised on what we would recognise as an 
industrial scale. Printing took its place in existing 
gift and commodity markets, books and prints as 
‘precious’ objects operating across both markets 
for many centuries. 
It is important to distinguish between markets 
and capitalism. Markets, in which commodities 
were exchanged for money, existed in some 
form since the first cities emerged around 8000 
BC. China had the world’s most developed and 
sophisticated market economy until the late 18th 
century; Islam dominated world trade and ran 
some of the largest commodity markets. None 
of these were capitalist. Nor were the market 
economies that began to emerge in Europe from 
the 12th century and which, by the time of the 
printing press, had become extensive, complex 
and locked into continental and global flows of 
trade and production. As these market economies 
developed and the population got wealthier the 
trade in precious and luxury goods began to grow. 
This included ‘artistic’ or symbolic goods such 
as books, paintings, prints, sculptures, bronzes, 
medallions, glazed ceramics, along with theatrical 
and musical performances, secular festivals, 
celebrations and pageants, new and varied 
buildings, interior decoration, frescos, panelling 
– products not just of the secular culture of 
Renaissance humanism, but also of the massive 
organisations of Church and State which also 
used these new forms of display, communication, 
control and prestige. 
These markets were characterised by direct 
patronage, where a craftsman, musician or 
painter was employed on a long-term basis, or 
by direct commissions on a one-off basis, or 
sometimes by more speculative commercial 
enterprises such as Elizabethan theatre or 
large scale printing initiatives. Rarely was an 
artist faced by ‘the public’ as represented by 
‘the market’ as in the 19th century. This rapid 
development of the market in symbolic goods 
had a profound effect on the organisation of 
production. The medieval craftsman was more 
or less anonymous and highly regulated by the 
guilds and church in terms of skills, quality and 
content. The growing market saw an increased 
demand for skilled craftsmen who now had 
more autonomy from guilds and could demand 
larger sums of money. They could set up their 
own studios and workshops and introduce new 
divisions and hierarchies of labour. In certain 
trades – especially those associated with what 
were to become the ‘fine arts’ of painting, 
sculpture, poetry and architecture – this new 
autonomy and hierarchy was accompanied by a 
change in status, from artisan to artist.
The labour of the artist was increasingly seen as 
a different kind to that of mere ‘mechanicals’. The 
growing prestige of the arts meant that those 
who supplied these artistic goods also shared 
in this prestige. Just as the new elites separated 
themselves from manual labour so too artistic 
labour was now to be of a different order. They 
could draw on [humanist] authors such as Vasari 
who, in his The Lives of the Great Artists (1550), 
saw the new Renaissance artists as engaged 
not in work but in creation and possessed of a 
visionary faculty that set them apart. This applied 
to different art forms in different ways – poets, 
painters and sculptures came first, musicians were 
latecomers, and actors never got a look in. Not 
only did it downgrade the manual skills of artisans 
but also ‘female’ crafts were now restricted to the 
domestic sphere. 
The autonomy of artists was not just about their 
growing financial independence vis-à-vis patrons 
it was also about the kind of art they produced. 
The history of art gives a narrative of artistic 
vision struggling to free itself from the confines 
of authority and tradition. However, though there 
are clear exceptions, this was less a conscious 
challenge to authority than a claim to autonomy in 
their work. It was over the illegitimate interference 
in the work of the artist on his materials, rather 
than explicit ideological content, that artists 
rubbed against external authority. In this way, 
though taking his distance from craftsmanship 
and techne, there remains that sense of a job 
well done, of fitness for purpose, of faithfulness 
to the demands of the material that marked the 
craftsman. In this sense the position of artist 
always kept open its links with the artisans; 
indeed, artisans saw their own aspirations 
reflected in the work of the great artists. 
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Both artists and artisans were to face in different 
ways the challenges of the industrial revolution 
in which ‘technology’ became linked to the 
maximisation of profit and the ‘subjugation’ of 
nature. In his critique of technology as domination 
of the world, Heidegger looks back to an older 
notion of techne that accepts and respects the 
given materiality of the world, a notion of respectful 
artisanship incarnated in art8. Similarly ‘artistic 
work’, so different from manual labour, become 
an ideal of meaningful work, where hand, eye and 
brain work together in close correspondence with 
the material it transforms. More recently ‘creative 
labour’ – work so meaningful and autonomous it 
is hardly work – once the preserve of an elite is 
now held out as the aspirational norm for modern 
employment.
Social differentiation, consumption 
and distinction
Where was the demand for artistic products 
coming from? The growth of the market economy 
in Western Europe had, by the 16th century, 
produced a growing market for ‘luxury goods’ 
amongst states, princes, nobility, clerics and the 
urban elite. By the early 18th century, production 
for such markets formed part of what economists 
have called the ‘industrious  
revolution’ – highly developed markets involving 
various degrees of capital outlay and domestic 
labour employed by piece work on basic 
technology. It was a market society Adam Smith 
would recognise and equally marked the global 
economic giant China. In one sense the ‘fine 
arts’ along with the decorative arts of ceramics, 
metalwork, glass and textiles, merely responded 
to this growth in demand. But there were other 
dynamics at work.
The emergence of Renaissance humanism in 15th 
century Italy was part of a wider change of society 
and ‘manners’ that Norbert Elias called The 
Civilising Process9. In Elias’ account this change 
includes the ‘pacification’ of feudal society – the 
expulsion of violent conduct to the margins of 
society (to warfare) and to the creation of new 
kinds of subjects able to control their emotions 
and conduct themselves in ways conducive to 
civilised (and this usually meant urban) interaction. 
This shift can be related to the rise of capitalist 
markets and trade (which demanded new legal 
forms of regulation and redress as well as ‘rational’ 
behaviour), the growth of cities (close proximity) 
and to the new power of the Absolutist State that 
wished to monopolise violence, and resulted in 
the separation of ‘courtly society’ from the rough 
manners and customs of those around them. This 
‘civilising process’ worked on everyday behaviour 
or ‘manners’ - not fighting, not swearing, not 
blowing your nose or pissing in public. But it also 
emphasised learning and ‘the arts’. In such a way 
the practice or appreciation of the arts – poetry, 
dancing, music, architecture (and town planning), 
painting and sculpture – became an essential 
attribute of the civilised man. These practices 
distinguished the social elites and also brought 
prestige and legitimacy to rulers and states. 
The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu sees 
this new form of distinction at the very origin of 
the modern notion of art, expressed by Vasari10. 
The wealthy and powerful use art to distinguish 
themselves from the common mass culturally as 
well as in terms of money and power. Parallel with 
the growth in the market we can see the extension 
of such prestige function – ‘cultural’ as opposed 
to ‘economic capital’ in Bourdieu’s terms – to 
the growing bourgeoisie of the towns and cities 
of Western Europe. However, there were other 
currents that complicate this. The bourgeoisie did 
not simply follow the nobility, they insisted on their 
own definition of culture. To the display of wealth 
and power which marked the great chateaus and 
villas, the Baroque churches, the pageants and 
spectacles, the huge tapestries and paintings – 
they stressed a form of inwardness, plain speaking 
and truth separate from religious and secular 
power. This can certainly be seen as part of the 
game of distinction – the art of the elite is fake and 
shallow, ours is the authentic. But the game of 
social distinction had political consequences. 
Politics and the public sphere
Contesting the legitimacy of rulers and elites in 
setting the standards of artistic practice is linked 
with the wider political contestation whereby 
‘society’ claimed autonomy from the state. 
Modern political theory dates from the 16th century 
and was concerned with the respective roles 
of civil society and the state. The emergence of 
both the idea and the material foundations of the 
public sphere (newspapers, clubs, coffee houses, 
salons, etc.) over the next two centuries saw 
‘opinion’ enshrined as a force which could subject 
government to the judgment of rational open 
debate. But if the ‘public sphere’ could be seen as 
crucial to modern democracy it was also in part 
where the ‘autonomy’ of art was registered. 
Developing technologies of production and 
reproduction, new forms of transport, a 
growing market economy and new forms of 
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communication and social assembly allowed new 
ideas of ‘public opinion’ to take hold. This public 
opinion – organised around particular locales 
but also extending across educated Europe, 
with its critics, newspapers, meeting rooms and 
academies – gave an alternative source of artistic 
value to that of elite patronage. It formed the basis 
of what came to be known at the end of the 17th 
century as ‘taste’. Taste was not just about social 
distinction but also deeply political. 
The heated debates on ‘taste’ was in part a 
defensiveness on the part of social elites about the 
extension of artistic and (what had previously been) 
luxury consumption to classes they considered 
unqualified – just as the aristocracy had earlier 
attempted to stop social mobility by introducing strict 
(though rarely enforced) dress codes or ‘sumptuary’ 
laws. But it also involved the claims of ‘society’ 
against the state. The Earl of Shaftesbury, often 
credited as one of the originators of ‘aesthetics’, 
was following the ‘liberal’ John Locke in asserting 
the primacy of the former over the latter. Society 
‘contracted’ the state to keep order but in many 
respects civil society was capable of regulating 
itself. ‘Taste’ was one such area where the free play 
of civil society could define the acceptable and the 
unacceptable – it did not need the state to regulate. 
Of course, Tony Bennett, following Terry Eagleton11, 
is correct in showing how the ability to exercise 
taste is restricted to an elite bourgeois ‘society’. 
The theorists of this British ‘civic humanism’ argued 
only those with an income sufficient for leisure 
and education were able to exercise responsible 
judgement. The labouring classes, driven by 
the necessity of work and lack of time, are thus 
disqualified. 
The exercise of taste was linked therefore to that 
of responsible citizenship; taste was not just some 
form of appropriate manners or knowledge of 
the arts, it involved a programme for new kind 
of subjectivity. Hegel’s image of the newspaper 
reading bourgeois at Morning Prayer was a 
new kind of individual who had to be made, 
or rather self-made. Foucault’s account of the 
construction of modern states, based on a shift 
from a ‘repressive’ to an active ‘productive’ notion 
of power, involved the creation of subjects that 
needed to ‘work’ on themselves, to internalise 
power not just follow external rules and 
prohibitions12. This was of course a softer side to 
the harsher discipline aimed at the lower classes. 
But it shows how taste in this civic humanist 
tradition is linked to the project of education – not 
just ‘manners’ for society but a fitness to exercise 
responsible political judgement. As modern writers 
have pointed out, this has both its democratic and 
exclusionary or disciplinary sides, which we are 
still working through today. Through a long line of 
thinkers, including Mathew Arnold and F.R. Leavis, 
it continues to inform the rationale on which 
an education in the arts is deemed essential to 
modern democracies. 
Thus, for example, whilst the novel can be seen 
as reflective of ‘the rise of the bourgeoisie’ in both 
its form and its content, it has more recently been 
seen more in terms of how it carved out a new 
space of subjectivity, of interiority. Lynn Hunt, 
for example, has shown how the idea of ‘human 
rights’, emerging at the end of the 18th century, 
grew out of the human ‘sympathy’ stimulated 
within the emotional interiority of the novel reading 
public13. This became a central claim of humanist 
education. 
In Germany the growth of a science of aesthetics 
in the mid-18th century was closely linked to the 
middle class refusal of the right of an autocratic 
state to define the parameters of taste. Kant’s 
systemisation of this refusal in his Critique of 
Judgement laid the foundation for a new kind 
of state educational programme based, in part, 
on individual development through Kultur14. This 
self-development or bildung tradition relates 
back to British thinking through Coleridge and 
others in a process famously traced by Raymond 
Williams in Culture and Society. The key point here 
is that art has been part of strategies of social 
distinction, but it has also formed part of the 
political discourse of the self-governing subject 
that has underpinned the educational and cultural 
strategies of the modern state. 
Aesthetics, knowledge, modernity
In Distinction Bourdieu suggests that Kantian 
aesthetics, the study of art as sensible perception, 
established ‘disinterest’ as the main basis of its 
appreciation. According to this model, art does 
not excite the appetites or the will but exists to 
be received in a state of disinterested pleasure. 
The charge is that this is a continuation of 
Shaftesbury’s idea – that the servitude of work 
makes aesthetic disinterest impossible for the 
lower classes. Bourdieu sees this in contemporary 
distinctions between the working classes who look 
to functional or ethical qualities (a good likeness, 
skill, evoking ‘good’ emotions) and the middle 
class who value art’s separateness from all social 
function – found above all in abstract classical 
music. In masking the social basis of art through 
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‘disinterest’ they deny the real social (educational, 
economic, cultural) qualifications for it; ‘the art 
galleries are free, therefore the working classes only 
deny access to themselves’. The second charge 
(though this is less marked in Bourdieu) is that 
the emphasis on ‘disinterest’ removes aesthetic 
appreciation from the lower faculties of appetite 
towards the higher ones of mind. This distinction 
is then read onto the social body, where the lower 
orders and their ‘entertainments’ are driven by 
bodily pleasures whereas the middle class rest on 
mindful contemplation free from such appetites. 
This opposition can be found at its strongest in the 
contemporary opposition of ‘popular’ to ‘classical’ 
music.
There is clearly some truth in both these charges, 
as art became part of a middle class way of 
life and used to mark itself off from the ‘vulgar’ 
lower classes. But it is only partly true, and 
we shall discuss this more below. The idea of 
the ‘aesthetic’ is not just a construction and 
legitimation of bourgeois taste but part of a wider 
re-organisation of knowledge and production, of 
‘making and doing’. 
We can outline this by looking at the shift between 
medieval and modern ways of ‘making and 
doing’. Forms of knowledge and practice (religion, 
science, ritual, art) inseparable in the Christian 
middle ages began, in early modern times, to 
separate out. Thomas Aquinas saw Euclidian 
geometry as a route into the divine order laid out 
by God for us to discover. Writing in the mid-13th 
century he became anxious at the thought that 
objective knowledge might be separated from 
other aspects of the human being: “Provided a 
geometer makes a true demonstration, it is of 
no importance how he stands in regard to his 
appetitive part, whether he be joyful or angry”. 
This objectification of the external world was 
famously outlined by Descartes 300 years later 
in his Discourse on Method. The only undeniably 
existing thing, and the basis on which all other 
truths were to be built, was the self: cogito ergo 
sum. The internal world of consciousness was 
radically severed from the mechanical external 
world; the formers task was simply to uncover 
the objective laws of this world. 
But when the Renaissance humanist and architect 
Alberti wrote ‘man is the measure of all things’ he 
was also referring to man’s productive capacity, 
his ability to create the world. Aquinas had man 
taking his measure from the divine; by what 
principles was man now to create measure both 
for the world and for himself? This was the basic 
question of the 18th century Enlightenment, as it 
slowly emerged from the scholastic metaphysics 
of the middle ages. What constituted knowledge; 
how did it relate to the passions and the will; on 
what basis did man give measure to his own 
actions in a self-created world? 
Kant’s first and second critiques15 were attempts 
to ground knowledge and morality in a Newtonian 
universe with no divinely revealed theological 
principles. They established the categories of 
perception and understanding on which our 
knowledge of the world was based, and the 
rationally based universal principle on which all 
morality should be founded. What then were those 
forms of sensory perception that gave pleasure 
– the arts – and yet did not seem part of either 
morality or knowledge?
Kant’s engagement with aesthetic theory related 
to the debate above as to whether civil society 
or the state should legislate taste. The German 
philosopher Baumgarten, seen as founding 
aesthetics in his book of 1750, suggested that 
‘the arts’ involved a specific form of knowledge 
– the poetic, the beautiful – that could not be 
subsumed under Reason. Rejecting the notion 
put forward by the official philosophers of the 
Prussian state that art was merely the attractive 
clothing through which lesser intellects came 
to rational understanding, he suggested that, 
through beauty, the senses had their own distinct 
form of knowledge – aesthetics means precisely 
‘pertaining to the senses’. 
In the early 20th century the sociologist Max Weber 
suggested that a distinguishing characteristic of 
modern society was the separation of spheres – 
economic, legal, political, and aesthetic – each 
with its own autonomous laws. What then was the 
aesthetic sphere that seemed to be neither about 
morality or objective truth? Speaking of the impact 
of classical mythology on European art, Malcolm 
Bull writes: 
“whatever way you looked at it, the renaissance 
had fostered a third category between the true 
and the false, namely that of images which were 
acknowledged to be false but were nevertheless 
admissible…Culture could no longer operate on 
the assumption that its content was true" 16.
The space of this third category was fabula, 
invention – the creative imagination that extended 
beyond the reach of reason. 
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Such fabula – a ‘mass of chimeras, daydreams, 
and absurdities’ – were ‘admissible’ under 
certain conditions. Since the Renaissance, these 
conditions were set by the forms and functions 
of the different ‘fine arts’ (painting, sculpture, 
poetry, theatre etc.) which, following Aristotle, 
allowed these ‘neither true nor untrue’ inventions 
to be justified by their wider social function (moral 
lessons, allegory, catharsis, etc.). The ‘fine arts’ 
were also organised as a hierarchy based on the 
‘nobility’ of their themes, images and forms (poetry 
was the highest, music the lowest). Aesthetics 
shifted the emphasis from the hierarchy of forms 
to the senses themselves, to a particular mode of 
apprehending the world. Instead of the different 
‘arts’ we get ‘art’: a singular “sensible mode of 
being”17 shared by all artistic products.
‘Aesthetic art’ demanded a particular orientation 
or disposition associated with the new forms of 
subjectivity we have been discussing. The ability 
to display this capacity would become a form 
of social distinction, but this ‘disinterestedness’ 
also referred to a way of apprehending the 
world differently to that of the abstract universal 
knowledge produced by modern scientific 
reason. A fundamental claim of aesthetic theory 
was that rather than establish general laws 
which abstract from all particular instances – the 
method of modern science – ‘art’ creates singular, 
sensuous forms which embody a universal truth. 
Fabula does not simply apprehend the world; it 
is a productive power which creates new forms 
and new worlds that are not part of objective 
knowledge (they are neither true or untrue) nor 
subject to ordinary moral laws. 
If both British ‘civic humanism’ and Kant in their 
different ways looked to fix the autonomous 
productivity of aesthetic sensibility within socially 
agreed ‘taste’18, ‘aesthetic art’ in the 19th and 20th 
century constantly undermined these confines 
with a dynamism of invention that disturbed 
each new attempt to fix a tradition or canon. This 
crossing of boundaries does not just transgress 
the fixed forms and content of art; it also crossed 
those that sought to fix the limits of the aesthetic 
sphere itself. Art constantly crossed over into life, 
using the most mundane or vulgar aspects of 
this life and subjecting them to a different kind of 
gaze19.
It is often argued by economists and artists alike 
– that ‘art’ is a remnant from a feudal/aristocratic 
age, operating on a time lag in a modern capitalist 
society. Its ‘resistance’ to (or ‘drag on’ if you like) 
modern society was seen as an assertion of older 
values (human/elitist) left behind by social and 
economic change. The opposite is in fact the 
case: ‘art’ came into being at the same time as 
capitalist modernity, as a distinct set of practices 
whose awkward critical tendencies are part of that 
divided modernity in which we still live. 
A only a few years after Descartes, in the late 17th 
century when the economic and artistic energies 
of civil society were coming into their ascendency 
in France and Britain, the critic and librettist 
Fontenelle wrote: 
“If reason governed the world nothing would 
happen. Sailors most fear tranquil seas where they 
are becalmed, and they want wind even if it brings 
a gale. Amongst men, the passions are the winds 
that put everything in motion, though they often 
cause storms”20.
Art also has its share in the production of 
modernity, contributing to and trying to mitigate this 
new world in which ‘all that is solid melts into air’.
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Chapter 3
Art and industry: production, 
distinction, discontent
Art worlds
It is often argued that in the 19th century art and 
industry were separate entities, never the twain 
to meet. This problem was sometimes held to 
stem from ‘art’ – haughtily placing itself above 
the material concerns of everyday life – and 
sometimes from ‘industry’ – which bought into 
the art ideology itself, trying to justify itself through 
cultural philanthropy or sending its children into 
the ‘aristocratic’ liberal arts21. But it is not clear if 
this was a gratuitous separation – John Holden 
argues they were easily united in the 18th century22 
– or more structural, related to a particular form 
of mass industrial production – as John Hartley 
seems to suggest23. Is the rise of the creative 
industries a reunion of what was falsely rent 
asunder or a socio-economic shift suggesting 
a new kind of relationship between art, culture, 
industry and everyday life?
In the sense in which we now often use ‘industry’ 
to mean a more or less coherent and coordinated 
mobilisation of various physical and human 
resources and the creation and distribution of 
economic value therein – as in the ‘security 
industry’, ‘health industry’ or ‘sex industry’ – then 
‘art’ was an industry. The ‘art industry’ emerged 
as a particular set of structures and practices 
very distinct from those of the new factory based 
industrial activity of early 19th century England. 
Indeed, it is this difference which gives the force 
to creative industry arguments; not that the last 
200 years were some sort of aberration but that 
the sorts of practices associated with the arts 
now offered mainstream industry a powerful set of 
models and inputs – if they would only listen. This 
also comes with the rider that art, too, must drop 
its historical prejudices against industry. 
Nevertheless, ‘art industry’ is restrictive in its 
description of how these structured practices hang 
together; in 1984 Howard Becker instead used 
the term ‘art worlds’24. As with many in the same 
period (see above) he was concerned to break with 
the idea of art as the work of the singular genius 
speaking a universal language and tried to show 
the dense networks of collaboration and divisions 
of labour involved in even the simplest artistic 
product. Traditional art history, he suggested, with 
its emphasis on the individual artist, has tended 
to occlude this fact. The ‘art worlds’ of the 19th 
and 20th centuries are thus inconceivable without 
those complex developments in technology, 
markets, social distinction, politics and aesthetics 
associated with emergence of modernity. 
Take ‘classical’ music, for example, a defining 
image of ‘western art’ in the last two centuries. 
The symphony orchestra demanded new 
levels of instrumental craftsmanship based 
on technological innovation and industrial 
standardisation, underpinning the possibility 
of a global circulation of (and thus market for) 
music repertoires (a clarinet in Melbourne was 
expected to be the same as that in Shanghai). The 
piano was the most complex piece of machinery 
most domestic houses were likely to encounter 
– certainly the most bulky. By the 1820s piano 
production in Europe – especially London – was 
organised on industrial lines, with factory-like 
divisions of labour and innovations (such as the 
upright) targeted at new domestic consumers. 
From the 1840s pianos and orchestras could 
move more freely on railways and international 
shipping lanes, co-ordinated by sophisticated 
postal services and telegraphs. 
Sheet music production began to improve and 
innovate from the end of the 18th century, allowing 
for the circulation of orchestral parts, stimulating 
domestic piano playing, and becoming the first 
part of what we now call the ‘music industry’ to 
commercialise around mass reproduction. By 
midcentury a popular song could sell upwards of 
200,000 copies. Around sheet music emerged 
new copyright laws and practices, with performing 
rights lagging behind. Only in the early 20th century 
was sheet music replaced by gramophone 
recordings (and piano rolls)25. 
The biggest technology of the 19th century involved 
the rapid growth of the new cities, and it is within 
these that the explosion of music practice took 
place. The informal spaces of the 18th century public 
sphere, such as assembly rooms and pleasure 
gardens, were transformed, opening up to new 
urban (paying) publics. They were joined by the 
new public infrastructures of the reforming industrial 
cities. Concert halls, recital rooms and opera 
houses; museums, libraries and galleries; parks, 
boulevards, public squares, exhibition palaces and 
town halls; department stores and hotel lobbies; 
ballrooms, cafes and restaurants – these became 
the basic facilities for any city wanting to be regarded 
as modern and cultured, and as such they were 
exported not just to the provinces but to 
the colonies. 
The ability of forty or so professional musicians 
(able to make a living) to assemble, with their 
expensive instruments, trained to international 
standards (by teachers and standardised 
Arts and creative industries: a historical overview 43
textbooks), in a designated place at a designated 
time, in the same costume; financed by sale 
of tickets to a public who also turn up at the 
right time (having read about it in one of the 
newspapers) suitably attired and behaving as they 
should, with a requisite knowledge of musical 
codes and composers (having perhaps seen 
their engraved and later photographic image and 
biographical snippets in the newspaper also); 
and to engage in the co-ordinated performance 
of extremely complex non-traditional music (most 
works under a decade old) involving very specific 
individual musical parts, under the command 
of a conductor whom they might not have 
previously met – this was the kind of technological, 
administrative and cultural complexity that was 
utterly incomprehensible (amazing, bizarre) to 
non-western societies. 
Similar things could be said for painting, publishing 
and theatre. These were complex activities calling 
for technological, economic and cultural divisions 
of labour that took a whole century to fully emerge. 
New levels of professionalisation as well as new 
kinds of professions emerged. Impresarios, 
publishers, dealers – all facilitated the functions of 
these new markets for artistic goods. In Worldly 
Goods Lisa Jardine gives an account of the 
Renaissance in which the price of everything was 
both known and often specified in advance; this 
and that amount of precious colour, this and that 
size, these many apprentices26. By the 19th century 
artists had achieved some autonomy from this, 
but the price of the labour and materials involved 
in artistic goods was clear to all in societies of 
material scarcity. Beethoven’s letters are full of 
demands for payment, for commissions promised 
or unpaid, of talk about expense and anger at 
dodgy publishers. As countless plays, novels and 
memoires make clear, the artist’s life for most was 
one in which money and poverty loomed large. 
It is also clear that these new markets for artistic 
goods became differentiated and segmented, 
and that these markets and the intermediaries 
who attempted to direct and profit from them 
had a growing impact on what kinds of artistic 
goods got produced, and that certain aspects 
of both the goods and the artist associated 
within them became singled out and promoted 
(‘commodified’) as part of the appeal to these 
markets. Dickens’ novels were produced within 
a market created by newspaper and magazine 
serials; the classic three part novel was a product 
of the profit strategies of the publishing industry. 
However, artistic products were not simple 
commodities as we now understand the term. 
They were not goods with clear functional 
value exchangeable for specific sums of money 
determined by the market-price mechanism 
of neo-classical economics. Their non-market 
or ‘intrinsic’ value derived from the fact that 
their price was set within a wider socio-cultural 
dynamic not driven by markets27. Art worlds, in 
extremely complex ways, set the values which 
determine the value of artistic products. They 
operate within cultural and artistic conventions, 
codes of meaning that have deep social roots. 
They operate within systems of meanings set by 
arts schools, universities, journals, newspapers, 
critics, professional associations, and public 
agencies. The markets of an art world are a long 
way from the expressed preferences of the neo-
classical consumer – they work within a wider 
system of values, which assigns value to non-
functional goods. 
Distinction
Becker’s account, despite its rootedness in 
everyday production, is rather a-historical – 
accepting the emergence of art as such – and he 
treats art worlds, whether ‘high’ (e.g. modernist 
art) or ‘low’ (stereography, cowboy art) as 
exemplifying the same dynamics in a rather 
pluralist manner. But a major current of the ‘social 
critique’ of art since the 1960s – exemplified 
by Pierre Bourdieu’s work – suggests a more 
systematic organisation of these ‘art worlds’, 
and indeed the art world writ large, around the 
class distinction strategies of the bourgeoisie. 
From the end of the 18th century the bourgeoisie 
used the ideology and practices of art to give 
their economic domination a new legitimacy. 
Their particular interests were dressed up in the 
language of universal cultural values. Jurgen 
Habermas, the theorist of the 18th century public 
sphere, argues that the bourgeoisie separated 
themselves out from and became pre-eminent 
within this sphere in the 19th century28. They set 
the content and tone of that century. 
Historians have argued that the middle classes 
began to take hold of the performance spaces 
of the 18th century and impose a new kind 
of discipline, of silent, motionless, ‘serious’ 
contemplation, excluding the noise and bustle of 
the old entertainments of aristocratic and popular 
cultures. Di Maggio, for example, has shown how 
a particular ‘concert going public’ and repertoire 
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was formed in 19th century Boston, allowing the 
middle classes to claim a distinction based on its 
cultural capital29. Serious art music, like serious 
literature, theatre, art and sculpture, becomes the 
possession of the middle classes and marked 
off against, not so much vulgar popular culture 
– which was beyond the pale or romanticised as 
‘folk’ – but the new urban commercial cultures 
increasingly called ‘popular’ that used many of the 
forms of ‘serious’ culture but to commercial ends. 
The distain for operetta, the ‘penny dreadfuls’ 
and ‘illustrated magazines’, for cheap prints and 
photographic images and so on was part of the 
‘policing’ of the legitimate boundaries of cultural 
distinction. These boundaries, it was claimed 
by many in cultural studies, were reproduced in 
the new 19th century education system and the 
development of curricula used to inculcate the 
notion of the artistic canon as well as to erect 
hidden barriers to its access for those outside the 
middle classes30.
In this context the opposition of ‘art’ to ‘industry’ 
acquires the overtones of 18th century civic 
humanism: those who have the material means 
to acquire culture disdain and disqualify those 
who do not have these means, along with that 
part of the bourgeoisie who actually engage in the 
production of these material means. It links to that 
aristocratic disdain of ‘trade’ and the display of art 
as luxury which many bourgeois elites adopted. 
Art becomes a hypocritical veil thrown around 
the piano legs of a material and vulgar world; it 
becomes the sign of a noble soul too sensitive for 
an ignoble industry. 
All these things happened as a matter of 
historical fact. And in a new society such as 
Australia, where older social distinctions had 
to be vigorously asserted rather than naturally 
assumed, the machinery of cultural distinction 
was plainly visible – exemplified maybe in the 
image of the piano as harbinger of cultured 
civilisation. But it has become a new orthodoxy, 
an a-historical caricature of a complex and 
contradictory historical process, which has 
debilitating consequences for contemporary 
cultural policy. 
A new public
First, this process of distinction and the social 
and cultural structures within which it was 
exercised (including the inhabited subjective 
worlds of those who exercise it) had to be 
created, to be won, in an uncertain historical 
process. The kind of class consciousness which 
Bourdieu and others take for granted was not 
created over-night (as E.P. Thompson showed 
for the English working class31). Beethoven’s 
music was produced for a new kind of public. 
No longer aimed at the restricted ‘society’ of an 
aristocratic elite it emerged alongside the new 
claim, made by the 1789 French Revolution, that 
‘the people’ truly represented society. This new 
‘public’ was the people in their deliberative glory, 
and it is in their new language that Beethoven’s 
symphonies – much longer, more muscular and 
rhetorical, involving more instruments intended 
for much bigger performance venues (hence his 
constant demands on technology and technique) 
– tried to speak. It was the same public that the 
revolutionary French painter David attempted to 
address. As Adorno wrote, whoever does not hear 
the revolutionary bourgeoisie in the fifth symphony 
does not understand Beethoven. This struggle 
to speak to the public as ‘the people’ continued 
until the mid-19th century. It marked social realism 
and painters such as Courbet as well as writers 
such as Hugo, Heine and Sand. If the bourgeoisie 
came to see themselves as the exemplary public 
then many artists tried to either recall them to 
their roots (something found in Hugo but also 
in Dickens) or sought to connect instead to the 
working classes. That is, at no point in the 19th 
century did the domination of the ‘public’ by the 
middle classes go unchallenged.
As a result, and despite middle class attempts 
to define and dominate it, ‘the public’ could be 
an unknown and often fearful entity. Strategies 
of distinction operated against the expansion of 
the artistic market that seemed to offer access 
to any with money; against the market tendency 
to segment this public, rendering it opaque, 
ambiguous and elusive. In the new cities the 
middle class public had to distinguish itself 
from the urban crowds whose very mobility and 
unreadability threatened fixed social distinctions. 
This fear of the crowd, exemplified in the urban 
artistic and entertainment markets from mid-
century, strongly marks middle class attempts to 
define the public precisely because of the jostling 
and pressing of the modern city. This shift can be 
seen between two French contemporaries. Victor 
Hugo communicated with his reading public as an 
orator might the ancient republican crowd-people, 
calling them to social solidarity; Baudelaire’s public 
was the atomised mass of urban consumers to 
whom the artist, like the whore, was forced to sell 
his wares.
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Art worlds and popular culture
Second, though ‘policed’, the boundaries between 
art worlds and popular cultures were fluid and 
permeable. Older unruly popular cultures had 
been increasingly ‘civilised’ by the disciplinary 
regime of the new factories and industrial cities, 
and art spoke to the mind not vulgar bodily 
appetite. But from mid-century a market for 
entertainment and light art had emerged in 
the cities, and by the end, this was part of an 
international circuit. In the 18th century ‘popular’ 
was used in relation to a generalised taste; by 
mid-19th century the divisions between art and 
entertainment were emerging around the market; 
it was only towards the end of the 19th century that 
‘popular’ came to be defined as that which sold a 
lot and that therefore ‘popular’ had to mean of little 
artistic merit. But these were not fixed separate 
worlds, and it is precisely their juxtaposition which 
made for vigorous efforts to distinguish them. 
The forms of the new commercial popular cultures 
were often drawn from artistic models, though 
they were also subject to irony and parody. Many 
composers, musicians, writers, artists worked 
across the lines; some complained, others did 
not. Virtuosi from serious music became popular 
stars – as they remained until the 1960s. Film 
music was ‘applied’ classical music from the 
piano accompanists in silent film until the 1960s; 
photography constantly looked to artistic models 
(especially in pornography); interior design, 
ceramics, jewellery and so on also responded 
to art worlds, as did department store window 
dressing and emergent advertising. The line 
between popular and literary books could be very 
fine (hence attempts to make it bolder), as witness 
the careers of Wells and Kipling. In fact, until the 
end of the 19th century, the middle classes were 
the market, and certainly its most lucrative part: 
the lines between commercial and serious art 
were being drawn within the middle class. Thus 
artistic works constantly migrated to popular 
culture – operetta, Viennese waltzes, historical 
novels (Dumas fils), paintings of Roman peasant 
girls or Dutch interiors and so on. Historical work 
over the last forty years has uncovered how 
these art and popular culture worlds overlap 
and exchange. Likewise, ‘popular artists’ kept 
in touch with ‘high art’, even in areas such as 
Jazz, which seemed to many to involve a radical 
break. Alex Ross details how avant-garde figures 
such as Mahler, Strauss and Schoenberg would 
flock to Puccini premiers: Italian opera itself is 
an enduring case of popular ‘serious’ music32. 
The entry of commercial popular forms into ‘high 
culture’ is complex; they appear as subjects in 
novels, paintings, and music (think of Zola or the 
Impressionists, or the use of waltzes and other 
dances in symphonies) but only perhaps at the 
very end of the 19th century are they used to 
disrupt established aesthetics – the cabaret art of 
Montmartre, Cubism’s collages, Mahler’s use of 
popular tunes and similar borrowings in modernist 
novels.
Art and democracy
Third, the notion of a serious art different to 
commercial entertainment was not restricted 
to the middle classes, nor was the aspiration to 
acquire it. Values associated with art and learning 
had been fundamental to many popular religious 
and political movements since the Protestant 
Reformation. A long tradition of radical artisan 
learning can be found in Europe and North 
America, and was to strongly mark colonial 
cultures. The value of ‘great art’ and literature 
embodied in the ‘canon’, whose popularity was 
held to transcend any monetary commercial 
success, animates these popular traditions just 
as much as the bourgeois art ideologues. These 
values were present, for example, in British 
Chartism, as it was in the later trades union and 
socialist movements of Europe and North America 
and could be found in the various workers 
education movements and institutions that flowed 
from these. They underlay the immense popularity 
and prestige of John Ruskin and poets such as 
Walt Whitman as well as the more political works 
of William Morris, or later Jack London, or Henry 
Lawson. The 20th century labour movement was 
animated not by an assault on art, but claims for 
its democratisation, for the ability of all to enjoy the 
fruits of human culture and learning. 
These movements might enjoy popular 
entertainments – though many activists frowned at 
them as either frivolous or pernicious distractions 
from the political task at hand – but they did not 
seek to collapse the lines between these and 
‘art’. That these workers movements considered 
art as a part of a wider set of moral and political 
values is clear in the powerful role art played in 
the educational aspirations of the lower middle 
and working classes in the 20th century. Jonathon 
Rose equates the intellectual life of the British 
working classes with the autodidact tradition; 
most of the working classes and lower middle 
classes (the ‘clerks’) had to educate themselves 
in the face of hostile or patronising treatment. 
The aspirations were not just to individual 
betterment but also to wider social democratic 
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claims. There were also new occupational 
positions in working class ‘art worlds’ linked to 
the institutions of expanding education, working 
class movements and other social reformist 
initiatives, and these would support many new 
kinds of cultural practices – workers literature, 
painting and music making. Rose also shows 
how many of the autodidacts ended up in the 
new commercial worlds of publishing and theatre, 
later film and radio. The same can be said for 
new popular music. And this also provoked 
patronising comments about ‘clerks writing for 
clerks’ made most famous in Forster’s Howard’s 
End, but also documented (in very partial terms) 
by John Carey33. But when Bourdieu and others 
try to show how those with cultural capital always 
attempted to downgrade the efforts of autodidacts 
by accusing them of acquiring this knowledge 
in the wrong way – ‘in one gulp’ as one of the 
characters in Howard’s End put it – they very often 
end up dismissing their aspirations and belittling 
their gains.
To dismiss all this as ‘false consciousness’ or 
to see these attempts, as Bourdieu does, as 
always disqualified by class distinction and 
inequality is both to ignore historical evidence and 
to be equally patronising in turn. The workers’ 
movements took a strong political stance against 
those who sought to use art as social distinction 
or lock it up in the citadels of privilege. It was 
a charge they often threw at ‘art for art’s sake’ 
and later at modernism; wilful obscurantism and 
amorality or decadence was held to be a form of 
elitism, and this marked much of Marxism’s early 
response to modernism. On the contrary there 
were strong currents within ‘aesthetic art’ which 
offered a different knowledge of the world, a kind 
of plenitude, a wholeness felt in the sensuous 
immediacy of the work; this art had strong 
democratic promise. Not only did it no longer 
restrict aesthetics to privileged representations, 
this aesthetic attitude, seeing the world in a 
different light, was not restricted to one class – the 
promise to change life could have transformative 
effects on all individuals34. 
Indeed, it is now clearer than ever that Marx’s 
account of the capitalist commodity form and its 
overcoming in communism is profoundly related to 
the early German aesthetic tradition. His account 
of free labour and fulfilled humanity is linked to the 
promise of reconciliation and plenitude in Romantic 
aesthetics. It is in this sense also, as we saw, that 
the ‘dignity of labour’ in workers’ movements but 
also in many other social reform traditions (including 
religious) could find its ideal in the creative artist. It 
has been argued that movements for social justice 
and those for a more meaningful or non-alienated 
life (encapsulated by Rimbaud’s changer la vie!) 
were distinct; that artistic radicals were unlikely 
fellow travellers with workers’ movements that were 
not interested in their idealistic aspirations; that the 
1960s saw the cultural radicals in turn dumping the 
social aspirations of the workers35. There is much 
in this, as we shall see; ideas of the autonomy of 
labour, its self-fulfilment at work, as well as the 
claims to social justice they found embedded in 
the sensuous promise of art indicate that these are 
not always so distinct. And they were also at the 
forefront of the creative industries discourse – and 
its critics. 
The avant-garde  
and cultural dynamism
In the last forty years it has been not so much 
the games of distinction of the bourgeoisie so 
much as those of the intellectual avant-garde – or 
the ‘knowledge class’ – that has been at stake. 
This class and their monopoly of knowledge 
was threatened by the spread of education and 
the expansion of the artistic and cultural market. 
Jonathan Rose follows John Carey in seeing 
modernism as a deliberate attempt to make art 
more difficult and obscure, rendering the newly 
acquired cultural knowledge of the lower classes 
redundant. This threat to their self-interest is held 
to explain modernism’s obscurity, along with 
its contempt for the ‘masses’ and new forms of 
‘mass media’, in a process of what John Hartley 
calls ‘democracy as despair’36. 
This account is far too simplistic and reductive. 
In particular it ignores how the roots of 
modernism lie also in its opposition to the 
art world, not just between modernism and 
popular or mass culture. Modernism had 
strong, if ambiguous links, with radical politics 
and could use popular culture as part of its 
aesthetic radicalism, and in line with many 
within the working class movement itself, it did 
not equate ‘mass culture’ with the masses. We 
will discuss modernism and the mass media 
in the next section. Here we suggest that this 
reductive account of modernism as elitist – 
the avant-garde as ‘aristos’ as John Holden 
recently charged – seriously misunderstands the 
dynamics of contemporary culture37.
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The most systematic statement of these internal 
dynamics of the art world comes from Bourdieu. 
In The Rules of Art he identifies artistic production 
with a sub-section of the bourgeoisie – a 
‘dominated fraction of the dominant class’38. 
Those with ‘economic capital’ are despised 
by those who lack this capital but who have 
high levels of cultural knowledge and prestige – 
‘cultural capital’. Those with this cultural capital 
jealously guard their ability to legislate on art 
against those who rely on economic power - and 
those who seek only to serve it. 
“. . . the opposition between art and money . . . is the 
generative principle of most of the judgments that . . . 
claim to establish the frontier between what is art and 
what is not, between ‘bourgeois’ art and ‘intellectual’ 
art, between ‘traditional’ art and ‘avant-garde’ art”38.
This does not just separate the artistic producers 
from the economic middle classes; in more 
systematic fashion than Becker’s ‘art world’, 
Bourdieu organises the artistic producers 
themselves into a relational ‘creative field’. This 
field of artistic production is autonomous from 
the field of economic power – and the ‘cultural 
capital’ of any artist is based on how far they 
are from the field of power. Thus it is divided into 
those producers geared to large-scale production, 
which is close to the field of power (the 
mainstream bourgeois audience), and achieves 
good money (high economic capital). This is 
despised (low cultural capital) by those involved in 
small-scale or ‘restricted’ production which does 
not get a large audience, therefore little economic 
capital, but high levels of cultural capital. A further 
sub-division suggests a struggle between the 
established avant-garde and the new bohemian 
artists, who despise both fortune and fame – thus 
claiming cultural capital for the future. 
In line with many others, Bourdieu thus attacks 
the very idea of the individual creative genius and 
situates artists’ work not in personal biography 
but within a field of struggle, a deadly game from 
which they cannot escape. Bourdieu certainly 
outlines the sorts of tensions, maneuvers and 
self-serving idealisms familiar to anybody who 
has been involved in an art world. There are 
problems though. First is the sense familiar from 
his book on cultural consumption, of marionettes 
played by the system, the strings finally 
revealed by the all-seeing scientist. One of the 
fundamental criticisms of Distinction was that it 
suggested each act of cultural consumption was 
done purely for the purposes of social distinction, 
ignoring the real pleasures, the emotional and 
intellectual investments in this specific object, 
this specific kind of art. At times Bourdieu comes 
close to this in The Rules of Art, but there is 
a significant difference. The autonomy of the 
field of artistic production does not relate, he 
argues, to some eternal quality of art but is an 
historical event. But he also argues that this is a 
real historical gain and that it must be defended 
against the forces that threaten it – the market 
and political pressure. The autonomy of art is not 
just a delusional by-product or empty stake in the 
struggle between economic and cultural capital: 
it is a value we should cherish. 
We can certainly see the opposition of art to 
money as often a self-serving game – especially 
when it comes with a blanket condemnation of 
popular culture as pure commerce and completely 
dominated by the market. But its very power to 
condemn, to structure the field, to create a pole in 
opposition to the power of money and politics – this 
comes from an historical energy embedded in the 
notion of aesthetic art itself. The struggle to acquire 
cultural capital is worth engaging in precisely 
because that cultural capital is a capital. 
Bourdieu takes great pains to show how 
Flaubert’s novels represented a move within a 
complex artistic field of ‘art for art’s sake’ and 
social realism: Madam Bovary and Sentimental 
Education are both ‘realist’ and ‘pure’ works of 
art. Flaubert’s artistic success was due to his 
application of the aesthetic rules of ‘pure art’ to the 
kind of small town dreamer and adulteress usually 
reserved for social fiction. He could write a realist 
novel knowing it was a fiction. The autonomy of 
the artistic field, therefore, is not just about the 
accumulation of cultural capital but allows the 
working out of aesthetic material in accordance 
with its own requirements and in so doing it 
reveals a certain kind of truth about the world. 
This notion of aesthetic art, as we have seen, 
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stemmed from Kant but also the German romantics 
and idealist philosophers. Aesthetic art was not 
about an ethical truth or the correct technical 
execution of appropriate artistic forms (it was not 
artisanship or virtuosity), it was mode of sensory 
being. It was different to cognition and the power 
of the will – it did not subsume the particular 
under general laws and our response to art was 
spontaneous, unwilled. Aesthetics has been 
presented as some pre-modern, aristocratic distain 
for the material world. As Schiller wrote:
“At the present time material needs reign supreme 
and bend a degraded humanity beneath their 
tyrannical yoke. Utility is the great idol of our age, 
to which all powers are in thrall and to which all 
talent must pay homage. Weighed in this crude 
balance, the insubstantial merits of Art scarcely tip 
the scale, and, bereft of all encouragement, she 
shuns the noisy market-place of our century”39. 
This echoes Bourdieu’s ‘art versus money’, but we 
need to be clear about why this position becomes 
so influential given the historic association 
between money, power and art since the 
Renaissance. In his discussion of Juno Ludovisi 
Schiller defines the statue of the goddess as ‘free 
appearance’: 
“what the free appearance of the Greek statue 
manifests is the essential characteristic of divinity, 
its ‘idleness’ or ‘indifferency’. The specific attribute 
of divinity is not to want anything, to be liberated 
from the concern to give oneself ends and to have to 
realize them”40.
Schiller tells us that through the apprehension 
of art we share in this divinity as ‘free play’, and 
humans are only fully human beings when they 
play: “this paradox is capable of bearing the 
whole edifice of the art of the beautiful and the still 
more difficult art of living”. The property of being 
art is not about conformity to an ethical truth nor 
given by technical perfection “but is ascribed to 
a specific form of sensory apprehension”41. This 
aesthetic apprehension is distinct from everyday 
life – it makes everyday experience strange to 
itself – but it is at the same time about the ‘art 
of living’ and a form of politics. It concerns “that 
which comes within the province of art through 
its adherence to a sensorium different to that of 
domination”42. It is in this sense that no external 
‘academic’ or ‘artisanal’ standards can be set; 
why the dynamics of the art world are  
anti-hierarchical (the unknown bohemian can 
claim the mantel of art against the world renowned 
artist), and why artistic value is volatile and distinct 
from indicators of price. 
For the same reason art is both separate from life 
but constantly draws everyday life into itself; no 
experience can lie outside it. For the Romantics 
art represented a plenitude, a wholeness, that 
was forever lost by contemporary life. Or art was 
something to be redeemed, its promise made 
good by a new kind of community. Art as part of 
“a sensorium different to domination” could thus 
hold out the promise to ‘change life’, for a new life 
in common. It was in this sense, with its inherent 
democratic principle, that it also inspired the 
autodidacts and the artisans, the clerks and the 
shop girls, as well as the bohemians and avant-
gardes – and indeed, many in the middle and 
upper classes. Which is not to say that these are 
the same experiences; or that art’s plenitude did 
not ever become a compensation for inequality, 
deprivation and domination; or that its ever-
deferred promises did not provide excuses for all 
kinds of compromises and evasions. Nevertheless 
it retained a promise, though of what now remains 
to be seen. 
 
Conclusion 
1. We started with an opposition of ‘art’ and 
‘industry’; we suggested that in one sense of 
the word art was an industry, but one animated 
by different principles than that of factory 
based mass production. It is only in this way 
that it was able to offer a different model of 
‘industry’ for ‘post-industrial’ societies.
2. We also suggested art’s opposition to 
industry and markets was not always an 
aristocratic resistance to modernity or some 
willful avoidance of the material realities on 
which its comforts relied. Art’s rejection of 
the ‘dark satanic mills’ was not (just) about 
their ugliness or anti-pastoral violence; it 
was an attempt to assert a different quality 
of experience. Art was the experience 
of an object in a different way than the 
universal equivalence of scientific and 
technological rationality, the commodity or 
the administered objects of bureaucratic 
modernity.
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3. Art’s lack of external determination does 
not have to mean a ‘sacred apartness’, an 
auratic distance from the everyday. It also 
gives it a dynamic charge. Its impulse to 
change life gives rise to new art forms that 
intersect with the dynamism of the world 
in ways that are not always opposed to it. 
The world of ‘all that is solid melts into air’ 
produces modern art as well as modern 
industry43. The fact that modern art is 
uncoupled from fixed forms, places and 
codes gives it its critical, ‘dysfunctional’ 
aspect, but it also gives it productivity, it 
animates and transforms the world. As 
such it is always intersecting with an equally 
productive and transformative capitalism. 
4. If art and everyday life constantly transgress 
their own borders so to do the realms 
of culture and economics. Modernism’s 
maneuvers were in part an attempt to 
sidestep this process by shattering the 
representational illusion which seemed 
complicit with money and power. But of 
course modernism’s innovations have 
increasingly been linked to those of 
capitalism; it is an association not always 
easy for art to slough off, and its productivity 
is always there to be used44.
5. The respect for art and learning was never just 
a seeking after knowledge legitimated by the 
upper classes; it was lived as an aspiration 
for a new world, an altered perspective on 
life and how it might be lived. In this sense 
it contributed to that opening up of a space 
for subjectivity, which was part of western 
modernity and on which new forms of 
disciplinary power were based.  
6. Aesthetics also challenged the unified 
western subject, it did not subscribe to the 
domination of the rational ego and its work 
on the self. Aesthetics saw in art a possibility 
of personal growth through a different 
relationship between the conscious and the 
unconscious, between sensuous particulars 
and universals, through a suspension of will 
and desire in play45. As the later Foucault 
wrote, there is no universal subject, “the 
subject is constituted through practices of 
subjectification, or, in a more autonomous 
way, through practices of liberation”; 
elsewhere he said: “the transformation of 
one’s self by one’s own knowledge is, I think, 
something rather close to the aesthetic 
experience”46.
7. This was not simply subjectivity, ‘individual 
feeling’ as it is sometimes described. The 
Enlightenment opened up a new dimension 
of subjectivity which was a distinct way of 
responding to the experience of modernity47. 
Aesthetic Art is not just about individual 
‘feelings’ but provides a particular kind of 
knowledge about the world. This is very 
important for the justifications for cultural 
policy which we will discuss in the next two 
chapters. 
 
8. Just as importantly, art is not only a different 
way of seeing but also a way of seeing what 
might have been. The ‘sensorium different 
to that of domination’ also allowed it to see 
‘reality’ as produced by this domination. That 
is, to see this as one particular reality along 
with all those possible worlds lay buried 
within it. This was how Walter Benjamin 
interpreted the promise of art, that it allowed 
us to think history ‘against the grain’, that 
that which is might have been different – and 
might be still48. 
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Nation building
What we now term ‘cultural policy’ was for a long 
time ‘arts policy’. The shift from ‘art’ to ‘culture’ 
relates to disputes around the privileged position 
of the arts in respect to culture – popular culture, 
commercial culture, everyday culture – which were 
launched from the late 1950s onwards. We shall 
discuss this in more detail later. But the fact that 
the main emphasis of public policy was on financial 
support for ‘the arts’ should not hide the fact that 
such policies were part of a wider system of public 
intervention that we would now call cultural policy. 
We saw in section one how the civic humanist 
tradition presented art as part of the free 
development of civil society, and how this fed 
into the educational vision of the emerging 
nation-states. Mathew Arnold and his heirs 
saw this aesthetic education as being about 
the development of the self – what Michel 
Foucault called ‘the work of the self on the self’, 
a particularly modern form of power49. Alongside 
historians who have shown how the middle 
classes attempted to define public culture in ways 
that served their own interests for distinction, 
there are others who have shown how culture 
was used as a ‘softer’ tool in the civilization of the 
new industrial masses. Seed and Wolff showed 
how 19th century Manchester used a range of 
cultural institutions – parks, libraries, galleries and 
concert venues – alongside the statistical and 
disciplinary forms of control that evolved in the 
19th century city50. We have also suggested that 
the claims of art were also registered in the new 
working classes amongst autodidacts, mechanics 
institutes, workers education associations, Ruskin 
collages, and a range of social reformers. These 
groups made claim to the promise of art, and to 
return it to its roots in an equitable social world. 
This ‘social democratic’ idea, of claiming the 
rightful inheritance of all for culture rather than its 
being locked up in the elite, has and continues to 
be a very powerful strand of policy thinking. 
Imagined communities 
The civic humanist tradition had a pragmatic 
idealist mix (‘we must educate our future masters’) 
that has been disputed since; was it power-
sharing or just co-option? But its civilizing project 
was linked to a more functional, raison d’état 
approach of nation building in the late 1880s. The 
mobilization of populations – what Foucault has 
called ‘biopolitics – involved many aspects, but 
the ‘invention’ of national traditions and symbols 
of ‘imagined’ communities were a key part of 
this51. The arts played a role here, but so too did 
the emerging mass media – the newspapers and 
magazines, popular songs, postcards and posters. 
This more direct use of the media – as opposed to 
the techniques of aesthetic subjectivity – moved 
to the fore from WW1. The ‘mobilization of the 
masses’ by the state was inextricably linked to 
the emergence of new media technologies – film, 
newspapers, radio – which allowed new forms of 
mass address. Such potential power suggested an 
importance that could not be left to the humanists, 
and state media policy becomes both a new 
policy object and (partly) separated from humanist 
institutions. It thus in part threatened the control 
of an established ‘knowledge class’ over cultural 
values and legitimation. 
Despite this the grand narratives of the nation, 
the ‘invention of tradition’ and shared symbols of 
these ‘imagined communities’, whether in social 
democratic or ‘race and nation’ terms, drew 
heavily on a notion of art and artists as privileged 
expressions of national cultures. This derives 
from Herder’s notion of historical change having 
its roots in the spirit of a people, ‘culture’ as an 
organic historical growth medium. The individual 
genius was never the pure individual creator; 
they were the expression, often unconscious, 
of the deeper aspirations of history and the soul 
of the people. In republican France the genius 
spoke for the inarticulate people. This is not the 
place to examine this; the point is that individual 
artists often presented themselves as voice of the 
people, and a place where the people could find 
their greatness reflected. In this sense the national 
art tradition and the national artist acquired 
great importance in the last years of the 19th 
century. The plenitude of the work of art reflected 
the fullness or potential of the people, which 
could have social democratic, conservative and 
radical right wing political consequences; all had 
difficulties with ‘rootless’ modernism. 
Most of these grand narratives were in operation 
as post-war western states set up their various 
culture ministries, arts councils, heritage boards 
and cultural foundations. In these grand narratives 
‘the arts’ played a crucial though complicated 
role; historical monuments and (to a lesser 
extent) folk culture aside, it was the arts which 
carried the most privileged national storytelling 
responsibilities and received the bulk of the state’s 
attention. The arts became directly financed and 
central to humanist education, national solidarity 
and its ‘patrimony’. These grand narratives were 
undermined from two different directions.
Chapter 4
Arts policy: nation building, 
mass culture and modernism
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Markets and commercial 
popular culture
The decision to set up public agencies to fund 
the arts was presented as the state became a 
democratic ‘patron’ of the arts, preserving the old 
and commissioning the new in order to pursue 
and secure national culture (though within a 
wider universal humanist framework), often in 
quite conservative ways. But it also related to the 
antipathy of the arts to the utilitarianism and the 
market. In 1945 Keynes said in a radio broadcast:
“The exploitation and incidental destruction of the 
divine gift of the public entertainer by prostituting it 
to the purposes of financial gain is one of the worst 
crimes of present day capitalism”52.
He added however that “how the state could play 
its proper part is hard to say”, also suggesting 
elsewhere that maybe this was pump-priming and 
the arts might eventually become self-sufficient. 
At any rate, he said, “we must learn by trial and 
error”. This is an important qualification for those 
who equate ‘the arts’ with public funding; public 
funding is a recent development and was begun 
with an open mind. Indeed, as Williams points out, 
it took Keynes (with his modernist, Bloomsbury 
background) to wrest the agenda of the Arts 
Council of Great Britain away form Merrie England 
to a broader vision. 
“The task of an official body is not to teach or 
to censor, but to give courage, confidence and 
opportunity. Artists depend on the world they live in 
and spirit of the age...New work will spring up more 
abundantly in unexpected quarters and in unforeseen 
shapes when there is universal opportunity for 
contact with traditional and contemporary arts in their 
noblest forms”53. 
This was then ‘state patronage’ but it was also 
public funding akin to a ‘nationalisation’ of art. That 
is, to take it out of the lottery of the market, and 
at the same time to make it available to all. If for 
some it was preserving high culture in an ocean 
of ignorance, for others it was opening up the 
heritage of nation and humanity to all the people. 
The market, it is often forgotten, is predicated on 
the ability to pay; as with education and health, 
it was blamed for the locking up of art by those 
who could afford it. There was thus a strong 
re-distributive, social-democratic aspect, a sense 
of ‘fair play’, one which underpinned the popular 
support for the idea of ‘public service’. It continues 
to have strong resonances, paradoxically maybe 
more in art and culture than anywhere else. 
But despite Keynes’ open mind there was another 
sense of ‘nationalisation’, not that of public 
service, nor quite of scarce resource or natural 
monopoly (though the great heritage institutions 
and collections might fit this), but that of ‘market 
failure’. Keynes’ tentative interventions against the 
market gradually became the main justification. 
As the new discipline of arts economics made 
clear by the mid-1960s, the traditional arts 
were becoming extremely expensive and faced 
enormous challenges in increasing productivity 
– they could not whack out more paintings 
or run five shows daily. The gains from mass 
reproduction were not available to traditional 
arts. It was either increased prices, more public 
funding, more philanthropy or the lights go out54. 
In this context public funding acquired overtones 
of preservation that allowed the public service 
ethos to be deemed discharged purely by public 
subsidy, and its energies dissipated in disputes 
over how big (or small) the cake was and who got 
the largest slice. Finally, if it was legitimate in this 
context that those with the biggest overheads 
got the biggest slice (inevitably opera rather 
than, say, poetry), it was less legitimate to equate 
their activities with ‘the arts’ per se. But in many 
respects, who got public money became a de 
facto definition of ‘the arts’.
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This logic was reinforced by the transformation of 
popular culture into what became known as the 
cultural industries. We saw above how in the 19th 
century art and entertainment became separated 
into two different markets, with the latter being 
subject to the laws of commodification much 
more rapidly and extensively than the former. 
The result was that popular culture became 
associated with market culture, and on that 
basis was deemed a degraded form of culture. 
However, it was the middle classes that sustained 
the market for artistic and entertainment goods 
in the 19th century; working class popular forms 
had limited profitability. This changed at the end 
of the 19th century through new levels of leisure 
and income but also through new technologies 
of reproduction. The markets for music hall and 
variety, popular theatre, dance music and popular 
song were limited by their restricted reproducibility. 
Sheet music and novel/newspaper/magazine 
publishing were exceptions. This changed with 
recorded music, film and later radio. It was 
radically transformed again with television in the 
1950s. These became very large-scale industries 
driven by large and increasingly international 
markets.
This presented a challenge to the arts’ pre-
eminence in culture, and thus their qualification for 
public funding. It also presented a challenge to art 
as a central part of the nation-building narrative. 
First, nation-states were presented with a 
challenge to their monopoly of the new broadcast 
media. This monopoly could be classed as a 
strategic interest – the state must control a limited 
communication resource, as the BBC argued. 
But it also faced new powerful public figures 
and corporations – such as Lord Beaverbrook 
in Britain – who represented a challenge to the 
political class’ monopoly of the media and also 
to the existing configuration of the public sphere. 
Second it was also about content. The market 
meant that cultural commodities were subject to 
the laws of the commodity, and this meant (as 
we shall see) that in the search for profits, they 
often went against the state in ‘giving people what 
they want not what the state wants them to have’. 
This tension is still present – see the Murdoch 
press today! The association of the market with 
degraded popular culture then became a direct 
threat to the democratic humanist educative 
function of the arts, just as it seemed a more 
direct threat to the preeminence of art and ‘high’ 
culture. This presented problems for the social-
democratic tradition, which could easily be forced 
into a position of defending ‘elite culture’ (though 
they denied it was that) by those in commercial 
popular culture. Cultural studies comes out of 
this. Third, the commanding heights of the cultural 
industries lay in America. For both nationalistic 
and social-democratic reasons (and these 
were of course closely intertwined) the fact that 
market driven popular culture was also American 
presented real problems. 
It is for these reasons that post-war (sometimes 
pre-war) arts policy was also linked to a cultural or 
cultural industries policy: the active involvement 
of the state in the regulation and production of 
cultural industries. It did so mainly by substituting 
state organisations for the market, and by 
producing that which was deemed to be of a 
certain quality and of importance for the nation. 
These were derived from an aesthetic criteria, 
which as we saw had long intertwined with film, 
photography and music; but it was also a national 
aesthetic – privileged themes and forms which 
articulated a national culture. It should be noted 
that this did not preclude popular culture, and 
cultural industry policies and public broadcasting 
drew on a tradition of popular culture making 
which was not purely market driven. Justin 
Lewis, in his discussion of the founding of the 
Arts Council of Great Britain, shows how the 
state subsidy of popular entertainment during 
the war was very successful and popular. Its 
post-war abolition and the concentration on the 
arts program set the tone for the next decades: 
popular culture is equated with the market, and, 
unlike the arts, it was seen as able to survive 
purely on the basis of that market. It was a conceit 
that was barely challenged until the 1980s55.
The avant-garde and modernism
The association of ‘art’ with the shock of the 
new, with rule-breaking and constant change 
is nowadays almost complete; it provides a key 
basis for its association with innovation via the 
creative industries. This is sometimes seen as 
raw creativity – or as puerile, deliberately obscure, 
or the result of a creative field struggle to be the 
next new thing. We have suggested that the 
dynamism of art derived from its lack of external 
determination, and also that it was increasingly a 
free floating practice; it cut against fixed meanings 
in complex interaction with the changes of 
modernity itself. Rather than pre-modern it was 
anti-traditional.
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Andrew McNamara uses George Markos to 
suggest that traditional culture involves: 
“the meaning-bearing and meaning transmitting 
aspect of human practices and their results, ‘the 
symbolic dimension of social events’ (Geertz) 
that allows individuals to live in a life-world, the 
interpretation of which they essentially share, and 
to act in ways that are mutually understandable to 
them”56. 
In addition, traditional cultural activities were 
“subordinate to pre-given, externally fixed social 
tasks” as well as “internally organised around 
determinate social occasions and situations 
addressed to some particular, restricted circle of 
recipients”. This is notion would include Raymond 
William’s notion of culture ‘as a whole way of 
life’, the communities in which people live. It is 
also how Becker suggests that art worlds are 
used by social groups and individual artists to 
organize their working lives, to establish value and 
distribute tasks. It is also how the nation-state was 
conceived, as a symbolic community with shared 
values; art was used to express and to bind this 
sense of national community. However:
“Modernist cultural activities…[are] socially 
disembedded. They are not viewed as God-
ordained, nor are they performed constituted in 
accordance with traditional expectations or rituals 
at specific times…or places…Modernity introduces 
and valorates the idea of cultural autonomy…The 
emphasis…switches to creativity as originality, to 
critical evaluation and the testing of assumptions, 
experiment or innovation, at the expense of the 
priority of precedence. This creativity in modernity 
is purportedly at a remove from received standards 
or routines, which are traditionally regarded as 
normatively valid and culturally binding”57.
We also saw that in modernity what counts as art 
is no longer fixed to specific forms and themes, it 
is both separate from and intersects with everyday 
life; the aesthetic object is a state of being which 
is in opposition to that of rational objectivity and 
moral imperative (it does not have a lesson). These 
put together make the art of modernity not just a 
site for the creation of class distinction or modern 
subjects but one of volatility and uncertainty, of 
opposition to fixed codes, morality, nation, and 
utility in general. This is why classes and states 
that used art were constantly caught out by 
modernism and disturbed by it. It could be used to 
épater les bourgeoisie, it could be used to make 
the autodidacts feel stupid, but it could also be 
used to challenge the grounds on which the status 
quo stood, the arrangement of things, the unitary 
subject of the modern nation-state and the quality 
of contemporary experience. 
That is, modernism – central to the dynamics of 
the art world since the mid-19th century – could 
and did cut across the cultural policy uses to 
which it was put. This was very clearly recognized 
in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, neither of 
whose projects could recognize the autonomy 
of art – that it could have a specific form of 
knowledge legislated by itself. This antipathy, or 
at least ambivalence, was also evident in western 
countries where modernism was still a disputed 
form up to the 1970s. 
Responses to modernism
One response was to see modern art as an 
irrational collapse or retreat from modernity 
– a refusal of social democracy or the class 
struggle, an abandonment of democracy by the 
bourgeoisie when it looked like it was slipping 
away from them. The standard Marxist line was 
that modernism was simply anti-democratic 
obscurantism. For the conservatives it was 
a rejection of artistic standards and social 
conventions and morality; it was the anti-social 
work of malcontents. More latterly, modernism 
has been presented as anti-democratic 
obscurantism, fuelled by knowledge class 
malcontents resentful of the rise of popular 
culture58.
A second response was to bring modernism into 
the narrative of art we saw at the beginning: the 
history of art is one of an eternal value gradually 
freeing itself from all extrinsic determination by 
taking as its proper subject its own medium and 
material processes. This position is exemplified by 
Clement Greenberg. Though often over-simplified, 
his position came to represent a dominant 
modernist orthodoxy up to the 1980s. On the 
one hand it allowed a gradual accommodation 
between the more orthodox history of art and 
the modernist tradition. If Kenneth Clarke was 
still rather puzzled by it all in the 1969 BBC series 
Civilization, Robert Hughes’ 1980 BBC series 
Shock of the New presented a modernism that 
was now part of a common democratic cultural 
heritage. On the other, this position formulated an 
opposition between a ‘high art’ that was serenely 
pre-occupied by its own formal concerns and a 
mass commercial culture designated as kitsch. 
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In this sense modernism provided a critique of 
commercial culture by refusing easy identification 
and by deliberately disrupting the sense of an 
immediate access to reality given by mass culture 
and realist art. In kitsch you are not challenged, 
you find only yourself reflected; it becomes 
self-confirming, narcissistic. The designation 
kitsch is so easily associated with strategies of 
distinction and the derogation of popular taste 
that it is difficult to use today. But as we shall 
see, the opposition between modernist art and 
kitsch is one of the unacknowledged sources of 
the creative industries discourse. For Greenberg 
modernist art served a necessary political function 
by creating ‘movement’ in societies that would 
otherwise stagnate. Only high culture could do 
this; indeed only the part of high culture that 
was progressive, experimental and ahead of its 
time. Kitsch, reproduced the world and viewers’ 
emotions so cleanly and realistically on its own 
surface that it spoke to audiences without 
stimulating any thought, change or perturbation. 
Kitsch wasn’t evil, but it was useless and could be 
apolitical and thus become dangerous59. 
A third response moves between the two above. 
The left modernism avant-garde position shared 
a concern with the first that to withdraw from the 
masses and the contemporary world was to fall 
into nihilism or simply ‘Sailing to Byzantium’. It 
suggested that the subjective, anti-social, ‘world 
apart’ version of modern art was politically and 
morally unacceptable. It was a view stretching 
back to Hegel and his search for a new practical 
social ethics, or Wagner’s rather more ambiguous 
version of founding a new aesthetic social order. 
This sentiment could be found in Ruskin and 
Morris, and the ‘arts and craft movement’, which 
reverberated across Europe and Australia in the 
last years of the 19th century. 
On the other hand it looked to the formal 
techniques of modernism as new forms of 
perception, which could give a glimpse of a new 
possible world, a lived aesthetics of a new social 
order. Modernist aesthetics would respond to 
the needs of the masses and a new world that 
broke with the old. It erupted in that modernism 
associated with the Bauhaus and the attempt 
to link art to the design for a new kind of living 
together. It was part of the modern movement 
in architecture and planning which looked to 
a radical re-design of the city in an age of the 
masses. It was found in the formal experiments of 
the Russian modernists, whose concern with their 
medium had a direct political intent – to design a 
new visual language for a revolutionary new mass 
society. 
These did not follow either Lukacs or Greenberg 
into a rejection of the new technologies and forms 
of production associated with mass culture, 
but suggested that the new cultural industries 
of cinema and radio, new forms of print media, 
as well as other forms of mass production and 
transportation, all could be used in conjunction 
with new kinds of mass culture in a way that would 
re-invent both the artist and aesthetics in a new 
productivist manner. That is, they tried to establish 
a connection between mass culture, technology 
and the formal techniques of modernism in ways 
that would create a new contemporary art. This 
third position became very influential after its 
rediscovery in the 1960s and in the context of new 
technologies of the 1980s. Yet it said little about 
the market.
A fourth position had more to say about the 
market. Coming from left modernism Theodore 
Adorno saw the combination of new technologies 
and the totalising tendencies of Fascism, Soviet 
Communism and Western Democracy as 
leading to a catastrophic collapse of the critical 
separation between culture and economics. The 
combinations of technology and mass culture 
on which Benjamin and Brecht had looked 
positively, became not new forms of critical 
perception, but ways of controlling the masses. 
For Adorno, the Culture Industry completed the 
homogenisation process of the nation-state 
begun in the Enlightenment. The domination of 
human as of external nature was finalized by the 
abolition of the aesthetic resistance of the work 
of art. Acknowledging its deep implication in 
class society, Adorno nevertheless saw art as 
representing a critical space that was now being 
eroded. The form this resistance took was in some 
ways similar to Greenberg – the insistence of 
modernism’s formal properties, in pure adherence 
to the internal logic of the work of art – except that 
for Adorno the fact that it had to do so testified to 
the brutalized nature of the world. Not a sign of 
universal human creativity or a source of plenitude, 
its relentless negativity was a dark mirror of the 
catastrophe of the present. 
Arts and creative industries: a historical overview 56
49 Michel Foucault (1977) Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (trans. Alan Sheridan) Harmondsworth: Penguin
50 John Seed and Janet Wolff (1984) ‘Class and Culture in Nineteenth-Century Manchester’ Theory, Culture and Society 2: 38 pp. 38-53
51 Michel Foucault (2008) The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979 London: Palgrave Macmillan; Benedict 
 Anderson, Imagined Communities, op.cit; Eric Hobsbawm (ed. 1983) The Invention of Tradition Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
52 Quoted in Raymond Williams(1989) Politics of Modernism: Against the New Conformists London: Verso p. 148
53 Ibid p. 143
54 Cf. William Baumol and William Bowen (1966) Performing Arts: The Economic Dilemma New York: Twentieth Century Fund
55 Justin Lewis (1990) Art, Culture and Enterprise: The Politics of Art and the Cultural Industries. London: Routledge.
56 Andrew McNamara (2009) An Apprehensive Aesthetic: The Legacy of Modernist Culture Bern: Peter Lang p. 44
57 Ibid p.45
58 Jonathan Rose (2001), op.cit; John Hartley (1999) op.cit; John Carey (1992) op.cit; John Carey (2005) What Good Are The Arts?
 London: Faber and Faber.
59 Clement Greenberg (1939) ‘Avant-Garde and Kitsch’, Partisan Review. 6:5 pp. 34-49
60 Holden (2007) op.cit.; Ross (2006) op.cit
John Holden more or less equates this take with 
‘avant-gardism’ as a whole, and in turn dismisses 
its stance as ‘aristocratic’ and ‘snobbish’. 
He takes much evidence to this effect from 
Alex Ross’ survey of 20th century ‘classical’ 
music60. In this book however, Adorno remains 
a towering presence, annoying and inspiring, in 
his articulation of the utopian promise of the art 
work. Most critiques of his work either pass on 
the absolutist stance of total negativity, or focus 
on his one-sided attacks on the culture industry. 
However, it is also important to note that his 
take on the culture industry informed European 
cultural policy and contributed to the disdainful 
attitude to popular culture we shall see in the next 
section, but it also contributed to an ‘idea’ of art 
as opposed to homogenisation; the ‘indivisible 
remainder’ – that which cannot be absorbed 
within the system. This remnant became a main 
source of popular cultural energy in the 1960s.
For all these reasons, both commercial popular 
culture and the different dynamics of modernist art 
constantly destabilised arts and cultural policies. 
The situation we face now is the consequence of 
these two threats coming together in the 1960s. 
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Chapter 5
Pop culture, cultural industries, 
cultural studies
Cultural studies –  
from art to culture
The emergence in the late 1950s of what was to 
be known as ‘cultural studies’ has had a profound 
influence on arts and cultural policies – though this 
is hardly registered in writings on these, or indeed 
on creative industries61. In terms of our subject 
here its main impact has been to radically question 
the grounds on which judgments of artistic value 
have been made, and indeed to implicate such 
judgments in the ongoing reproduction of social 
inequality and oppression. Who has authority to 
judge; who is allowed a voice?
Richard Hoggart and Raymond Williams - in two 
very different kinds of books published in 1957 and 
1958 – suggested that art was only one aspect 
of a wider system of meanings, institutions and 
practices which we call ‘culture’62. Hoggart looked 
to working class culture to find a rich and varied set 
of everyday cultural practices. Williams’ took a more 
historical tack and showed how the ‘idea of culture’ 
in modern industrial society had been used to 
rethink and to challenge the fundamental direction 
and constitution of that society. Art might have 
provided a privileged site for this articulation, but it 
itself was only part of this wider reflection on culture 
and society, and indeed, was implicated in many 
of society’s self-deceptions and evasions. Hoggart 
not only suggested working class culture could be 
a valid object of study (and he comes from a line 
which includes Mass Observation, Picture Post, 
George Orwell and others) but also that, like Rose’s 
autodidacts, it bore the mark of the hidden injuries 
of art elitism63. Both of these books called for 
intellectuals, the ‘knowledge class’, to engage with 
those cultures they had so frequently dismissed or 
patronised. In a search for a ‘common culture’, the 
‘long dominative mode’ of thinking about culture, as 
well as blanket caricatures such as ‘mass culture’, 
had to be abandoned, and new forms of listening 
and talking introduced that would valorise the 
experiences and aspirations of those excluded from 
power. Williams wrote:
“A culture in common, in our own day, will not be 
the simple all-in-all society of old dream. It will be 
a very complex organization, requiring continual 
adjustment and redrawing…this…difficulty is only 
soluble in a context of material community and the full 
democratic process” 62.
Williams, and later, Hoggart’s team at the 
Birmingham School of Contemporary Cultural 
Studies, would move towards that social critique 
of art we discussed at the beginning. Art was a 
form of material practice and to be understood 
as part of wider socio-cultural and economic 
processes. It was thus complicit with the 
inequalities of society as well as (sometimes) 
critical of them. The study of art within cultural 
studies then lay in its relationship to different social 
classes and groups, and thus became part of 
the wider study of ideology and ‘representation’. 
Cultural studies, through to the mid-1980s, was 
engaged in showing how various popular cultural 
forms symbolically mediated the interests or 
predicament of different social groups. To some 
extent art could be positioned as a particular 
‘sub-culture’ were it not for its historically 
privileged association with power. It could not 
easily be welcomed into the club of ‘common 
culture’, and not just because of these continued 
accommodations with class and power – those 
involved in art worlds seemed to refuse the idea 
of their own socio-economic determination. For 
the later Williams the specific problem with art lay 
less in terms of its explicit content (for instance, 
the landscape art of Gainsborough naturalising the 
power of the gentry) than the structural refusal of 
a common materialist culture inherent in aesthetic 
art. The overall trend of modernist aesthetics, he 
argues in Keywords, is a drift to: 
“isolated subjective sense activity as the basis of 
art and beauty as distinct…from social or cultural 
interpretations… an element in the divided modern 
consciousness of art and society …[where] aesthetic 
considerations … [were separated from] practical or 
utilitarian considerations”64. 
This is the context in which Bourdieu was also 
writing in the 1960s. Distinction came out of a 
long series of investigations into how the working 
classes were excluded from the spaces of art 
which were, on the surface, free, democratic 
spaces. Echoing many in the arts funding 
establishment since, they seemed to be excluding 
themselves! The aesthetic disposition – the ability 
to appreciate something ‘for itself’, apart from its 
utility or its skill, or representational faithfulness – 
was something from which the working classes 
were excluded. Bourdieu’s powerful charges 
against the elitism of art is now a staple diet of 
cultural studies and used by those who don’t 
buy into his radical politics to attack middle class 
‘cultural elitists’. However, there is a profound 
condescension towards the working classes in 
his work. As we have seen, Bourdieu sees the 
autonomy of art as an historical gain, something 
to be defended; it is just that the working class, 
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as the dominated class, are not yet ready for 
it, not yet capable of helping this defense. 
Equally, though aware that the creative field of 
autonomous art is the province of (a sub-sector 
of) the dominant class, he dismisses popular 
culture as completely determined by commercial 
objectives, mere production for the market to the 
exclusion of any other considerations65. Williams 
and Hoggart refused such a dismissal of popular 
culture, commercial or otherwise, establishing an 
engagement that has continued to mark cultural 
studies in Britain, Australia and North America. 
As we suggested above, in the 1980s cultural 
studies, sociology and art history came together 
to argue that art was a material social practice, 
inevitably marked, though in complicated ways, by 
the social structures in which it was produced – in 
particular the capitalist division of labour and the 
production of ideology by the knowledge class. 
What then was the specific aesthetic experience, 
the pleasure or sensuous knowledge of art? This 
was often lost in accounts of its social functions. 
Janet Wolff’s comprehensive summary argued 
that the aesthetic disposition, to see something 
distinct from everyday life, from immediate use, 
was an historical phenomenon not an eternal 
quality pertaining to something universal called 
‘art’. But what it was exactly needed more 
research66. Writing at the end of the decade Terry 
Eagleton saw the promise of romantic aesthetics 
as pure ideology, a substitute religion; it needed 
to connect with radical politics and the workers 
movement in a materialist aesthetics based on 
the artist as producer not as ineffable genius67. 
Tony Bennett, in a more critical and positively 
angry reading, saw aesthetics as holding out a 
promise of redemption that was always deferred; 
a promise held to be embedded in the canon of 
great art which was in fact historically constructed, 
arbitrary and tautological: great art can be found 
in the canon and it’s in the canon because it’s 
great art. The ‘depth’ of the work of art was 
merely the reflection of what the critics want 
to put in it, an endless re-reading, and endless 
interrogation of ‘the text’. Why? The issue was 
certainly distinction, but it was also about the 
construction of the modern subject, the work of 
the self on the self which Foucault held to mark 
the organization of modern state power and the 
foundation of the system of modern education. 
Aesthetics, and the ideology of art, was dead. 
Its only meaning (illustrated for Bennett by its 
use on a hairdresser’s sign!) was now some 
form of sensuous pleasure or allure. Bennett’s 
anger stems from the disappearance of the 
eschatological view of history – that there will be 
some future reconciliation in which the promise 
of aesthetics is made good. After the collapse of 
communism it is not just Marx who goes out the 
window but Schiller as well. There is no longer 
any overblown aesthetic radicalism, no more 
revolutionary avant-gardes, only provisional moves 
within the cultural institutions in which we are all 
implicated68. Aesthetics, as he titles one of his 
chapters, is Really Useless ‘Knowledge’.
The redemptions, ideologies and disciplinary 
practices of aesthetics might have disappeared, 
but ‘pleasures’ remained. A common criticism 
of Bourdieu’s approach is that he ignored the 
specific qualities and pleasures of the artistic or 
cultural products being consumed. They were 
merely gambits in a game of distinction, adopted 
or dropped as their cultural capital value changed. 
In response his critics talked about the pleasures 
of cultural consumption, and their proliferation and 
hybridisation across class boundaries. It was with 
these complex pleasures and identifications that 
cultural studies began to engage in the 1990s. The 
issue was not just ‘who was being represented 
and by whom’ but what does representation 
actually mean, what identifications do we invest in 
it and what pleasures do we get from it. It began 
to draw on a series of French structuralist and 
post-structuralist theorists concerned with the 
specificity of language and discourse, speaking 
and reading, signs, images and simulacra, desire 
and the other. Many of these approaches had 
their origins in art theory or in philosophies that 
drew on radical critiques of the western ‘unified 
rational subject’ derived from modernist artistic 
practice and criticism. They were now applied 
to the multiple and multiplying forms of popular 
culture. Many of the concerns of aesthetics, 
suitably uncoupled from their romantic baggage, 
and dubbed ‘the politics of pleasure’ now landed 
centre stage in academic discussions of popular 
culture. Stuart Hall writing in 1992:
“Popular culture …is not at all, as we sometimes think 
of it, the arena where we find who we really are, the 
truth of our experience. It is an area that is profoundly 
mythic….It is there that we discover and play with the 
identifications of ourselves, where we are imagined, 
where we are represented.”69 .
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1960s: the expressive revolution
Jonathan Rose suggests 1920s Bohemia was 
closed to the working classes; bohemians could 
play with poverty in ways the working classes – 
conscious of real penury – might not. Eventually, 
they always had someone to pay their bills. Maybe 
so, but it was the values of bohemia that formed 
the real barrier. The untidiness that shocked some 
of Rose’s would-be bohemians brought up to see 
cleanliness as the sign of respectability, echoed 
the fact that to ‘drop out’ (to use a sixties term) 
for the middle classes was different to that of 
the working classes. The former, though in real 
poverty, might have personal, social and cultural 
resources of self-respect and ‘respectability’ yet 
for the working classes dropping out meant falling 
through the social net into an unthinkable hell. 
For the working classes art and culture meant 
‘betterment’, which if it did not bring material 
reward, it did bring respect.
Rose goes on to suggest that since the 
sixties “we are all weekend bohemians now, 
patronising the ‘creative industries'". Disposable 
income led not just to “washing machines and 
automobiles” but also to “fashion designers, 
interior decorators, artists, boutiques, rock 
entrepreneurs, experimental playwrights and 
trendy restaurants”. This results in a new market 
for cultural products whose turnover increases 
exponentially as the next new thing replaces the 
old. “Far from undermining capitalism, Bohemians 
are selling ever newer and more expensive 
products as status markers, thus ‘extending the 
distance between rich and poor’”. It turns out not 
to be everyone; it is “middle class youths… leftist 
academics and cultural entrepreneurs” who have 
adopted the distinction strategies of modernism 
(the next new obscure thing). The working class 
autodidact (“like the factories”) is left behind; his 
“Everyman’s library will be rendered obsolete 
by critics who insist that everyone must buy this 
year’s model of the literary canon, or else subject 
the old canon to increasingly opaque methods 
of interpretation”70. Moreover working class 
culture does not get state funding and they are 
systematically excluded from that which does. 
This is a rather confused and mournful view of the 
sixties. It suggests that modernist art is the same 
as Bohemia; that Bohemia (and the counter-
culture) is simply a new kind of consumerism; that 
this new consumerism is about social distinction; 
that the working classes only value traditional 
culture; and that working class notions of culture 
are excluded from, or a victim of, contemporary 
post-industrial culture. Though this strikes some 
chords – to which we will return – it is a nostalgic, 
conservative view of culture that retreats from the 
challenges set by Williams and Hoggart. 
We can tell another story by suggesting a more 
positive encounter between popular and modernist 
culture with its ‘bohemian values’; that this was not 
about ‘distinction’ alone, nor empty consumerism; 
that it was not confined to ‘middle class youth’ 
and ‘leftish academics’, but part of a wider set of 
historical transformations in which the working 
class shared (if differentially); that there were many 
similarities between these ‘cultural entrepreneurs’ 
and those working class autodidacts that Rose 
and others oppose to these entrepreneurs.
We have tried to suggest that aesthetic art 
contained an injunction to ‘change life’; it was 
about self-development but also about founding a 
new life-in-common. Avant-garde and modernist 
art tried to implement this in a range of ways. It 
could uncouple art from everyday culture, but 
it did this so that the plenitude of art could be 
re-founded, re-established; it had to be made 
opaque, or sundered from easy representation and 
identification; or it had to be made purely in the form 
of negation. The rifts this set up between it and 
traditional art (and traditional conceptions of culture) 
could be read in terms of class – the metropolitan 
modernists against the middle brow autodidacts 
and suburbanites. But by the 1950s this was 
becoming more generational. Modernism, with or 
without the expansion of education, was becoming 
popular. The canon of avant-garde and modernist 
art was becoming more widely established, as 
was its narrative of misrecognition and suffering 
at the hands of the ignorant public. Its opacity 
held out a promise of hard won plenitude. It held 
out a promise of a different life, one which broke 
with an older way of living. Jazz, beat, pop art, 
abstract expressionism – all have to be understood 
as meeting points where older conceptions of art 
and life are transformed through encounters with 
new forms of popular culture. Some of these new 
conceptions emerged around the unconscious or 
de-centered subject, new attitudes to the body 
and sexuality, and a more tactile, immersive sense 
of communality. These could be found in popular 
culture, but they were also released from within the 
aesthetic tradition itself. It was in Bohemia that many 
of these early exchanges took place, building on the 
long history of experiments on the self. But they are 
also found in older avant-garde agendas of social 
transformation.
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This account is most clear in rock and roll, which 
moved from a new ‘popular entertainment’ form 
to become emblematic of the transformations 
of western culture and society. Ian McDonald 
writes of The Beatles’ ‘turn off your mind, relax 
and float downstream’ (a quote from the Tibetan 
Book of the Dead), from Revolver that it signified 
the “pivotal moment” when the “free world’s 
coming generation rejected established wisdom, 
knowledge, ethics and behavior for a drug 
inspired relativism which has since undermined 
the intellectual foundations of western culture”71. 
This was not just rather wild exaggeration; it 
ignored the more obvious connections to an 
aesthetic romanticism familiar from Novalis. So 
too The Beach Boys’ elegy for a lost wholeness 
and innocence in Barbara from Pet Sounds. Or 
The Stones’ Sympathy for the Devil. Art schools 
in Britain and Australia were a crucial site of these 
exchanges and transformations, producing wave 
after wave of popular music, which mixed in the 
ideas of historical and contemporary avant-garde/
modernist art and passed these to a new kind 
of audience. It is not just that popular culture 
picked up on avant-garde and modernism; it 
itself became in part avant-garde. The Velvet 
Underground and Warhol, Paul McCartney 
attending experimental concerts in London, Brian 
Ferry taught by Richard Hamilton – these are a few 
of the thousand such stories. The counter-culture 
is really “an avant-garde culture in the older sense 
of that term”, as Derek Scott wrote72. Which is not 
to say that it was not also something new.
Bernice Martin’s important 1981 book title 
charts the transfer of bohemian and avant-garde 
modernism into everyday culture via the counter-
culture73. Her account emphasizes the themes of 
transgression of the rational self and social rules, 
along with the feeling of liminality, of stepping 
over a threshold into another world. They sought 
exstatis and commintas, the overcoming of self 
and the founding of a new world. Martin calls this 
the ‘expressive revolution’, which thus leads to a 
new kind of identity politics – that of individual self-
constitution beyond the prescribed rules of social 
convention. Individual creativity is an expression 
of self, finding who you are in a private journey 
of exploration. For Martin and others it is deeply 
anti-social; two decades later this becomes an 
essential resource for economic productivity. 
These avant-garde and counter-cultural themes 
were not just ‘expressive’, they were also 
new forms of knowledge. They were about 
understanding the self and the world in different 
ways, and their questioning of the economic-
rational and administrative-functional view of 
the world had, as we have seen, a very long 
history. The creative and symbolic – ‘expressive’ 
– resources of identity construction were also 
resources for interventions into the world.
1968 is emblematic of a shift between a unified 
‘left wing’ around the workers’ movement and 
the ‘single issue’ politics of today, often totally 
detached from (and sometimes opposed by) 
that movement. It has been seen as marking 
a separating out of the workers’ movement 
concerned with social justice and material 
redistribution from the new white collar workers 
or service class (especially young students) who 
were concerned with autonomy at work, and a 
general ‘non-alienated’ approach to work, career 
progression and life. However, these claims also 
occurred outside of work in terms of anti-urban 
development, collective consumer (health, public 
services), gender politics, sexuality, ecology and 
so on. In Getting Loose Sam Binkley argues that 
the counter-culture cannot just be seen as simply 
a new consumerism in the making; it expressed 
a wider sense of social change not restricted to 
material goods74. It was about personal growth 
and new forms of community – what Ronald 
Inglehart has called ‘post-materialist values’75. 
These were inextricably intertwined with new 
forms of, and attitudes to, ‘art’ and ‘popular 
culture’. 
Binkely and others are right to try and place these 
changes in specific social groups at specific times 
and places. Bourdieu does this also, with his 
notion of the new middle classes, but he reduced 
it to the post-68 generation elevating popular 
culture into ‘art’ in order to displace the existing 
holders of cultural capital. Same old game. Many 
writers have charted the radical challenge to an 
older conception of cultural hierarchies, personal 
behavior, social codes and what ‘art’ was. Indeed, 
many on both the political right and left saw this 
challenge as the undoing of society. For the right 
it was about pure individuality; for the left it was 
a return to an irrational, decadent evasion of 
class struggle and a refusal of historical reason. 
Modernist art was still disputed amongst ‘leftish 
academics’ until the end of the 1980s. For many 
younger people their first encounter with Barthes, 
or Kristeva, or Foucault, or Bataille, or Baudrillard 
was not in a lecture room, but in the pages of the 
music press (a fact that shocked these theorists 
when they were informed). 
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This was not an exclusive middle class thing. 
Punk and post-punk in the late 1970s and 80s 
represented an extension and intensification of 
these themes, often into darker waters in a way 
that mirrored much in the art world in which they 
were increasingly active participants. Though punk 
is portrayed as a reaction to de-industrialization, it 
was a protest against the old jobs as much as the 
lack of such in the present. Rimbaud’s ‘change 
life’ applied as much to Joy Division as it did to 
Dylan. Other forms of popular music cultures 
linked to the politics of desire and pleasure. ‘Pop’ 
itself became a form of delight to be set against 
the earnestness of rock; dance music set the 
body free against white men with guitars; the 
comunitas of rave encouraged a new form of 
temporary networked connections and a belief in 
a new being-in-common. 
By the 1990s the attempt to link such genres to 
specific class sub-cultures no longer worked, and 
cultural studies gave up the attempt. It sought new 
forms of explanation derived from theorisations of 
pleasure, desire and identification based on post-
national subjects, with multiple, temporary and 
contradictory identities, operating in a fragmented 
but highly networked social and cultural space. 
Popular culture is no longer a stranger to the 
concerns of aesthetic art, and what this aesthetic 
might be has changed profoundly in the last fifty 
years. It is no longer possible to draw neat lines 
between them. This is a profound challenge 
to the public funding of the arts. William’s 
democratic culture is faced with the challenge: 
who is to say what is of more value than anything 
else? 
Art worlds and cultural industries
Art worlds have had to confront commercial 
popular culture in new ways. Adorno’s newly 
coined term The Culture Industry was a monolithic 
system for the pacification of the workers, 
anticipating and manipulating their responses 
in ways that safely entertained them and led 
them to identify with the existing order76. This 
was predicated on the complete evacuation of 
the promise of art; its reduction to an industrial 
machine. Adorno was not so much talking about 
commercialisation so much as industrialisation, 
which is an important distinction because, as we 
saw, most art in the 19th century was produced for 
a market of the paying public. 
There were a number of problems with this 
perspective. First, the notion of ‘mass culture’ 
was being challenged by academics in cultural 
studies and elsewhere, such as amongst 
journalists and authors in the counter-cultural and 
mainstream press, and by the growing evidence 
of its dynamism and diversity from the 1960s. 
Second, the culture industry itself was either being 
challenged or having to respond to this dynamism; 
popular music industry changed radically, 
Hollywood films incorporated the independents, 
radical theatre or ‘performance’ made inroads 
onto the commercial stage, and television and 
radio also became a prime site for staging the 
conflicts between traditional culture and ‘youth 
culture’. Third, the lines between the big ‘culture 
industries’ (film, TV and radio, publishing etc.), 
commercial popular culture (emerging fashion, 
music, design, publishing), youth/counter-cultures, 
and ‘the arts’ were increasingly permeable. 
Artists and entrepreneurs, critics and celebrities 
increasingly circulated through them all. 
There were two sets of consequences, one for the 
notion of ‘culture industry’ and one for ‘the arts’.
Culture industry
A number of academics in France, Britain, North 
America and Australia, working in the fields of 
media and cultural studies (though they were 
often not called that) questioned Adorno’s model. 
One direction was to suggest that the ‘passive 
audience’ was not tenable, which has become a 
powerful strand within cultural and media studies. 
Another was to show how the machinations of 
the culture industry were much more ad hoc and 
contingent, operating in isolation from one another 
and from the authoritarian state deemed to be 
running the show. The field of study known as 
‘political economy’ suggested that Adorno and 
‘Mass Society’ theory was erroneous – not so 
much because the audience remained active and 
critical, on which there was a variety of opinions – 
but because it ignored the real dynamics of culture 
as a commodity. 
Though they could and did have ‘ideological’ 
effects, cultural commodities were produced not 
by state propaganda departments but by capitalist 
companies seeking to make a profit. Cultural 
commodities had to sell. They had therefore to 
appeal to what people wanted; a certain ‘use 
value’ for the audience. What this ‘use value’ 
might be is the key question of contemporary 
culture – and indeed central to the concerns of 
aesthetics. But at this point it is clear that the 
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sausage factory model of endless repetition of 
the same was not feasible. Novelty, the creation 
of something new within certain parameters 
of convention; a certain meaningfulness and 
pleasure; a certain trust (misplaced or otherwise) 
in the artist or production company, which we 
might call ‘authenticity’, a sense of honesty rather 
than ‘faking it’ or ‘manipulation’; all these qualities 
(which are assessed very differently amongst 
different groups) are involved in ‘use value’. 
These ‘use values’ had to be turned into 
commodities that brought in profit. Because these 
were in the main ‘public goods’ – commodities 
not used up when they were ‘consumed’ – ways 
had to be found of making sure their consumption 
was exchanged for money. Each different 
branch had different methods of monetizing its 
products: physical products (recorded music, 
books); or control of access (cinema; live 
performance) or free/cheap linked to advertising 
revenue (newspapers); or funded by the state or 
advertising revenue (TV and radio). There was not 
a culture industry but cultural industries. Rather 
than some department of propaganda their need 
for profits often went against law (censorship, 
relying on new technologies of copying) and/or 
challenged its social, cultural and political ethos. 
This was clearly the case from the 1960s; indeed, 
part of that ‘use value’ was to be seen to be in 
some way challenging, rebelling against, this 
social or political ethos. 
This ‘use value’ was non-functional in the strict 
material sense – it did not perform a set of clear 
tasks, like a car or washing machine. But of 
course it did have a ‘function’. It might be for 
social distinction, or for identity building, or self-
expression, or for ‘changing life’. The problem 
was that this ‘function’, or the object which might 
fulfil that function, was highly elusive and volatile. 
Its value was established within those complex 
symbolic circuits of society we call ‘culture’. And 
this culture was no longer just a traditional culture 
with a set of shared codes within which individuals 
and communities organised the life-world and 
specify where and when certain symbolic actions 
should take place: this culture – both art and 
commercial popular culture – was restless and 
dynamic, constantly pushing the boundaries of 
what can be written, shown and played, and how, 
and where. It constantly interacts, or re-enforces 
or challenges the fixed symbolic boundaries of 
the everyday life-world as well as the symbolic 
systems that organised the dispersed, mediated 
world of modern society. 
If economic value derives from this cultural value, 
then it becomes an extremely difficult process 
to predict, manage and generate profit. Most 
products of the cultural industries fail; they are 
subsidised by the successes. There are now well-
established forms of organising and stimulating 
consumer demand (genres, stars, sequels, 
formulas, back catalogues, special editions and 
the myriad approaches to marketing through the 
media), many of which were developed in the 19th 
century. Simon Frith has called this ‘rationalising 
the irrational’, which is not to say that that cultural 
choice is irrational, just that it does not follow the 
logic and form of neo-classical choice theory 
based on price and function. The ‘irrationality’ 
involves two things; the unpredictable preferences 
of the audience and the management of those 
charged with creating the products for this 
audience – the artists or ‘creatives’. 
Another failing of Adorno’s Culture Industry thesis 
was that, in fact, these artists or creatives never 
became reduced to mere ‘factory hands’. Many 
were freelancers or operated as small business 
practices; even salaried workers had a high 
degree of autonomy. The ‘irrationality’ of managing 
highly skilled, highly motivated and often highly 
awkward (semi-) autonomous workers involved 
‘tacit knowledge’ and know-how that had also 
begun to develop in the 19th century. The cultural 
industries were a series of ‘art worlds’ (Becker 
includes them in his definition), a complex mix 
of cultural, business and technological practices 
which had many similarities with ‘the arts’. Their 
ability to mass reproduce and distribute multiple 
copies meant that levels of capital investment and 
profitability were much bigger, and this introduced 
some distinctive dynamics into the process. As 
‘art worlds’ they evolved ways to use creative 
labour in ways that suited them. The development 
of creative product (‘R&D’) was mostly done 
unpaid on the creative’s own time (whilst dreaming 
in the garret), and a ‘reserve army of unemployed’ 
artists kept wages down. But each branch 
(books, film, music, fashion, theatre, TV and so 
on) developed its own way of managing this with 
its range of intermediary services (dealers, A&R, 
agents), educational/training institutions, specialist 
press and media and so on. 
Whether this represented an intrinsic conflict 
between capitalist profit and culture, or a 
particularly difficult business model based on 
the production of unknown value, these cultural 
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industries could not be dismissed as degraded 
market oriented culture. The fact that commercial 
cultural production represented the main source 
of cultural consumption for the majority of the 
population meant that they had to be taken 
very seriously. This had major implications for a 
democratic cultural policy, and it was mainly in 
this sense – art, culture or media policy – that the 
cultural industries were approached up to the 
1990s.
‘The arts’
We suggested that public funding of the arts was 
only established fully in 1945, and its subsidy 
model rather tentative. We also suggested that 
as subsidy became more established (due to 
increasing expense), it tended to absorb the idea 
of public service, which focused on distributing 
the cake, and restricted the notion of art to ‘the 
arts’ that were subsidised. We also noted Keynes’ 
suggestion that the task of the Arts Council was 
“to give courage, confidence and opportunity…. 
New work will spring up more abundantly 
in unexpected quarters and in unforeseen 
shapes when there is universal opportunity 
for contact with traditional and contemporary 
arts in their noblest forms.” In 1981 Raymond 
Williams commented on this in ways that could 
sum up the general approach of the social-
democratic discontent with existing arts funding 
arrangements. He suggested that the task set by 
Keynes was
“that of encouraging a serious, expanding and 
changing popular culture… [and it is here] that the 
whole question of the nature and purposes of art 
is being redefined, and that the key element of this 
redefinition is openness… But what is hardest to 
realize is that even traditional art changes when its 
audiences change, and that in the making of new 
art changing audiences are always a significant 
factor…Thus it is never only a quantitative extension 
or expansion of a culture. If we take seriously the 
idea of making art, as practice and as works, more 
accessible to more people, we have to accept 
and indeed welcome the fact that as part of these 
changes there will also be changes in the arts 
themselves”77. 
He adds: nobody who knows the history of art 
should fear these changes, and that there is 
more danger when art is “locked into courts 
and academies” or when “artists are pushed by 
neglect into isolation and there is no flow between 
them and a wide and diverse public”. 
This position clearly links to the community 
arts movement as it developed from the 1960s 
which was a much more ambitious movement 
than the ‘social inclusion’ after-thoughts which 
characterises much of what we know as 
‘community arts’ today. In it art moves out of 
the (middle class metropolitan) institutions and 
engages with popular culture – conceived as 
that ‘whole way of life’ of communities, not just 
commercial culture. In so doing it picked up ideas 
of ‘left modernism’, which, as we have seen, 
directly challenged both traditional aesthetics and 
that conception of modernism that separated 
itself from the concerns of everyday life. The 
engagement with popular culture – what in the 
1920s and 30s had been called (in positive spirit) 
‘the masses’ – transformed both traditional and 
contemporary art. In this sense ‘community art’ 
was also radical and experimental, responsive 
to the needs of that community; it wanted to 
transform the passive contemplative spectator of 
‘bourgeois aesthetics’ into the active working class 
participant. Benjamin’s work on the new forms of 
perception in film, popular entertainment and in 
the modern city – montage, shock, interruption, 
non-identification – generally suggested a more 
active, tactile and ‘distracted’ form of engagement 
with art. It was a form of engagement linked to the 
modern city with its juxtapositions, its partial views 
and unexpected encounters – not the quiet auratic 
space of the museum.
Brecht’s work was seminal here, and especially 
his break from the artist-genius towards the 
‘author as producer’, a more artisanal, collective 
and pragmatic approach to creating the artwork. 
It also began to engage with modern technology. 
One of the critiques of commercial popular culture 
in the 1930s and 40s was that it displaced more 
active and participatory forms of cultural activity 
by replacing them with cultural forms (such as 
Hollywood films or Broadway songs) produced 
a long way away – culturally and geographically 
– from local concerns. Brecht was clear that 
the freedom of the artist outside these new 
technologies was meaningless: “To say to the 
intellectual worker that he is free to renounce 
the new work tools is to assign him a freedom 
outside the production process”78. Community 
art then was not just about opening access to the 
working classes as Williams suggests, it involves 
a radical transformation of that ‘art’ itself. But it 
also involves a new conception of the artist and 
the whole production process. What is more 
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explicit in Brecht is that this involves a more active 
engagement with both the technologies (an idea 
powerful in arts education) and the production 
values of commercial popular culture. Williams 
might be more circumspect about the big culture 
industries but community arts suggested that an 
engagement with popular culture and commercial 
popular culture was necessary and possible. 
Williams argues that the attempt to take ‘the arts’ 
out of the market was a failure, and that was 
always going to be so; it is impossible to isolate 
them from the realities of a contemporary capitalist 
society. This is also clear amongst those writing 
from the social production of art perspective – 
how could they not be part of this society? On 
the one hand, Williams argued, governments 
would constantly pressure them to become more 
commercially viable and account for themselves 
in crude measures of profit and loss. On the other, 
the arts were used to promote tourism and lend 
their prestige – via sponsorship, advertising and 
‘corporate’ entertainment – to the business world. 
For Williams, this cements metropolitan arts elitism 
and capitalism in ways that lock art up within a 
new kind of ‘court’; it leads to the underfunding 
of the regional and community arts activities. 
Williams was writing just before Myerscough’s 
work on the economic impact of the arts, where 
their ability to generate income and employment 
through tourism and hospitality are used as key 
justifications for funding (or ‘investment’), and 
before this became a crucial plank in the new 
concept of ‘arts led urban regeneration’79. 
Williams thought that the Art Council’s 
engagement with new forms of art and popular 
culture (conceived as an overlapping pair) was the 
only legitimate justification for public spending. 
In fact the 1980s saw a significant shift towards 
the economic justification of public spending 
on the arts. On the one hand, this resulted in 
the ‘economic impact’ justifications above, on 
the other it shifted the sense of public funding 
from public service to ‘welfare’. That is, the new 
confidence around the ‘free market’, which 
permeated political debates especially in the 
Anglo-Saxon world (and its spheres of influence), 
suggested that the only reason for public funding 
was ‘market failure’. The state stepped in because 
the market failed to provide for certain things 
– infrastructure, education and heritage – that 
were deemed socially necessary or desirable. 
This led to a certain defensiveness on the part 
of the publicly funded arts organizations who 
were; constantly tempering accounts of their 
positive contribution in order not to be asked to 
stand independent of public funding. Indeed, 
it could seem that ‘market failure’ was actually 
the failure of the arts to engage with the market. 
In this context public funding became ‘welfare’ 
in the new sense – a dispiriting dependence on 
handouts, which, in the end, did nobody any 
good. Part of the appeal of the cultural and then 
creative industries agenda, as we shall see, is that 
it seemed to suggest a way out of this impasse.
Williams opposed openness to popular culture, 
to a situation where art was locked up in the 
(corporate) “court” and “academy”; but he also 
opposed the situation where “artists are pushed by 
neglect into isolation and there is no flow between 
them and a wide and diverse public”. As Williams 
and many others had pointed out, both the source 
of this “isolation” and the dominant mechanism 
for the flow between artist and public was the 
market. What is missing in Williams’ account is 
how this engagement of art and popular culture 
is to be funded. If commercial considerations are 
distorting, and if the trustees of the Art Council 
become short sighted and dependent on the 
powers that be, how is democratic public funding 
to work? Any vision of an open, democratic 
culture, many suggested, needed an engagement 
with commercial popular culture. 
The cultural industries could not be easily 
dismissed as pure ideology or pure trash; many 
of the most innovative and dynamics aspects 
of popular culture were already deeply involved 
in this commercial world (at least, they were not 
state funded). Brecht had been aware of the 
disruptive energies of commercial culture: “the 
masses’ bad taste is rooted more deeply in reality 
than the intellectuals’ good taste”. For him it 
also represented a form of collective production 
which had positive potentials: “it is the essence 
of capitalism and not something generally valid 
that ‘unique’ and ‘special’ artifacts can only be 
produced by individuals and collectives only bring 
forth standardized mass commodities”80. Cultural 
production had to mobilise collective resources 
in which creation was a collaborative process. 
Outside of the Soviet block such mobilisation 
had to be done through the market, even if the 
state was paying. And ultimately this state-funded 
production had to legitimate itself in terms of its 
public benefit and find ways of responding to 
audience need. In both of these the market was 
unavoidable. The nature of this ‘market’ and 
this ‘collective’ or ‘public’ is, however, disputed 
territory.
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Cultural industries, 
post-Fordism and public policy
 
Corporate culture 
If art is autonomous and opposed to debased 
commercial culture then the clear task of arts 
policy is to defend this autonomy, mainly through 
funding. Since the 1980s such a characterisation 
of commercial popular culture was not so easy 
in Australia or Britain (and decreasingly so in 
other parts of Europe), and the sanctity of the 
individual creative artist had, as we saw, been 
repeatedly challenged by art history and cultural 
studies. Nevertheless, the (relative) autonomy of 
the artist or the creative process was not to be 
dismissed especially as a growing ‘neo-liberalism’ 
and cultural studies populism positioned such 
claims as leftist elitism. Williams had suggested 
that whilst in the 19th century the artist had dealt 
as individuals with the market via intermediaries 
(dealers, publishers etc.), in the 20th century 
the dominant trend was towards the ‘corporate 
professional’, where artists were employed to 
execute the ideas of the corporate entity. In this 
sense the erosion of creative autonomy could only 
result in a corporate-inspired culture. 
Bill Ryan’s 1992 account was one of a growing 
number looking at how ‘creatives’ are managed 
within large scale corporate entities81. Ryan traces 
in meticulous detail how creatives are ‘handled’ 
by producers who tend to know the cultural 
field, but have to work within a wider context 
set by the accountants and the requirements of 
the marketing department. Without reducing a 
complex account too harshly, there is a sense 
that the authentic use value of culture is gradually 
shaped and groomed into the capitalist exchange 
value of a marketing driven enterprise. Much of 
this is undeniable. However, if one of the difficulties 
of such enterprises is that cultural value – as 
what sells – is unpredictable, then simply setting 
creatives a task to execute does not get at the 
full complexities of the process. It also does not 
explain why some great work comes out of these 
enterprises (as well as lots of rubbish). Becker’s 
rather sanguine view of the art worlds does point 
to all sorts of constraining factors which set these 
enterprises within wider worlds of codes and 
conventions, accepted practices, reputation, 
press and media criticism, and the wider cultural 
dynamics of the market itself. Negotiations around 
the autonomy of the creative does not just involve 
the immediate creative workers but involves wider 
issues for the company – its forms of creative 
management, its internal culture and its external 
reputation – that also have an impact on its future 
employees and audiences. That is, ‘corporate 
culture’ is constrained in all sorts of complex 
ways by the nature of its product; it has to be 
aware of the large cultural dynamics within which 
its products gain value and the complex ways 
in which its management of creative input and 
audience perception of this, affect these values.
As such, large cultural corporations are part of the 
wider system of the ‘social production of culture’. 
They rely on many forms of publicly funded 
input, from educational and training institutions, 
regulatory and legal enforcements, and from wider 
inputs in the form of environments conducive to 
sustaining a ‘creative class’. They also form part 
of that public sphere which emerged at the end 
of the 18th century, that is crucial to the openness 
of that ‘culture in common’ with which cultural 
policy is concerned. It is in this sense that cultural 
industries policies are public policies, and it is why 
they are contested policies. They are always going 
to involve political, economic as well as cultural 
interests.
As public policy, cultural policy has to confront 
‘market failure’ in a rather different sense: that 
markets themselves fail or become dysfunctional. 
They have tendencies to monopoly and 
agglomeration of which Adam Smith was fully 
aware. The huge financial stakes in the large 
cultural industries can make ‘creative autonomy’ 
a threat to be managed. Directly addressing 
Bourdieu, Nicholas Garnham wrote:
[T]he dominant fraction [of the dominant class] 
cannot safely leave the cultural field to be shaped by 
the interstatus group competition between subsets 
of the dominated fraction, since the reproduction of 
their economic capital now depends directly upon 
both the costs of production and the size of the 
markets for symbolic goods82. 
Cultural industries policy has not just been about 
nation building but also about concerns over the 
openness of the public sphere. Habermas’ work 
on the subject was sparked by his concern over 
how these large corporations were now able to 
dominate this sphere. Cultural industries policies 
attempted to set such market failures (distortions) 
within a mixed economy of state and market, 
ensuring competition and transparency. With this 
ambition the stakes of national identity, social 
democratic openness, strategic media control and 
increasing national market share have been mixed 
together. 
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In response, the 1980s and 90s saw waves of de-
regulation and globalisation as part of a concerted 
economic expansion of international corporations 
against (though sometimes with) local states. 
These directly challenged the legitimacy of 
nation-state interventions in the cultural industries. 
First, there was an ever more forceful ‘free trade’ 
argument, driven by the World Trade Organisation, 
World Bank and institutions associated with the 
‘Washington Consensus’, which suggested that 
globalisation could not make exception for cultural 
goods. Second, technological developments 
(satellite, fibre optic, internet) alongside the 
internationalisation of finance and corporate law 
allowed new levels of global distribution and cross 
platform ownership. Third, the legitimacy of ‘nation 
building’ was being challenged across the political 
spectrum; there was no longer a singular national 
identity but multiple cultures, multiple identities, 
many of which have crossed borders and 
disrupted traditional national narratives. Fourth, 
cultural studies had strongly challenged the 
claims of art to provide some privileged access 
to the essence of national culture, or that they 
represented universal values to that all sections of 
society could (or should) subscribe. 
For all these reasons, at a time when the authority 
of nation-states over their own ‘cultural territory’ 
was being challenged by globalisation, there was 
growing dissensus around the desirability and 
feasibility of a cultural policy aimed at promoting 
‘national content’. On what grounds could such 
be identified let alone promoted? By the 1990s 
governments became increasingly unsure about 
the grounds of intervention into the cultural 
industries. By default they began to focus on 
the ‘industry’ component – how to defend and 
enhance the competitiveness of national cultural 
industries as economic entities. However, the 
promotion of national cultural industries was 
always to some extent a cultural as well as 
economic policy; local-national production, it was 
believed, would ensure locally relevant content. 
Yet the grounds for this became elusive, and the 
economic justification increasingly did service for 
the uncertainty of the cultural politics. 
However, this situation was complicated by the 
emergence of a non-corporate cultural industries 
sector in which issues of market and culture, both 
local and global, took on a different hue.
Post-Fordism and the creative 
entrepreneur
The intermingling of art worlds and popular 
culture in the 1970s and 80s often took place 
on the peripheries of corporate structures. It 
received little direct arts funding but thrived within 
marginal economies dependent on different 
kinds of public funding and small-scale local 
markets. These included work in community arts 
education and facilities, occasional work for the 
large arts institutions, and informal activity around 
student unions, university and other post-school 
educational institutions. Welfare payments were 
also important. So too were small ‘alternative’ 
retail, local design work, and the informal 
economies of the music industry. All these made 
up a motley economy of independent cultural 
producers operating in marginal areas of cities.
In the 1980s and 90s these sorts of activities 
began to intertwine with the activities of larger 
cultural industries, as in-house employment 
increasingly gave way to the use of freelance 
and small business input. This was part of a 
general shift towards sub-contracting and out-
sourcing, a response to the new post-70s market 
fragmentation and unpredictability known as 
‘flexible specialisation’ or ‘post-Fordism’. The 
proliferation of niche markets and the volatility 
of demand called for the kind of flexibility and 
responsiveness that had been long established 
in the cultural industries. It is for this reason that 
Lash and Urry, in 1994, suggested that the cultural 
industries were no longer a hangover, a remnant 
of an older artisanal economy, but a harbinger of 
the new. They were now cutting edge83. 
What became clear in the 1980s was that much 
of the employment in the cultural industries sector 
consisted of freelancers and small businesses, 
and they occupied similar social and cultural 
spaces as the arts. This suggested that cultural 
production, conceived at its widest, was occurring 
outside the arts funding system, that it was not 
opposed to the arts but intersected within them 
in all sorts of ways, and that it was producing 
culture within the market but not dominated by the 
maximisation of profit. 
Arts and creative industries: a historical overview 67
A new cultural policy vision
 
1981: Greater London Council 
It was to this area of the cultural industries that 
the Greater London Council, in part following 
experiments in France and Italy, applied itself 
between 1981 and 1986. Its approach grew out 
of that desire for a democratic cultural policy we 
saw with Williams, where art and popular culture 
would encounter each other. But it did so by 
building on that political economy insight that 
most cultural goods were carried by the market. 
It also suggested that it was the small scale 
cultural producers who were the most dynamic, 
that they were embedded in and articulated local 
cultures, and that they were exploited by the big 
corporations which controlled distribution and 
access to markets. The GLC took two lines on this. 
First was the attempt to support producers 
by training and giving access to production 
facilities, either through publicly financed facilities 
or through financing co-ops and community 
arts facilities. The impact on subsequent local 
economic and cultural strategies was high. It 
represented an attempt to break out of a cultural 
policy centred on ‘the arts’, or rather those 
activities that had established themselves as ‘the 
arts’ for the purposes of public funding. But in 
widening their view they were also forced to move 
beyond the reliance on direct subsidies to artists 
and producing institutions as the foundation of 
that policy. They began to address the conditions 
of the commercial production of culture using 
economic and statistical tools (e.g. value-chains, 
employment mapping), focusing on how the 
sector as a whole worked as an integrated system 
– including those crucial commercial and technical 
‘non-creative’ activities essential to art worlds. 
As such it represented an ‘industrial’ approach to 
cultural policy, in the sense that it addressed the 
complex division of labour and markets involved 
in the social production of culture. Such an 
approach also suggested an approach to cultural 
policy, which used economic means to achieve 
cultural ends. This had always been so in cultural 
industries policies at a national level – through 
the regulation and state financing of large cultural 
industries – but its application to the local level 
introduced new dynamics and complexities.
The second line of approach was a new focus on 
the role of the market at the consumption end. A 
crucial point made by Garnham, who was involved 
in these initiatives, was that art and the market 
were not inimical to each other – the market can be 
a relatively efficient way of allocating resources and 
reflecting choice. Public policy can and should use 
the market as a way to distribute cultural goods 
and services – and to do so in a way that follows 
audience demand rather than the ambitions of 
the producers themselves. Garnham’s focus 
was not primarily on local production strategies 
but on developing a democratic cultural policy 
based on an educated and informed audience 
demand to which publicly owned distribution 
companies and cultural producers alike could 
respond. Garnham was clear that the possibilities 
for cultural consumption were limited by income, 
time and competition from other activities; cultural 
goods, public or private, were in competition with 
each other and the market was an important 
mechanism of selection84. 
Creative Nation
The 1994 Labour Government’s Creative Nation 
policy statement extended the rethinking of 
arts into cultural policy from a local to a national 
level. It drew on modernising currents within the 
Australian Labour Party who were responding – 
like many other social-democratic labour parties 
– to the political challenge from the civil rights, 
anti-war, feminist and ecological movements of 
the 1970s. Arguably, however, its most immediate 
trigger was the role the cultural lobby had played 
in the election of Labour – its efforts deemed 
to have assisted it in winning the ‘unwinnable’ 
election of 1993. Strands of thought that can be 
clearly discerned in Creative Nation included a 
much warmer embrace of popular culture than 
any policies had shown previously. It evoked a 
diverse popular culture counter-posed to elite 
conceptions of art. Some saw it as inflected with 
a complex anti-colonialism in which ‘art’ had 
been associated with the civilising mission of the 
mother-country and the impossible aspiration to 
become ‘just like them’. It was complex because 
inflected through the question of indigenous 
culture which positioned white Australia as 
themselves colonisers. Whilst the GLC experiment 
certainly had its own complex internally focused 
‘anti-imperialism’ it could never articulate this as 
a national vision. Creative Nation attempted this 
and remains the touchstone for an ambitious 
reorientation of the future trajectory of Australia in 
the 21st century.
Creative Nation also resonated with the growing 
critique of the arts establishment, finally provided 
with a national funding body protected by Act of 
Parliament in 1968. The rapid growth of Australian 
cultural studies and critical cultural policy studies 
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from the 1970s onwards gave a combative edge 
to this critique that was to continue through the 
‘culture wars’ of the John Howard government 
years. But from the perspective of this report, it was 
the recognition that an inclusive Australian culture 
had to include not only indigenous (and indeed 
other non-western) cultures but also commercial 
popular culture. The work of Australian based 
scholars – John Frow, Tony Bennett, Graeme 
Turner, Meagan Morris, Stuart Cunningham, Colin 
Mercer, Gay Hawkins to name but a few – gave 
the notion of cultural industries the same kind of 
positive charge found around the GLC.
In the years around Creative Nation Australia led 
the Anglophone debates around both the theory 
and practice of cultural policy. The national vision 
of a diverse and open culture which seriously 
attempted to go beyond a traditional arts policy 
was accompanied by the development of urban 
cultural industries policies which Conservative 
Britain made increasingly difficult. It is clear that 
Creative Nation fed directly into the new cultural 
policy vision being developed for (what was to 
become) New Labour by Chris Smith and others. 
It might be that the term ‘creative’ was the source 
for the re-named creative industries of 1998.
A new role for markets
The GLC and Creative Nation visions were in 
their different ways social-democratic attempts 
to re-assert the role of markets in the face of 
Soviet top-down planning, as well as the Fordist/
Keynesian industrial agglomeration policies of the 
1960s and 70s. It also distinguished itself from the 
free market theories coming from the USA and 
adopted by Margaret Thatcher; markets were not 
universal laws but tools that could be adapted 
and used. These debates formed the backdrop 
against which cultural policy debates in the last 
two decades evolved.
The debate around state and market became 
more ideologically polarised, but on the other 
the precise nature of markets became more 
complicated. Although the idea of ‘free market’ 
had became very powerful, at the same time 
economists, historians and geographers were 
suggesting that neo-classical economists 
had got it wrong. Market economies were not 
located in some Newtonian space where force 
is equally distributed and universally the same; 
economic space was lumpy, uneven, has different 
dynamics and tendencies in different places. 
Markets were embedded; they linked with local 
cultures, histories and institutional structures. 
This coincided with a widespread re-assertion 
of the important implications of local history and 
identity (or ‘path-dependency’) for economic 
development. Thus alongside globalisation went 
an assertion of local economic possibilities that 
used markets strongly embedded in local socio-
cultural contexts. 
A new creative habitus
These tendencies could be seen above all in local 
cultural economies. The absolute opposition to 
the market, marked classic bohemian culture, 
was giving way to a more flexible approach. 
Independent cultural producers were acting in 
ways akin to small business entrepreneurs; they 
were self-employed and looked to take advantage 
of niche, emerging, fleeting markets. But they 
were distinguished by their cultural motivations. 
The impulse we identified as emerging in the 
1960s – to change life, to break the 9-5, to engage 
in creative and meaningful work, to be your own 
boss, to be autonomous – became increasingly 
operative in the context of these new kinds of 
‘post-Fordist’, fragmented, dispersed economies. 
Making a living in the new art/popular culture 
worlds involved a complex mix of formal and 
informally acquired creative skills, as well as an 
ability to mix business and cultural considerations. 
As Oakley and Leadbeater suggested in 2000, 
these cultural entrepreneurs operate not as 
heroic individuals but within complex networks 
of interdependence85. These networks do not 
have simply economic and technical functions; 
these complex collectives facilitate the creation 
of economic and cultural value. And they do so 
in non-linear ways – they take us beyond the 
simple value-chain. Their concern is not with the 
neo-classical price-use mechanism, but with the 
creation of unknown values, of things people do 
not yet know they want; that is, of new markets. 
These collectives developed ways in which to 
acquire, manage and profit from their insiders’ 
knowledge of the cultural dynamics of these as yet 
unknown markets. In this sense they intersect with 
funded artists who also try to get in touch with 
audiences and to present them with something 
of unknown value. In many respects artists and 
‘creatives’ are working in that same space of 
unknown value. “What will audiences/markets 
respond to?” is a question answered by an 
immersion in a ‘creative field’, knowledge acquired 
not just at the rational analytical level but through 
an intuitive grasp of possibilities which Bourdieu 
described as learning to inhabit a subjective 
position (habitus) from the inside. 
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Creative clusters
These local ‘clusters’ (as they became known 
in the 1990s) provided economies of scale in 
specialized skilled labour, and they also circulated 
local tacit knowledge or ‘know-how’. In this sense 
they formed in part with localised economic 
systems identified by economic geographers and 
historians. But as producers of cultural goods 
their activities were also seen as expressive of 
place, the sorts of knowledge they mobilised 
was that produced within, and at the same time 
reflecting or mediating, local cultures. This very 
deep connection of cultural industries to cultures 
of place provided the basis for a convergence 
between local economic and cultural policy from 
the late 1980s, at the moment when such a link 
was being challenged at national level. 
These local clusters or ‘ecosystems’ were crucial 
to the operations of larger cultural companies. 
We saw above how (despite Adorno) freelance 
labour had always been the norm in the cultural 
industries, and even as Williams was writing of 
the age of the ‘corporate professional’, the small 
and micro-enterprise sector continued to grow86. 
In an age of volatile and fragmented markets, it 
made sense for the basic ‘R&D’ to be left to these 
ecosystems. The big companies and dispersed 
micro-sector operated in symbiosis. But these 
local ecosystems, these ‘art worlds’, were creative 
fields organized around money, aesthetic and 
ethical/social economies in mutual tension. They 
were not just driven by money motives; they were 
also regulated by judgments of aesthetic value. 
As with Becker’s account, there were complex 
systems of formal and informal judgment – from 
peers, from the media, from industry bodies 
and awards, from educational institutions, from 
politicians – within which artistic/creative reputation 
and self-respect were constructed. Equally, there 
were ethical/social judgments concerning business 
practice, abuse of trust, personal behavior (to 
staff and partners, for example) etc, which Mark 
Banks called ‘moral economies’87. These aesthetic 
and ethical/social (which could also be political) 
economies were very much at play in the creative 
industries, as especially within the small and micro-
sectors. They were not structured simplistically 
around the opposition of art and money, as in 
Bourdieu, but they produced complex systems of 
value that cannot be reduced to ‘the market’ in the 
sense of price/profit maximisation. 
How these creative ecosystems structure local 
and global, formal and tacit knowledge, and 
organise the financial, aesthetic and ethical/social 
systems of value are still in the process of being 
understood. But that these ecosystems involve 
the publicly funded arts, as well as the creative 
industries, is now well established. The global 
creative industry capitals are, for the most part, art 
capitals. There are art capitals, which do not have 
creative industries, and vice versa, but they do not 
figure in the top tier of cultural capitals. Currid’s 
updating of Becker in her account of the ‘Warhol’ 
economy of art, music and fashion in New York 
gives some indication of the complexity of this 
ecosystem, where nightclubs and institutions of 
cultural modernism occupy key positions on this 
circulation of value88.
Conclusion
The GLC experiment remained only that, and 
Creative Nation was quickly eclipsed by a new 
right-wing government. But they both gave rise to 
three new policy strands in the next decade. 
1. They underlined a shift from ‘arts’ policy 
to ‘cultural’ policy – an attempt to register 
the difference Williams had made between 
the arts as a specific set of practices and 
culture ‘as a whole way of life’. But culture 
as a ‘whole way of life’ was ambiguous; 
although it included the meaning systems 
and practices of a whole social world – 
the anthropological sense – it was used 
primarily to assert the claims of ‘popular 
culture’ against the arts. Popular culture 
became all those commercial and 
amateur practices associated with cultural 
consumption and leisure, and previously 
excluded by the arts. Cultural policy for local 
government thus became an expanded 
sphere of leisure provision in which ‘the arts’ 
were but one subsection, a particular niche, 
in a democratic diversity of possibility. This 
glossed over the fact that the arts often 
accounted for the bulk of local expenditure 
(especially galleries, museums and concert 
halls), but also that the arts continued 
to receive funding based on claims to a 
preeminent status within culture. The arts 
remained the unacknowledged primus 
inter pares within this new democratic 
culture. It is this ambiguity that much of 
cultural studies addressed in the 1990s, 
exposing the lack of clear legitimacy for 
the pre-eminence of ‘art’ and the interests 
associated with this. We return to this in the 
next chapter.
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2. They introduced a concern with the 
economics of culture into cultural policies. 
Cultural economics began to take off as 
a distinct discipline in the 1960s; national 
governments, as we saw, had taken more 
note of the economic dynamics of cultural 
industries, and this extended to the European 
Union level from the 1980s. In the late 
1980s cities also became more interested 
in understanding arts and cultural activities 
as economic activities. Statistical surveys 
and audits, along with economic models 
such as value chains, became much more 
widespread. By the end of the 1990s in 
the UK they became near statutory policy 
instruments. The motivations for such studies 
were both economic and cultural, in the 
way described for the GLC and Creative 
Nation. Understanding value chains, gaps 
in infrastructure, market structures and so 
on, would allow intervention and support to 
promote a local arts and cultural sector which 
would also have direct employment benefits. 
However, these two elements did not always 
sit together nicely. The range of economic 
benefits expanded to include tourism, city 
marketing and urban regeneration which 
would often cut against the local cultural 
sectors they sought to promote. In particular, 
the economic benefits of the arts and cultural 
industries were recouped much quicker 
through their linkage to iconic buildings and 
real estate than they were by longer-term 
cultural industrial growth. 
3.  It became increasingly hard to distinguish 
between economic and cultural benefits 
in any traditional sense. The contribution 
of arts and culture to city image were of 
course measurable in tourist spending 
and inward investment, and these became 
classic justifications of arts spending from 
the 1980s onwards. They were also the 
site of much conflict over what was real 
‘local’ culture and the impact of ‘yuppies’ 
and ‘gentrification’, which have re-emerged 
around the ideas of Richard Florida’s ‘creative 
class’89. But at a deeper level there was a 
hope that the arts and cultural industries 
sector, embodying cutting edge cultural and 
entrepreneurial energy, could enhance the 
wider dynamism of the local economy. The 
‘creative city’ idea saw a vibrant arts and 
cultural economy as a key element of an 
intelligent, future oriented urban vision, but 
it also emphasised the anthropological idea 
of culture. Culture as a whole way of (urban) 
life becomes a resource for the city. Indeed, 
as de-industrialisation set in many Australian, 
European and North America cities, this 
local cultural capacity – education, attitude, 
history and social structure – became seen 
as a crucial competitive factor. In the early 
1990s these various capacities were to be 
wrapped up in the term ‘creativity’, and it with 
this new resource that the cultural industries 
were to re-connect with national cultural and 
economic policy.
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Creativity
At the moment when the notion of ‘artistic genius’ 
was being thrown out by art history and cultural 
studies, ‘creativity’ was being presented as a new, 
universal, resource for economies and societies. 
Sarah Selwood points out that in a review of UK 
arts policies in the 1980s the word creativity was 
not used90. Kate Oakley suggests that it was not 
used as an abstract noun until 193391; others 
put it earlier92. In this sense, the debate can get 
rather arcane. ‘Creativity’ gained traction within 
professional disciplines early in the 20th century 
in educational theory and psychology, drawing 
on models of artistic practice and perception 
to suggest different forms of learning and 
understanding from those of ‘linear’ rationalist 
thinking. Much of writing has traced the word 
across other disciplines from management 
and HR, through to innovation economics and 
neuroscience. However, from our perspective of 
arts and creative industries, the notion is so central 
it is very easily overlooked. 
First, human beings’ ability to create new things, 
to invent, to build has always been seen as one 
of their essential characteristics; though how this 
relationship between humans and the natural 
world and with other humans has been conceived 
and lived is very different in different societies. The 
power to create new things outside the measure 
set by God was something that emerged in 
Europe with the Renaissance. The foundations 
and consequences of man’s productivity and 
the bounds within in which it might be set 
(reason, morality, justice) were the starting point 
of the Enlightenment. In many important senses 
‘creativity’, as a universal quality of individuals and 
societies, has been the central focus of European 
philosophy, economics, politics and sociology for 
the last 300 years.
Second, the specific association of creative ability 
with artistic practice occurs in the period between 
the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. This 
is frequently seen as a ‘locking up’ of creativity 
within the artistic genius and thus in some ways 
an act of elitism. This notion is linked to the radical 
critique of aesthetics we have already discussed; 
that it makes art the realm of freedom and work 
the realm of necessity, acting as compensation 
for, and ideological masking of, the inequalities 
and injustices of capitalism and modern industrial 
society. However, we have suggested that art 
and aesthetics have also been about a manner of 
apprehending and acting on the world different to 
that of cognitive and moral reason. Art’s autonomy 
has sometimes been interpreted as a radical 
separation from social reality – ‘art for art’s sake’ 
– but has most consistently been associated with 
a space in which the world might be differently 
apprehended. And this has had tremendous social 
and political consequences. Art and aesthetics 
have been central to the understanding, critique 
and productivity of modernity itself. 
Third, the fact that ‘creativity’ has gained wide 
currency in the last 20 years might suggest 
either that the artist’s vision has finally been 
taken seriously, or that a creativity monopolised 
by artists has now become a democratic right. 
But behind these lie bigger narratives about the 
transformation of work, of individual subjectivity 
and of social organisation, which in turn involve 
claims about collapse or folding of culture and 
economy into one another. Such assertions would 
radically challenge the claims of art and subsume 
them under a ‘creative industries’ capable of 
driving a new kind of economy.
Information Society
The work of Alvin Toffler and Daniel Bell in the 
1970s suggested that the dominant trend in 
advanced economies was towards the production 
and management of information93. In the 1980s 
it became widely accepted that competitiveness 
was to come not from prices but innovation, and 
as such ‘knowledge’ or ‘symbolic’ workers were 
positioned as central. Two aspects are important 
for us. 
First, being competitive involved a cultural capacity 
– the ability to “process knowledge and manipulate 
symbols” in Manuel Castells’ phrase94. At one level 
culture was being used in the sense of particular 
symbolic systems, such as science, mathematics, 
statistics and other forms of knowledge. But it 
was also used in the anthropological sense. The 
ability to be innovative meant not just manipulating 
existing codes but challenging the systemic rules 
themselves. ‘Creativity’ becomes this ability to work 
at the more innovative, rule-breaking end of the 
knowledge economy. This creative capacity relied 
not simply on creative individuals but on the wider 
social, economic and cultural structures within which 
they operated. For example, the famous contrast 
between Boston and Silicon Valley suggested that 
the former had rigid divisions between different 
social and economic sectors, whereas the latter 
had much more lateral connections. Indeed, it was 
the social and cultural ethos of California which was 
deemed to have allowed such radically innovative 
Chapter 6
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and entrepreneurial success. Thus it was not just 
traditional indicators such as levels of schooling, 
transportation, R&D investment, or amenities that 
seemed decisive, but more subtle assessments of 
‘weak social ties’, cultural attitudes, and openness 
to diverse social connections – the socio-economic 
configuration and culture as a ‘whole way of life’.
Second, in the 1980s knowledge workers were 
seen as driven by job fulfillment, demanding of 
high levels of autonomy, and having wider ethical 
and political concerns that they brought to their 
jobs. This has clear overlap with cultural workers 
with whom they were increasingly associated. 
Indeed, by the later 1990s writers such as Richard 
Florida and John Howkins were placing all these 
knowledge workers together under the banner 
of ‘creative class’ and ‘creative economy’95. The 
notion of ‘creativity’ then becomes part of the 
innovation system within knowledge intensive 
industries, located at the more ‘blue skies’ end of 
the spectrum. There is a lot of literature on how 
innovation and creativity relate, and how they can 
be managed. But creativity is used to refer to the 
kind of lateral, non-linear thinking associated with 
artistic and scientific practices when they operate at 
the limits of the established rules. Moreover, those 
involved in these processes were seen as achieving 
the kind of self-fulfillment and a level of autonomy 
previously associated with artistic labour. 
Entrepreneurs as the new rebels
The ‘knowledge class’ was frequently attacked in 
cultural studies, which positioned it as elitist with 
respect to popular culture. At the same time, the 
idea was also associated with ‘corporatism’ and 
the planned economy by many on the political 
right. Indeed, though the ‘knowledge class’ 
had power, they (as with Bourdieu’s ‘dominated 
fraction of the dominant class’) were never as 
powerful as the owners of economic capital. In the 
1980s Schumpeter’s notion of the entrepreneur 
displaced the autonomous knowledge worker from 
the driving pole of innovation96. 
Schumpeter’s solution to Marx and Keynes’ critique 
of capitalism’s market failures (falling rates of 
profit as markets get saturated) was to suggest a 
periodic break with existing ways of doing things. 
Old markets and production structures would be 
shattered and new ones emerge out of the ruins in 
a process he called ‘creative destruction’. The key 
to this was not the state or corporate professionals 
but the maverick figure of the entrepreneur. 
Entrepreneurs don’t follow obvious profits but look 
for new products, new markets; if successful they 
shatter the existing arrangements, leading to short 
term economic turmoil resulting in new levels of 
growth. Schumpeter’s creative destruction has 
obvious affinities with a form of modernist artistic 
innovation – the avant-garde’s destruction of the old 
and clearing the ground for the new. Business and 
management literature in the 1970s began to equate 
the entrepreneur and the artistic rebel. Both broke 
the rules, worked outside their ‘comfort’ zone, trod 
paths at a tangent to the mainstream, and thought 
‘outside the box’. Both thrived when ‘all that is solid 
melts into air’.
There were three consequences. 
First, the agenda of ‘creativity’, which emerged 
in the 1990s used knowledge and information 
society discourses, but linked these more directly 
to that particular manner of dealing with this 
information/knowledge found amongst artists and 
cultural workers. Second, it shifted the emphasis 
from corporate professionals in the knowledge 
economy towards entrepreneurs and the SME 
sector. This was especially so when innovation 
within Internet and digital technology seemed to 
be driven by this latter sector (the ‘dot.com boom’ 
was key). Third, it made an association between 
the radical practice of both entrepreneurs and 
artists in such a way as to allow ‘creativity’ to be 
applicable to both. 
As a result Florida’s ‘creative class’, Howkins’ 
‘creative economy’ and, in 1998, the UK 
government’s ‘creative industries’ established 
themselves at the confluence of some powerful 
and evocative contemporary discourses. The 
richness or ambiguity of this notion of creativity 
could suggest that the different productivities of 
culture and economics, art and industry, which 
had seemed to take divergent paths at the 
end of the 18th century, were now headed for a 
reconciliation. 
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Creative industries
The associations between creative artist and 
creative entrepreneur – the entrepreneur as 
the new bohemian rebel – could remain merely 
suggestive. What made the difference was the 
very real growth in the size and significance of the 
cultural industries and those markets that relied on 
‘aesthetic’ innovation. 
We have already noted how in 1991 Lash and Urry 
had re-positioned clusters of small-scale cultural 
businesses as ‘cutting edge’. If post-Fordism 
demanded more flexibility and responsiveness 
to niche markets, and thus new levels of both 
hard and soft (intuitive, immersive knowledge) 
information, then those industries who increasingly 
dealt with non-functional, ‘unknown’ values such 
as the new service sector (also being renamed 
as the ‘experience economy’), and design-led 
manufacture should look to the cultural industries 
as a role model. Despite the glamour attached to 
these industries – which should not be discounted 
and which was not lost on policy makers – they 
exemplified the new resource of ‘creativity’ not 
because they were stuffed full of visionary artistic 
geniuses but because their skills and business 
practices were attuned to these new kinds of 
‘cultural’ markets. They dealt in unknown values; 
that is, non-functional goods whose value was not 
set within neo-classical cost-price mechanisms. 
Those cultural industries, which sought to produce 
for this market, were highly dependent on feedback 
loops and non-linear production processes which 
had evolved from the art worlds and cultural 
markets of the 19th century and early 20th centuries. 
However, the UK government’s definition of the 
creative industries was very different: 
“those industries which have their origin in individual 
creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential 
for wealth and job creation through the generation 
and exploitation of intellectual property”97. 
This emphasis on creative individuals generating 
intellectual property moved away from the 
industrial, sectoral or ecosystem approach98. It 
did so because it was concerned to focus on 
creativity as a universal, human resource that 
could be tapped. The information/knowledge 
society demanded creative individuals, and the 
creative industries involved such individuals 
par excellence. But it set the net too wide. The 
DCMS was, after all, a cultural policy body and 
its definition resulted in a fairly conventional list. 
It included ‘the arts’ and the classic cultural 
industries sector – adding design, fashion and, 
more controversially, parts of ‘software’ to these. 
But was science not creative, or other businesses; 
did not other sectors deal in intellectual property; 
did the production of intellectual property 
adequately describe the economic operations of 
all in the creative industries? The price paid for 
the re-branding of the creative industries was a 
lack of clarity as to their specificity. What did they 
do differently to science, or business services, 
or indeed the service sector generally; what was 
distinctive about cultural, or aesthetic, or artistic 
value? These are crucial questions and we will 
return to them in a moment. 
The price was paid because the DCMS wanted 
to position what had been known as ‘the arts 
and cultural industries’ as economically important 
and cutting edge. They also plugged into other 
politically attractive discourses. 
Creative work
First, the promotion of ubiquitous individual 
creativity suggested its democratisation – no 
longer was it just artists, careers in the creative 
industries were now to be made open to all. But 
equally ‘creativity’ was to be a value sought for 
amongst the workforce as a whole, who in turn 
could legitimately expect to exercise creativity 
in their jobs. What the creative industries idea 
did was to promise levels of autonomy and 
personal fulfillment at work which had been long 
associated with artistic work (or ‘creative labour’), 
but which had also been a demand of skilled and 
‘knowledge workers’ since the 1960s. It took that 
part of the promise of art to ‘change life’– to make 
work into free creative activity, meaningful rather 
than alienated – and linked it to a new kind of 
productivity centred on innovation.
Leaving aside for the moment the linkage of 
creativity and economic innovation, this emphasis 
on creative labour has brought a lot of criticism. 
First, it ignored the persistent low wages in the 
sector, the high levels of self-exploitation, and 
new kinds of ‘creative exploitation’, which go with 
the undoubted pleasures of cultural work. There 
is now far too much research on these effects to 
be dismissed by policy makers. When we add 
the increased routinisation of cultural work, and 
especially its links to international divisions of 
labour (the digital sectors in East Asia have close 
affinities with the most mundane factory work) 
then this becomes one of the most pressing 
themes in contemporary literature on this sector. 
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Second, it has been claimed that this promotion 
of the autonomous creative entrepreneurial 
individual has not only led to new kinds of 
workplace exploitation, but was also part of a 
wider shift in approaches to the labour market. 
These approaches involve the positioning of 
the individual as entirely responsible for her or 
his own fate; that formal training and a more 
entrepreneurial attitude to the self was the most 
appropriate way of ensuring labour market entry. 
Here the anthropological notion of ‘culture as 
a whole way of life’ becomes a way of shifting 
responsibility for economic and social failure 
onto individuals and communities themselves. 
The relation between this ‘disciplinary’ discourse 
of creativity and what has been called ‘the new 
cultural state’ is something that also needs to be 
registered in the creative industries debate.
Creative consumption
The logic of post-Fordism does not just lie in the 
nature of production but also in consumption. 
Just as Fordism was associated with mass 
consumption, post-Fordism was linked to niche 
markets and to the increased cultural components 
of goods. This has been seen as a shift from a 
first to a ‘second modernity’, where identity is no 
longer directly linked to class, group, occupation, 
ethnic group, etc., but is constructed by individuals 
themselves. This is part of that transformation of 
attitudes to the self discussed above; we now 
have no choice but to make choices and thus 
need to develop capacities to allow us to negotiate 
these. It is what the German Sociologist Ulrick 
Beck called ‘risk society’ – where those risks (as 
well as opportunities) are now set squarely on the 
shoulders of the individual99. In the words of one 
recent Chinese blogger:
“As opposed to given, organic, primordial identities, a 
lifestyle is an active choice about identity. The general 
historical movement has been away from given 
and secure identities and meaning determined by 
parentage, religion, and work toward moral relativism 
and meaning/identity unmoored, left increasingly 
to personal choice. Globalization accelerates 
this existential shift, which is both liberating and 
frightening. You are freer to choose larger parts of 
your own identity, but how exactly do you make that 
choice? How is one set of values better or more 
“true” than another?”100
Much of this was being asked by the 18th century 
enlightenment philosophers, but crucial for us is 
that important aspects of that identity are now 
deemed to be constructed through consumption, 
and in particular the consumption of cultural 
goods. And not only artistic or cultural goods 
but also those objects and services which 
increasingly contain symbolic meanings or 
non-functional values. Mike Featherstone called 
this ‘the aesthetisisation of everyday life’; this 
might mean the construction of self as a work 
of art – a traditional concern of what might be 
called the ‘aesthete’ – but also the saturation of 
everyday life by symbolic consumption and the 
cultivation of one’s identity around this type of 
consumption101. 
There have been various ways of approaching 
these developments. Abraham Maslow’s 1943 
‘hierarchy of needs’ was frequently (mis-) 
used to show how, after having satisfied ‘basic 
safety needs’, ‘the needs of love, affection and 
belongingness’ and ‘the need for esteem’, society 
can now move on to satisfying the ‘need for self-
actualisation’102. This schema has been used to 
describe the historical progress of the consumer 
economy, with increasing prosperity leading to the 
search to satisfy higher needs. Leaving aside the 
objection that ‘self-actualisation’ seemed to be 
something that had been historically postponed 
until the economic boom of the 1950s (as 
opposed, for example, to the emergence of the 
earliest religious or symbolic acts, such as cave 
painting) its overwhelming use has been within 
marketing to promote non-essential, lifestyle or 
‘identity’ consumption. But these ‘post-materialist 
values’ have paradoxically become associated 
with ‘up-market’ consumption of cultural goods 
whose primary value lies in their role as status 
markers. That is, they partake of that social 
system of distinction outlined by Pierre Bourdieu 
with the caveat that the traditional hierarchies of 
high art/popular culture are now attenuated to 
such a degree that the boundaries are looking 
rather weather-beaten. 
It is in this sense that the counter-cultures and 
bohemias of the 1960s are charged not with 
challenging the system, but with contributing 
to its survival and growth through new forms of 
cultural consumption. As Jonathan Rose argued, 
the jostling of metropolitan urbanites for the next 
new thing resulted in highly niched markets and 
the inclusion of these (ex-) bohemians on the rich 
lists. Pierre Bourdieu’s ‘restricted production’, 
which had set art for the cognoscenti against 
mass production for money, now becomes the 
generator of extended niche production whose 
initial refusal of the mainstream is predicated on 
the consequent economic returns from the cultural 
Arts and creative industries: a historical overview 76
capital accumulated by such a refusal. The circuit 
between cultural and economic capital is thus 
made more rapid, more extensive and forms a 
business model now central to capitalism itself.
Culture-economics détente?
The ‘elective affinity’ between capitalism and 
modernist art – their break with the past, their 
search for the endless new – was part of the 
1980s critique of modernism, and art’s link with a 
new consumer economy was a defining aspect of 
‘post-modernity’. Jonathan Rose’s ‘everybody is 
a weekend bohemian’ underscores this close link 
between modernism and consumer capitalism. 
As Lash and Lurry argued, we are surrounded by 
culture. In 1945,
“what was mostly encountered in everyday life 
were material objects (goods) from the economic 
infrastructure….But in 2005, cultural objects are 
everywhere: as information, as communication,  
as branded products, as financial services, as media 
products, as transport and leisure services, cultural 
entities are no longer the exception: they  
are the rule”103.
Cultural consumption has not only accelerated but 
has increasingly marked the consumption of goods 
and services previously outside the arts and cultural 
industries. Adorno’s Culture Industry was about 
the production of homogeneity; for Lash and Lurry, 
the creative industries are about the production of 
difference. Traditional commodities are identical 
functional material objects; creative industries 
produce non-identical objects and services. Or as 
Andre Gorz put it:
“The commercial value (price) of the products was, 
then, to depend more on their non-measurable 
immaterial qualities than on their substantial utility 
(use-value). These immaterial qualities – style, novelty, 
brand prestige, scarcity, or “exclusiveness” – were 
to confer on products a status comparable to that of 
art works. These latter have an intrinsic value; there 
is no scale by which a relation of equivalence or “true 
price” can be established between them. They are 
not, therefore, real commodities. Their price depends 
on their scarcity, on the reputation of the artist who 
made them, and the desire of the potential buyer. 
The incomparable immaterial qualities procure for the 
producing firm the equivalent of a monopoly and the 
possibility of deriving a rent from novelty, scarcity, or 
exclusivity”104.
For some this is not problematic – cultural 
consumption is now a part of identity and 
citizenship and adequately served by the market. 
This argument is given more force as the potential 
of home computing and the Internet have – it is 
claimed – eroded the gap between producer and 
consumer, between ‘the culture industry’ and 
everyday social life, between the professional 
expert and the amateur. 
From this perspective, the triumph of creativity, 
which seemed like a validation of the artist after 
years of being positioned as marginal, turned 
out to be something rather different. Not only is 
everybody and every activity potentially creative, 
but ‘art’ – its productivity, its validation of 
difference, its concern with sensuous knowledge 
– seems dissolved in a ‘culture’ that is more or 
less indistinguishable from everyday life and, 
more importantly, from the economy. Indeed, 
it could be said that the dream of bringing 
art into life, associated with such as William 
Morris or the Bauhaus, has now been fulfilled. 
As such, whilst contemporary society needs 
‘creatives’ – and we are all creatives now – it 
does not need artists. John Hartley, for example, 
sees the marginalisation of ‘art’ as one with the 
universalisation of creativity; its demise is both a 
victory for democracy and heralds the end of the 
elitist art-industry divide inaugurated by aesthetics 
and cultural policy105.
Creative industries: 
for or against the arts?
One strand of the creative industries discourse, 
then, positions the arts as minority and elitist. For 
the arts agencies this might suggest a crisis of 
legitimacy. Not only did ‘excellence’ in the arts 
run up against the universality of creativity, but 
also ‘market failure’, rather than a justification 
for subsidy, might in fact be a democratic 
judgement on art’s historical redundancy. In these 
circumstances, apart from a retreat to heritage 
(or ‘cultural infrastructure’), more pragmatic 
justifications of the arts as providing ‘R&D’ or 
other ‘inputs’ into the creative industries come to 
the fore. 
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Art, popular culture and the public sphere
These challenges to arts and cultural policy 
cannot be understood apart from a wider context 
in which not just cultural – but any ‘public interest’ 
arguments outside the market – have been made 
increasingly difficult. In 2001 Graeme Turner 
pointed to:
 “the pre-eminence achieved by the institutions of 
business, by discourses of the economy, and by 
the broad deployment of the concept of the market 
as a strategy for social organisation. The alignment 
of these forces with a rationalising and globalising 
capitalism has proved almost irresistible. Free 
market economics represents itself as fundamentally 
democratic whilst it turns regulated environments into 
markets; the consumer benefit of proliferating choice 
is offered right across society as a means of closing 
down government services, demolishing regulatory 
structures, and minimising the commercially inhibitory 
effects of existing policy frameworks….this trend 
directly denies the point of having publicly funded 
cultural institutions at all”106. 
In this context it has been easy to make the 
equation between popular culture as democratic 
citizenship and popular culture as market choice. 
Here the citizen and the consumer do not just 
overlap, they are the same thing. This idea is 
closely related to the debates around cultural value 
that emerged in cultural studies in the 1990s. 
If, as Gay Hawkins wrote categorically in 1993, 
the “primary function of discourses of value is 
social differentiation” and, as John Frow and 
Tony Bennett suggested at the same time, all 
judgements of value are related to the social 
interests of those (intellectuals) with the power 
(cultural capital) to make these: how could a 
cultural policy be possible107?
“Given the fact (if this is conceded) of 
incommensurability between different regimes of 
value, and given the intense social interests that play 
around these fractures and asymmetries, how is it 
possible for judgements of value to be applied in the 
routine and everyday manner required by school and 
university curricula, by editorial decision-making, by 
decisions about arts funding and research funding, 
and about the exhibition of artefacts? What gets 
floor-space and wall-space in the museums and the 
gallery? What gets discussed in the arts pages of the 
newspapers and magazines“? 108
John Frow also showed how relativism or 
‘anything goes’ does not work either – on 
philosophical and, as above, on practical 
grounds. Disagreement implies some core-shared 
grounds around which the dispute takes place; 
incommensurability implies mutual ignorance/
indifference and fragmentation. In the context of 
modern capitalist society however, one solution to 
this stands out. As Francoise Lyotard wrote in his 
foundational postmodernist text of 1979:
“[T]his realism of the ‘anything goes’ is in fact that 
of money; in the absence of aesthetic criteria, it 
remains possible and useful to assess the value 
of works of art according to the profits they yield. 
Such realism accommodates all tendencies, just as 
capital accommodates all ‘needs’, providing that the 
tendencies and needs have purchasing power. As 
for taste, there is no need to be delicate when one 
speculates or entertains oneself”.109
What was a real quandary for some, therefore, 
was easily solved for others; the market was the 
only judge110. 
This was further complicated by the accelerated 
rejection by many of both the feasibility and 
desirability of a unified national culture, that 
other prop of cultural policy in both ‘nation-
building’ and social democratic guises. The 
spread of globalised cultural markets, Graeme 
Turner argues, often resulted in “an enthusiastic 
advocacy for the vitality and democratic inclusivity 
of a wholly commercialised public sphere which 
markets its benefits without fear, favour, or 
regulatory inhibitions to citizens of all nations”111. 
But even those who distinguish between capitalist 
globalisation and the other aspects of a ‘global 
citizenship’ made possible by increased mobility 
and the Internet, and who are aware of the 
illusions, injustices and exclusions of the nation-
state, are faced with the old cultural studies 
question of a ‘common culture’. 
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Cultural studies’ attempt to extend the range of 
the public sphere, to keep open the conversation 
with those so often excluded from it, has been the 
source of its vitality since Williams and Hoggart in 
the late 1950s. How ‘art’ and ‘mass culture’ have 
helped fix elitist, non-permeable lines between 
class cultures has been well documented. But 
as this too became orthodoxy, both Hoggart and 
Williams became anxious. Jonathon Rose tells us:
“Hoggart unfortunately lived long enough to hear 
an Oxbridge academic proclaim that ‘lavatorial 
graffiti are not to be distinguished in any qualitative 
way from the drawing of Rembrandt’ and a BBC 
executive declare ‘there is no longer art. There is only 
culture – of all kinds’…‘Here the far left meets the 
slick entrepreneurs’, Hoggart sighed. ‘Some of our 
arguments come back to haunt us’”112. 
The problem here is not just the value of art (which 
we will discuss in a moment), but also the very 
possibility of a common culture around which 
any such debate could take place. As Williams 
and Hoggart both strongly argued, this common 
culture was not the same as the market; indeed, 
the market – in the sense of the systematic and 
unending search for profit – was in many ways 
inimical to that common culture. As Gorz wrote, 
this search:
“forces firms to invent new needs and desires 
constantly, to confer a symbolic, social, erotic value 
on commodities, to spread a “consumer culture” 
predicated on individualization, singularization, rivalry, 
and jealousy – in a word, on what I have elsewhere 
termed “anti-social socialization”113. 
In this sense the search for a common culture is 
less now about cultural elitism than about finding 
a way beyond this ‘anti-social socialisation’ with 
which an expanded cultural consumption has now 
become intertwined. As Nick Couldry puts it: 
“what is urgent now is not defending the full range 
of cultural production and consumption from elitist 
judgement (an old story), but defending the possibility 
of any shared site … for an emergent democratic 
politics”114. 
The distinctiveness of art
We have suggested that from at least the 
18th century ‘art’ became separated out from 
wider social and cultural practices. It became 
autonomous (self-legislating) from cognitive and 
practical reason, as well as operating with different 
dynamics and in different social times and places 
to ‘everyday culture’. We also suggested that 
whilst this has been accompanied by a range of 
elitist and ideological functions (the status of the 
new middle class, the idealist compensation for 
the inequalities and injustices of the world), it also 
had enormous potential for social and personal 
empowerment and transformation in the face of 
the given world. 
We have also seen how cultural studies 
and the new art history had challenged the 
‘transcendental’ view of artistic genius, rejecting 
some mysterious ‘creativity’ for a more socially 
grounded ‘cultural production’115. In the last 
decade a new kind of radical aesthetic thinking 
has emerged which accepts many of the critiques 
traditional aesthetics but insists on centrality of 
artistic creativity for human emancipation and its 
distinction from ‘everyday life’.
Raymond Williams, concerned like many to bring 
an idealising, transcendental art back to its real 
social conditions of production, was also aware of 
not reducing art to these conditions, or obliterating 
its radical potential. 
“The attempt to distinguish ‘art’ from other, often 
closely related, practices is a quite extraordinarily 
important historical and social process. The attempt 
to distinguish ‘aesthetic’ from other kinds of attention 
and response is, as a historical and social process, 
perhaps even more important”116. 
We saw with Bourdieu that this was a historical 
process but it should not be reduced to this 
process and dismissed. We also saw how 
‘aesthetic art’ constantly penetrated into 
‘everyday life’, and vice versa; in this sense it 
generated powerful impulses for individual and 
social transformation based on a specific way of 
apprehending the world, in a mode ‘different from 
that of domination’ as Ranciere put it. 
For this reason many within cultural studies, 
following Williams, have been concerned not to 
dissolve the difference between art and culture, 
or to dismiss the vital and critical tradition which 
art and aesthetics represents. The nature of 
that aesthetic specificity has been subject to 
much debate; but despite the onslaughts of 
deconstructionist philosophy and critical cultural 
studies, aesthetics can no longer be equated 
with 19th century romantic aesthetics; things 
have moved on. Isobel Armstrong, from a critical 
feminist perspective, echoes Janet Wolff in 
arguing strongly for the distinction between art 
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and everyday culture if this everyday culture is 
defined purely in terms of consumption117. But 
such a distinction cannot retreat into elitism or 
become a form of specialised value creation for 
the cultural economy. Following the American 
philosopher and educationist John Dewey, 
Armstrong argues for an inclusive notion of art 
that connects with everyday or popular culture. 
The question is how to combine art’s creative 
inclusiveness and its distinctiveness from the 
everyday, especially everyday consumption.
The challenge of creative industries to art
In this sense the connections between art and 
economy established within the idea of creative 
industries can be quite disruptive. The link is 
centred on the new productivity of ‘creativity’, 
which conflates two distinct meanings. First, the 
idea of ‘creative’ relates to innovation in general – a 
general capacity to invent, to improve, to enhance 
using more non-linear, ‘left of field’ approaches 
long associated with the artist. Second, a much 
more specific account of the abilities required 
to work within a cultural economy that deals in 
non-functional goods. In this sense it foregrounds 
the production of novelty, of new kinds of ‘allure’, 
new kinds of desire, specifically associated with 
‘aesthetic’ products. 
From this perspective contemporary capitalism 
seeks, generates and exploits concrete 
differences, qualities not quantities, and manages 
eddies of desire and identification in ways 
previously associated with the work of the artist. 
This has been a source of the new economic 
centrality of culture and creativity, but it also made 
art’s claim to a radical critique or to a unique 
apprehension of the world difficult to sustain. 
In these terms there is little to suggest that ‘art’ 
is either a space of cultural reflection set apart 
from the logic of economy, or that it need do 
anything differently from any of the many other 
forms of creative or cultural activity which make up 
contemporary ‘social network markets’. 
However, we might object that this reduces the 
productivity of art to innovation, novelty and 
difference, that it merely expresses and responds 
to individual subjective desires. We hope we 
have shown that art has certainly been about 
this – it has been disruptive and innovative and 
de-stabilising, as the art in which ‘all that is solid 
melts into air’. But that it has not just been about 
this. It produces the new within specific codes of 
collective social meaning, which it both accepts 
and challenges. Indeed, the ‘elective affinity’ of 
modernism and capitalist ‘creative destruction’ 
is something long recognised and resisted 
within art theory and practice. ‘The Shock of 
the New’ is no longer the defining characteristic 
of art, no matter how much the media wants 
it to be. Indeed, many have stressed its role in 
documentation, in preservation, in mourning, 
and in re-visiting the past which modern society 
leaves behind. 
Art as knowledge 
Our understandings of the kind of sensuous 
knowledge produced by art has been expanded 
and made more complex as notions of subjectivity 
and emotion, rationality and social power have 
shifted. But it is crucial to stress that art is about 
knowledge as well as expressivity, collective 
as well as individual meaning. As such art says 
things about the world, holds it to account in its 
particular ways. Many of those who have tried 
to isolate an ‘intrinsic value’ for art as opposed 
to social and economic values have fallen into 
the trap of associating ‘intrinsic’ with ‘individual’. 
John Holden, for example, sees the consumption 
of art as a purely personal affair, for its own 
‘intrinsic’ sake118. This is akin to John Carey’s idea 
that art is purely in the mind of its beholder and 
thus there can be no judgment of value119. This 
has resonance with the identification of ‘creative 
industries’ with ‘expressive value’ or ‘identity’ or 
‘experience’ goods. For Holden this is set against 
the ‘instrumental value’ of wider social impacts, 
but in fact it is precisely the economic and social 
that are so often at stake in the work of art. 
Art is autonomous but it is also a deeply social 
act; it is not merely about individual subjective 
expression but makes claims to knowledge. 
Though undoubtedly the relation between 
individual and social here is problematic, this is 
a problematic that has marked aesthetic theory 
and practice from the beginning: how is the 
deeply subjective act of making meaning related 
to our wider life in common? Seeing the ‘intrinsic 
value’ of art as individual pleasure and identity 
construction, and its social value as ‘extrinsic’ is 
to misunderstand the last 250 years of aesthetic 
debate. Although Holden dismisses Adorno as an 
‘aristo’, the German philosopher’s concerns with 
how the injustices of the world are registered at 
the very heart of aesthetic form indicate a concern 
with art as a form of collective knowledge which 
is frequently absent from this tradition of cultural 
policy analysis. 
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Indeed, without this notion of the collective and 
‘objective’ dimension of art, the cultural studies 
reworking of popular culture as the free play of 
consumption and identities easily becomes an 
uncritical account of cultural consumption. And 
aesthetics becomes – as Tony Bennett suggested 
– a mere cipher for the surface allure on which 
these products base their appeal. Art becomes 
merely an input into the creative industries system 
– a method of working, a resource for images and 
ideas, the blue skies end of R&D. Greenberg’s 
opposition of avant-garde and kitsch – where the 
former challenges, and the latter confirms, the 
audience – is reworked into a schema where the 
former becomes R&D for new modes of identity 
confirmation. ‘Identity’ is assembled through 
choice across a range of niche products whose 
very refusal of initial identification gives them a 
distinct market edge.
On the other hand, using these collective and 
objective dimensions we might look again at the 
counter-culture. It certainly did lead to the rise of 
new forms of consumption, just as perhaps the 
later breed of punk bohemian entrepreneurs led to 
the creative workforce of today. But this was not 
all they were about. It was an attempt to challenge 
and rethink mass consumption, and to find new 
forms of community in a rapidly changing world. 
These are questions that are still with us. As the 
Chinese blogger continued:
“Yet lifestyle politics is not just about consumption. 
The concept of lifestyle extends beyond the pursuit 
of leisure and consumption practices to involve the 
expression of individual rights and a consciousness 
about the social responsibilities associated with a 
given lifestyle. It is about associating with a group 
or class of people in order to claim rights and 
recognition against the insecurities of contemporary, 
globalized society”120.
In this sense we can make a connection – and it is 
not easy or straightforward – between the attempt 
to make value judgements in art and the attempt 
to question the values of our being together in 
society. As Williams said:
“The attempt to distinguish between good, bad, and 
indifferent work in specific practices is, when made 
in full seriousness and without the presumption 
of privileged classes and habits, an indispensible 
element of the central social process of conscious 
human production”121. 
If ‘creativity’ is not simply a form of aesthetic-
technical input into product, it is also a reflection, 
a questioning of the ends of that economic growth 
and innovation. 
Art, popular culture and a  
‘whole way of life’
Here we encounter another issue. The use 
of culture as ‘a whole way of life’ is frequently 
opposed to ‘the arts’ as if this means popular 
culture per se, and in particular commercial 
popular culture. We have suggested that 
‘popular culture’ – the commercial and voluntary 
production of symbolic artifacts – has long been 
intertwined with ‘aesthetic’ dimensions. The 
similarities and differences between an ‘art’ and a 
‘popular culture’ aesthetic is something that has 
been buried between the opposition of ‘high’ and 
‘low’ culture, or ‘depth’ versus ‘horizontal’ models. 
That there are a range of times and places in 
which to value ‘light’ or ‘serious’ art, ‘surface’ 
and ‘depth, the transitory and the enduring, the 
celebratory ecstatic and the disturbingly opaque 
is a generally accepted part of contemporary 
culture. Mapping these onto ‘high art’ and 
‘popular culture’ is no longer straightforwardly 
possible. Lines between good and bad are drawn 
in all these areas; so too judgments of when either 
is appropriate, if at all. 
To dismiss the arts as merely one (expensive, 
subsidised) preference amongst all other 
consumer preferences is at the same time to 
refuse to extend artistic value to popular culture. 
But in fact the notion of ‘art’ and ‘artist’, of an 
aesthetic dimension distinct to the music, the 
writing, the image making, the computer game, is 
a persistent refrain in most reflections on popular 
culture. Creating such value is part of the sense 
of fulfilment and pleasure we discussed in terms 
of cultural work, that which makes a lot of hard 
work, low pay and exploitation bearable (most of 
the time). Unlike many in cultural studies, very few 
creative workers refuse the value of ‘art’ either to 
‘the arts’ or to their own work. 
A contemporary aesthetic where what were 
‘popular’ and ‘high’ cultures intermingle – the 
encounter Williams and others before him 
looked forward to – is not just one in which all 
are reduced to a game of distinction through 
consumption. The idea of the cultural omnivore 
– one who appreciates hip hop and symphony 
concerts, baseball and gallery openings – has 
mostly been used to undermine Bourdieu’s fixed 
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oppositions of high and low. But it might also work 
to open up a democratic space for contemporary 
culture in which we are not just ‘weekend 
bohemians’ looking for the new consumption 
item, but the emotional, sensuous knowledge 
of art serves to bring into view the collective 
and individual transformations of which we are 
capable. It is in that spirit that the academic and 
Mercury Prize judge Simon Frith writes: 
“Culture as transformation…must challenge 
experience, must be difficult, must be unpopular. 
There are, in short, political as well as sociological 
and aesthetic reasons for challenging populism. The 
problem is how to do this whilst appreciating the 
popular, taking it seriously on its own terms. [My own 
tastes are] for the unpopular popular, my own belief 
[is] that the “difficult” appeals through the traces it 
carries of another world in which it would be “easy”. 
The utopian impulse, the negation of everyday life, 
the aesthetic impulse Adorno recognised in high art, 
must be part of low art too”122. 
 
Conclusion
The idea of the creative industries can thus be 
used to suggest that art is elitist and/or merely 
(one) useful input into production. On the other 
hand, it can also be seen as part of an exciting 
encounter between popular culture, the cultural 
industries and ‘the arts’. There are four broad 
conclusions we might take from this second 
position.
1. Art not ‘the arts’
Art may not be the same as everyday 
culture, but it cannot be equated simply with 
what is currently funded as ‘the arts’ – with 
the traditional, pre-mass reproduction art 
forms. These traditional art worlds have 
grown up over centuries and have evolved a 
complex ecosystem of institutions, practices, 
validations and markets that carry a vital part 
of our common culture. They are increasingly 
expensive and resistant to the sorts of 
productivity gains available to art forms built 
on mechanical reproduction. And they are 
also permeable to new cultural currents, 
new interpretations and new technologies in 
ways that make them much more than the 
‘already known’ of heritage. They are part of 
contemporary culture not because they are 
‘new’ but because they re-open our common 
past in the light of our current predicaments.  
However, if art is more than ‘the arts’, if it is not 
opposed to ‘popular culture’, nor to some ‘other’ 
of commercial culture, then arts policy must 
inevitably engage with this broader spectrum 
of cultural activity, and a significant part of this 
will be under the heading of cultural or creative 
industries. This is more or less accepted by 
the policy heading of ‘arts and cultural policy’, 
but it is necessary to make this explicit. Too 
often popular culture is acknowledged in policy 
documents but the actual material support 
goes to ‘the arts’, leaving popular culture to the 
market. We will explore this more in the final 
chapter. 
2. Cultural and economic values are not 
the same
The idea of the creative industries has frequently 
been used to suggest that there is no longer 
any conflict between cultural and economic 
value. But whilst the terms of this conflict 
have changed enormously in the last forty 
years, we have suggested that both ‘art’ and 
‘popular culture’ contain values at variance to 
the maximisation of profit. Cultural producers 
constantly made distinctions between the 
values of ‘art’ or ‘culture’ and those of financial 
gain. Though working within markets, and even 
seeing themselves as ‘entrepreneurial’, creatives 
seek to ‘make a living’ not to pursue unlimited 
economic growth. Balancing the need to make 
a living with their wider creative aspirations 
involves a complex set of judgments, which 
make up the texture of the life of a creative 
entrepreneur.  
 
Policy makers too, adding economic 
development tools to the growing repertoire 
of cultural policy instruments in the 1980s and 
'90s, witnessed overlap between economic and 
cultural objectives – but also real conflicts. For 
example, the promotion of creative production 
by local cities has frequently led to rapid 
increases in property prices and a domination 
of the urban landscape by cultural consumption 
often run by international companies. What was 
often presented as a win-win scenario – where 
cultural and economic value would now walk 
hand in hand – was not always so. Though the 
creative industries were often presented as 
merely technical economic development policy 
questions, in this area like others, they involved 
cultural-political value-judgments. 
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3. Market failure includes the 
failure of markets 
Creative industries policies are public policies – 
they involve a range of economic, cultural and 
social questions that make for complex policy 
making. This is made more difficult if economic 
growth is seen as the central objective; it not 
only ignores the cultural aspirations of the 
creative industries themselves, but also those 
individual and collective values within art 
and culture which rub against the economic 
imperative. ‘Market failure’ is not just about the 
failure of arts within the market, it is about the 
failures of the market itself; that is, the ways in 
which economic forces both provide for us but 
also undermine and cut against individuals and 
communities.  
 
Leaving the creative industries to the market 
alone, merely providing for ‘the arts’, is not a 
democratic cultural policy. This is recognised 
at both national and local levels. National 
government is concerned with the quality of 
Australian television, publishing, film, music and 
so on; with how it expresses and challenges our 
values, as well as how it excites and inspires us. 
Local government is concerned with promoting 
local cultural production and consumption 
for cultural as well as economic reasons. The 
policy tools involved in this will be explored in 
the final chapter, but the principles on which 
interventions into the whole creative ecosystem 
are based also need to be spelled out in the 
face of purely economic justifications.  
4. Common cultures 
These principles involve common values and 
common cultures, and we have seen how 
these have been radically challenged in the 
last forty years. The pre-eminence of art within 
cultural policy; the authority of ‘experts’ and 
the ‘knowledge class’; the desirability of a 
‘national culture’; the possibility of any public 
sphere to establish cultural value as other than 
an act of elitism: all these have raised crucial 
questions which have enormously enriched the 
debate. But, as we saw, they have frequently 
resulted in the (often unintended) outcome 
that the market itself – individual consumer 
preferences – becomes the only possible 
arbiter of cultural value. The notion of a unitary 
national culture whose ‘essence’ could be 
represented by certain emblematic art works 
or genres was only ever partially tenable; as we 
have tried to show this was always challenged 
across a broad spectrum stretching from high 
modernism to vulgar popular culture. Similarly 
the notion that cultural policy was about 
removing ‘art’ from the market place has also 
been challenged – most especially by that 
policy tradition which comes out of cultural 
studies. But it sought to extend the question of 
cultural value not to abolish it; to open up art to 
contemporary popular culture not dissolve it into 
‘everyday life’; to engage with the realities and 
possibilities of markets, not become an engine 
of economic growth.  
 
If this is to be the case not only must we have 
new policy instruments but – as Williams 
suggested in his review of the Arts Council 
of England thirty years ago – new kinds of 
democratic engagement about cultural policy 
and cultural value. On the one hand this points 
to new kinds of public engagement – as active 
and interactive audiences, as consumers, as 
markets. On the other, as John Holden has 
suggested, it requires a new kind of democratic 
input into the management of cultural policy 
making123. But it also points to a leap in the 
evolution of cultural policy as a whole. We need 
not shy away from this. 
 
Arts and creative industries: a historical overview 83
90 Sara Selwood (2009) ‘Creativity and Innovation in the Cultural Economy: Museums, Gallaries and the Visual Arts’ in Andy Pratt and Paul  
 Jeffcutt Creativity, Innovation and the Cultural Economy London: Routledge pp. 219- 240
91 Kate Oakley (2009) ‘The Disappearing Arts: Creativity and Innovation after the Creative Industries’ International Journal of Cultural Policy 15: 
 4 pp. 403-414
92 Rob Pope (2005) Creativity: Theory, History, Practice Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge
93 Daniel Bell (1973) The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society New York: Basic Books; Alvin Toffler (1980) The Third Wave New York: 
 Bantam Books
94 Castells, M. (1989) The Informational City: Information Technology, Economic Restructuring, and the Urban-Regional Process. 
 Oxford: Blackwell.
95 Howkins, J. (2001) The Creative Economy: How People Make Money from Ideas. London: Allen Lane. 
 The CreativeFlorida’s suggestion that this creative class could be attracted to particular locales by the provision of certain cultural amenities  
 and the promotion of open, tolerant values represents a ‘fast policy’ fix to the issues of cultural capacity raised by economic geographers?.
96 Joseph Schumpeter (1942) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy New York: Harper & Brothers
97 DCMS (1998) Creative Industries Mapping Document. London: DCMS.
98 A criticism acknowledged by the DCMS’ later use of term ‘creative economy’
99 Beck, U. (1992) Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. Trans. Mark Ritter. New Delhi: Sage. 
100 Ying Zhu and Bruce Robinson Critical Masses, Commerce, and Shifting State-Society Relations in China 
 http://www.thechinabeat.org/?p=1526 (accessed 12th April 2010) 
101 Mike Featherstone (1996) Consumer Culture and Postmodernism. London: Sage
102 Abraham Maslow (1943) A Theory of Human Motivation Psychological Review 50 pp. 370-396
103 Scott Lash and Celia Lurry (2007) Global Culture Industry. Cambridge: Polity p.4
104 André Gortz (2010) ‘The Exit from Capitalism has Already Begun’ Cultural Politics 6:1 pp. 5-14 p.7
105 John Hartley (2005) Creative Industries op.cit
106 Graeme Turner (2001) ‘Reshaping Australian Institutions: Popular Culture, the Market and the Public Sphere’, Tony Bennett and David Carter  
 (eds.) Culture In Australia: Policies, Publics and Programs Cambridge: Cambridge University Press pp.161-175 p.173
107 Gay Hawkins (1993) From Nimbin to Mardi Gras: Constructing Community Arts St Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin p. 12; John Frow (1995) 
 Cultural Studies and Cultural Value. Oxford: Clarendon; Tony Bennett (1980) Outside Literature op.cit
108 John Frow op.cit p.154 
109 Jean-Francois Lyotard (1986) The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Trans. G. Bennington and B. Massumi) Manchester: 
 Manchester University Press p. 76
110 This argument was made even easier with the emergence of the Internet, and claims that it undermined the big culture corporations which  
 controlled access and distribution, and that everyone could be a creative producer and develop markets with like-minded people across 
 the globe.
111 Graeme Turner (2001) op.cit. p.194
112 Jonathan Rose (2001) op.cit. p. 366
113 André Gortz (2010) op.cit. p.8
114 Nick Couldry (2006) Listening Beyond the Echoes: Media, Ethics and Agency in an Uncertain World. London: Paradigm Books p. 70
115 Cf. Bob Pope (2005) op. cit.
116 Williams, R. (1981) Culture. London: Fontana p. 126
117 Isobel Armstrong (2000) A Radical Aesthetic Oxford: Blackwell
118 The Value Triangle, paper at Participate conference,
 Belfast 25th March 2010 http://www.docstoc.com/docs/24459724/john-holden-%E2%80%93value-triangle (accessed 12th April 2010)
119 John Carey (2005) What Good Are The Arts? London: Faber and Faber.
120 Ying Zhu and Bruce Robinson op.cit.
121 Raymond Williams (1981) Culture op.cit. p. 126
122 Frith, S. (1998) Performing Rites: Evaluating Popular Music. Oxford: Oxford University Press. P.20
123 John Holden,(2008) Democratic Culture: Opening up the arts to everyone. London: Demos
Arts and creative industries: a historical overview 84
The creative 
industries moment
As we suggested at the beginning, the questions 
we asked of the relations between the arts and 
creative industries were not just about technical 
definitions; neither ‘the arts’ nor ‘the creative 
industries’ is a straightforward term but involves 
some fundamental issues of contemporary 
economy, culture and society. 
Creativity has become one of the most overused 
contemporary concepts and, like all such 
aspirational terms, it has lost much of its precise 
meaning. We have suggested that in this context 
it contained two senses. First, it was seen as 
a particular kind of inventiveness at the more 
innovative, rule-breaking/bending end of the 
spectrum, and it drew on certain non-linear, 
even non ‘rational’ ways of thinking and working 
traditionally associated with the artist. Second, 
as the specific set of knowledge and practices 
associated with the ‘creative’ sector who produce 
non-functional and thus ‘unknown’ goods and 
services for audiences/markets – ‘symbolic’ or 
‘aesthetic’ inputs which also increasingly mark 
production outside the traditional cultural sector. 
The notion of ‘creativity’ as a key input into 
contemporary economic and social development 
conflates these senses – the growing general 
importance of creativity and the expansion of the 
creative/cultural industries – in ways that cause 
much conceptual confusion. 
The UK’s Department of Culture, Media and 
Sport renamed the cultural industries as ‘creative 
industries’. It did so, according to the minister 
Chris Smith, for pragmatic reasons – to lever 
more money out of the economic departments of 
state. This pragmatism involved avoiding the word 
‘culture’ (associated with ‘luxury’ consumption 
and public subsidy), a tactic which has been 
seized on by many lobbyists for the arts and 
creative industries ever since. It’s a move that has 
its risks, because it establishes a reliance on an 
economic justification, which is difficult to turn 
around. For many, indeed, the introduction of 
creative industries policy ideas is precisely about 
emphasising their economic importance. But the 
appeal of this new agenda was always broader 
than the purely economic. 
Creativity, for many, carries the suggestion of 
a universal capacity available to everyone; an 
anti-elitism and a challenge to the experts in its 
democratisation of powers previously ascribed 
to the artist. Thus ‘creative’ has frequently been 
read as more democratic, more about popular 
culture, about easier access as opposed to the 
stuffy institutional worlds of ‘art and culture’. In 
many countries – Portugal, Brazil, Taiwan to name 
only a few – ‘creative industries’ has been adopted 
as a way of shaking up cultural establishments, 
of bringing a breath of fresh air. This echoes the 
liberating, optimistic elements of ‘Cool Britannia’ 
and indeed Creative Nation before it. 
Even where it was welcomed primarily as a new 
economic agenda – policy makers gleefully 
removing it from its association with cultural 
value and planting it foursquare on the agenda 
of growth and innovation – it could still represent 
a popular challenge to the established or ‘elitist’ 
cultural order. And from the perspective of many 
new creative entrepreneurs these two aspects run 
together; creative industries gives them the space 
in which to make a living making new culture124. 
On the other hand, many academics continue 
to use the term cultural industries, arguing that 
‘creative industries’ makes little sense and 
that ‘cultural value’ is precisely what marks 
this sector as distinct. This stance has proved 
difficult to sustain in the face both of its adoption 
by influential policy bodies and its widening 
currency. The term ‘creative industries’ may not be 
academically robust, but its associations resonate 
with fifty years of cultural studies and critical 
art history, as well as the growth and massively 
enhanced legitimacy of popular culture. As a 
result the term ‘creative industries’ has not only 
asserted the economic importance of this sector 
– an argument that in fact had been made from 
the 1970s onwards – but has frequently linked 
this to the ‘elitism’ or ‘marginality’ of the arts. In 
the light of those wider political trends towards a 
pronounced validation of the ‘laws of the market’ 
(chapter 6), this has tended to put justifications of 
the arts on the back foot. 
A replacement for art?
This report has attempted to give due weight to 
these arguments: that art is rooted in wider social 
processes and structures; that it involves complex 
combinations of labour, capital and technology; 
that it has been implicated in processes of social 
distinction and exclusion; and that it has been 
linked with the ‘social technologies’ of nation 
building and newer forms of subject-construction. 
Finally, a range of social, cultural and economic 
developments has combined to suggest to many 
that ‘art’ is a historically redundant category.
Chapter 7
Defining the arts and 
creative industries
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Taking an historical approach, the report has 
attempted to show, however, that these issues 
have been part and parcel of debates on art since 
it emerged as a distinct set of knowledges and 
practices in the 18th century. ‘Art’ emerged as 
part of that wider set of transformations we know 
as ‘modernity’ – the rise of capitalism, modern 
technologies, modern cities, complex social 
structures, and the radical doubt associated with 
the uncoupling of social and individual meaning 
and morals from traditional and theocratic 
authority. The art of modernity contributes to the 
world in which ‘all that is solid melts into air’, but 
it also looks beyond it. In particular it asserted a 
different kind of knowledge and a different kind 
of experience to that presented under the laws of 
scientific, economic and administrative rationality. 
The radical attack on art and aesthetics that 
picked up momentum from the 1960s has indeed 
challenged and transformed how we talk about art 
and culture. However, this report has suggested 
on the one hand that the radical rejection of 
aesthetics – an account of the specific experience 
articulated by art – leaves only a vacuum into 
which purely political or economic rationality 
can step. In the last twenty years, the absolute 
authority of markets has frequently replaced the 
‘elitism’ of art. Yet at the same time much of the 
critique and promise of ‘art’ has been embraced 
by popular culture and by wider sections of the 
population. 
Some have argued that in this way art has 
not become redundant but in fact animates 
the most dynamic (i.e. profitable) elements of 
contemporary capitalism – we are all ‘weekend 
bohemians’ consuming the latest trends. This 
report suggests other ways of reading this; 
that the intertwining of art and popular culture 
has resulted in new forms for the articulation of 
modern experience that have moved beyond 
18th/19th century aesthetics. But the latter’s 
concerns have not been erased; much of 20th 
century modernist culture actively sought to 
critique and transform these concerns, and its 
attempts continue to mark contemporary popular 
culture. Indeed, we might suggest that in many 
ways the traditional divide between art and 
popular culture is increasingly threadbare.
Art’s claims to legitimacy as a set of social 
practices and understandings worthy of public 
policy support do not therefore lie in their 
economic function, nor in their importance for 
individual consumption or ‘expression’, but in their 
ability to articulate a shared experience, a shared 
knowledge of that experience, which is more than 
that of abstract economic or political rationality. 
In this sense, if ‘creative industries’ suggests an 
opening up of cultural participation (reception 
and production), a widening of focus beyond 
the big public and private organisations towards 
the dispersed and fragmented ecosystems of 
producers, consumers and citizens – then all well 
and good. But more frequently, just as ‘creativity’ 
draws on artistic practice but effaces the specific 
kinds of values and understandings involved with 
it, ‘creative industries’ draws on the allure of ‘art 
and culture’ but avoids the full weight of its historic 
challenges for contemporary society. 
At stake for a contemporary creative industries 
policy is to acknowledge and understand the 
myriad connections between art and culture 
and wider socio-economic dynamics – but not 
to reduce them to it. Recent developments have 
certainly transformed the set of oppositions and 
tensions between ‘art’ and ‘industry’ that marked 
the industrial epoch, but they have not vanished 
as if some historical bad dream. Nor would 
anyone want them to.
Definitions
This report was prompted by a set of related 
definitional questions which we are now in a 
position to answer:
•	 What unifies the groups of industries 
collected together under the name creative 
industries? 
•	 Are the arts a part of the creative industries per 
se? 
•	 What are the inputs of the arts to the creative 
industries? 
•	 Are they just a subsidised input to the 
creative industries?
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Is ‘creativity’ the unifying factor?
The Department of Culture Media and Sport 
(DCMS) famously used ‘creativity’ as the defining 
characteristic of all those industries:
“which have their origin in individual creativity, skill 
and talent and which have a potential for wealth and 
job creation through the generation and exploitation 
of intellectual property”97.
The problem with ‘creativity’ as a definitional 
tool is that it is far too wide: were not science, 
engineering, business services creative? John 
Howkins’ The Creative Economy was subtitled 
‘how to make money from ideas’. He thus defined 
this creative economy in terms of intellectual 
property – patents, copyright, trademarks and 
designs. But like the ‘information’ or ‘knowledge 
society’ this too would include science and 
other forms of R&D, as well as financial services, 
engineering, business services, tourism, the 
service sector and so on. And it was also clear 
that much of the creative industries did not trade 
in intellectual property. Many business to business 
services do not retain IP rights on the products to 
which they contribute; many creatives either do 
not chose to or are unable to enforce any rights 
that they might possess. Defining the sector in this 
way is thus reductive and inevitably favours the 
larger corporations who dominate the extraction of 
IP revenue125.
In fact the DCMS articulated a rather traditional 
list of 13 sub-sectors which made up the creative 
industries, including ‘the arts’ and cultural 
industries (TV, radio, publishing, recorded music 
etc.) adding computer games, fashion and 
architecture (which were more or less included 
in most local authority lists). Only ‘software’ was 
new and it caused much controversy as it was 
unclear what it contained (bright young Gen Xs or 
routine programming drones?) and it over-inflated 
the employment figures for the sector. Though 
there have been a few modifications, this list has 
become more or less standard for the creative 
industries. The biggest omission by the DCMS was 
that of galleries, libraries, archives and museums 
(GLAM), and most surveys now include them – 
especially at a local level where these are often 
very big employers. Others have sought to add 
sport and tourism to this sector, but though used 
by some countries to inflate their cultural economy 
figures, there are usually distinctions made 
between the creative industries and these other 
sectors126.
This list of the creative industries sector (including 
GLAM) has become standard; but what was 
specific to these that would differentiate them from 
other elements of Howkins’ ‘creative’ economy? 
The answer is that they are all involved in the 
production of goods and services with cultural 
value127. But ‘cultural value’ can also be set very 
wide. At its most general it refers to products/
services that gain their value from the meanings 
which we ascribe to them: traditions and customs, 
codes and beliefs, shared communal meanings 
and group identities, communicative practices and 
so on. In short a ‘whole way of life’. In this sense 
by far the most important cultural or creative 
industry is the education system, which accounts 
for huge amounts of government and private 
spending. Leaving this aside, there has also 
been a huge increase in the commercialisation of 
‘everyday life’. Services and goods that used to be 
provided outside the market (caring for old people 
and kids, giving advice, preparing vegetables) are 
now big business, and many of these concern 
issues of ‘cultural meaning’. For example, ‘identity’ 
used to be a function of class, gender, and 
ethnicity, etc. – an ascribed social position; now, 
it is increasingly constructed through commercial 
‘cultural’ consumption, and previously functional 
goods now build such cultural appeal into their 
products. 
These issues will be discussed shortly; we 
suggest that in historical and contemporary 
debates the production of goods and services 
with cultural value refers, in a more restricted 
sense, to those cultural forms that have been 
associated with art and popular culture since the 
18th century. That is: visual arts, music, books and 
magazines, performance, dance, film, records, 
radio broadcasts, TV and so on. In short, with 
those cultural practices of modernity which, 
though rooted in wider social practices are also 
distinct from them, having their own logic and 
autonomy. These practices have become crucial 
to our individual and collective sense of ourselves. 
They are also complex systems of production and 
consumption involving commercial markets, formal 
and informal institutions, and circuits of public 
opinion organised into ‘art worlds’ or ‘fields of 
cultural production’ or in more recent times, cultural 
or creative ‘industries’. 
For many policy makers there was a great deal of 
uncertainty as to what ‘creativity’ was when it came 
to actually dealing with specific policy agendas. It 
was certainly a value to be promoted in education 
or management or across cities as a whole; how 
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did it relate to its prime constituency covered by 
those thirteen sub-headings? In 2006 the DCMS re-
launched the idea of creative industries around the 
‘creative economy programme’ and asked Observer 
editor and economist Will Hutton to produce a new 
definitional document, Staying Ahead. In trying to 
define more specifically what kind of value was 
produced by the sector, what set it apart from the 
wider ‘knowledge economy’, Hutton used the term 
‘expressive value’128. 
Staying Ahead defines expressive value as ‘every 
dimension which…enlarges cultural meaning 
and understanding’128. ‘Expressive’ clearly draws 
on the ‘artistic’ connotations of creativity and is 
part of culture understood as a shared public 
meaning system. Hutton endorses the Australian 
cultural economist David Throsby’s list of the 
different values associated with cultural value – 
‘aesthetic, spiritual, social, historic, symbolic, and 
authentic’. This is the same list upon which John 
Holden drew to define the different dimensions 
of the ‘public value’ of culture129. It is clear that 
‘expressive’ value involves cultural values, the 
same cultural values as are also at stake in 
contemporary cultural policy. 
These ‘expressive values’ are the basis for a range 
of major economic activities and thus a clear 
connection is implied between economic and 
cultural policy but these cultural values are also 
legitimate policy goals in their own right. How this 
is dealt with is not directly addressed in Hutton’s 
report – but there is a clear indication that support 
for the creative industries is done for economic 
and cultural reasons130. 
Are ‘the arts’ part of the  
creative industries?
If creative industries produce cultural value, then 
in a broad sense ‘the arts’ are obviously part 
of them. In that sense too ‘the arts’ cannot be 
an input – subsidised or otherwise – into the 
creative industries as they are already inside the 
creative industries. The question is what kinds of 
relationships exist within the creative industries. 
The sector is not homogenous, there are internal 
distinctions to be made. In policy terms this is 
crucial both for an understanding of the different 
dynamics and requirements of the sub-sectors, 
but also as to what policy body takes ownership 
and with what priorities. 
Immediately after the introduction of the new 
term ‘creative industries’, policy agencies and 
consultants began to make distinctions within 
this sector because clearly the sector was not 
homogenous. Visual art, computer games, TV 
production, and fashion design: they did different 
things, they worked in different ways, they had 
different objectives, and they had different 
connections to different policy agendas. Under 
whose remit did they fall and what priorities 
– economic, cultural, and social – should be 
applied to them? Arts agencies, for example, 
wanted to push claims for their expertise in this 
newly important economic sector, but policy 
bodies responsible for economic development 
or innovation or IT policy wanted other parts for 
themselves. Thus a whole suite of terms came 
into existence; ‘creative and cultural sector’, 
‘creative and digital’, ‘creative media’, ‘new media’ 
and so on, in which non-cultural agencies tried 
to separate the more ‘innovative’, ‘fast growth’ 
parts from the artistic and cultural (or, as one 
development agency termed it, ‘lifestyle’) ends of 
the spectrum. 
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One influential model for understanding the 
sector has been that of concentric circles, with a 
‘creative (arts) core’ surrounded by the ‘cultural 
industries’ and then the ‘creative industries’. We 
can look at three influential versions of this as a 
way of pulling out some of the issues and more 
problematic conclusions drawn from this way of 
dividing up the sector.
David Throsby: Cultural Industries Sector131.
Core Creative Arts: Music, Dance, Theatre, 
Literature, Visual Arts, Crafts, Video Art, 
Performance Art, Computer and Multimedia Art
Wider Cultural Industries: Book and Magazine 
Publishing; Television and Radio, Newspapers 
and Film
Related Cultural Industries: Advertising, 
Tourism, Architecture, Design, Fashion
Will Hutton: Staying Ahead128.
Creative Core: all acts of original creation of 
expressive values.
Cultural Industries: commercialisation of 
expressive product (TV, Radio, Film, Music, 
Computer Games etc)
Creative Industries: combination of expressive and 
function values (architecture, advertising, fashion, 
design)
Wider Economy: expressive input into 
manufactured and service goods (Dyson, Virgin)
KEA: EU Cultural and Creative Sectors132.
Core Arts Fields: Visual arts; Performing Arts; 
Heritage (Sub-sectors: crafts, painting, sculpture, 
photography)
Cultural Industries: Film and Video; TV 
and Radio; Videogames: Music; Books and 
Press (Sub-sectors: Recorded and Live music, 
Collecting Societies, Books and Magazine 
publishing) 
Creative Industries: Design, Architecture, 
Advertising (Sub-sectors: fashion, graphic, interior 
and product design)
Related Industries: Manufactures of MP3s, 
PCs, Mobile Phones etc.
We thus have a confusing system whereby the 
creative industries can often become a sub-sector of 
…the creative industries! But there are more difficult 
issues buried in these superficially similar models. 
Mass reproduction?
KEA identified the core as ‘the arts’ in the traditional 
sense, and they are defined as “non-industrial 
activities”. ‘Non-industrial’ here can have two 
senses – non-commercial/subsidised, and not 
involving mass reproduction. Both of these are at 
play in the allocation of ‘recorded and live music’ to 
the ‘cultural industries’, characterised as “industrial 
sectors aimed at massive reproduction”. Here, 
then, we have an extremely conservative version of 
the creative arts, which associates these art forms 
with pre-mechanical reproduction art forms and 
non-commercial, subsidised activities. 
There are certainly major new dynamics involved 
when technologies of mass reproduction 
opened up increased levels of profitability. Some 
cultural theorists and policy makers set the 
‘uniqueness’ of traditional art products against 
the ‘industrialisation’ of mass reproduction, but 
this kind of technological-aesthetic binary, already 
challenged in the 1930s by such as Benjamin and 
Brecht, has very little contemporary credibility. The 
more telling critique was that mass reproduction 
held out the possibilities of high profits – and 
required expensive processes of production, 
artist selection and management, marketing, 
distribution and so on. That is, it was high levels 
of capitalisation rather than mass reproduction 
per se that marked these new cultural forms. We 
have shown, however, to refuse to allow these 
forms the status of ‘art’ is highly questionable. 
The notion of ‘mass reproduction’ ignored the 
complexities of production – organised around a 
mosaic of companies and freelancers, and driven 
by the need to produce new cultural value – and of 
consumption, which became increasingly literate 
as well as highly niched. 
On the other hand, to suggest the arts are not 
a commercial ‘industry’ (in the sense we have 
used it here, as an economic sector) ignores 
their connections – through recording, film, 
radio and television, publishing and so on – to 
mass reproduction and, more importantly, mass 
distribution. The traditional arts certainly have a 
‘live’ or ‘unique’ presence upon which they thrive 
and which to some extent restrict productivity 
gains, but they are no strangers to the possibilities 
these industries and technologies open to 
connect with a wider audience. The Internet has 
merely underlined this, but there are organisational 
innovations such as franchising, which have 
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become huge money earners. Think of musicals 
and circuses, operating at global multi-troupe 
levels, for example, or the Tate, MOMA and 
Guggenheim brands. It is also to ignore the hugely 
profitable and highly prestigious sections of their 
own markets. Parts of the visual and performing 
arts are as internationally connected and as 
highly capitalised as many cultural industries. 
Their command of public subsidy also results in 
high levels of spending and influence – employing 
staff, setting the terms for artistic markets, altering 
urban profiles and landscapes. Even as publicly 
subsidised they are big business. Finally – and 
we shall return to this – the arts and cultural 
industries share skills and personnel, ideas and 
aspirations, and often the social spaces in which 
these circulate. Their ‘art worlds’ or ‘creative fields’ 
– those complex ecosystems of economic and 
cultural value creation that mark the traditional arts 
as well as the newer cultural forms – overlap and 
intermingle.
There are differences between these different art 
practices, and between them and the larger media 
companies with whom and for whom they often 
work. But it is simply not possible to separate ‘art’ 
from ‘live and recorded music’, or from a film, or 
TV mini-series, in such a way.
Art’s input into the cultural and 
creative industries 
Creative core?
David Throsby has a ‘creative arts core’ which is 
“the locus of origin of creative ideas, and radiating 
outwards as those ideas become combined with 
more and more other inputs to produce a wider 
and wider range of products”131. This is echoed by 
Will Hutton’s ‘creative core’ whose “commercial 
outputs possess a high degree of expressive value 
and invoke copyright protection”. Hutton notes: 
“Importantly creation… should not be interpreted 
solely in terms of traditional artforms. The writing 
of computer software, the establishment of a 2.0 
website or the evolution of a new character in a video 
game all belong here”128. 
There are two problems with this. First, though 
inventing a new game character involves 
‘expressive value’, it is not clear that writing a piece 
of software or establishing a website does. They 
might, yet there are websites and codes which 
are original and protected by copyright but which 
could not be described as having ‘expressive’ or 
‘cultural value’. Here Hutton is confusing ‘creative 
ideas’ in general (inventive, original, rule pushing) 
with creative cultural ideas. 
This confusion relates to the second, bigger, 
problem. Hutton’s ‘creative core’ is not about 
industries per se but creative acts or inputs 
into cultural products. A new game character 
is certainly a creative input, but it would most 
likely be produced within a cultural industries 
company. Similarly musicians are placed at the 
creative core but music industries are in the 
cultural industries circle. What appears initially as 
a way of categorising different kinds of industries 
is here being used to identify different inputs or 
activities. Hutton’s model is a kind of value chain: 
from creation, to reproduction/commercialisation, 
to incorporation into functional product. In reality, 
those creatives in the creative core are actually 
employed throughout the various circles; they 
do not form a determinate set of industries in 
themselves133. 
Hutton’s ‘cultural industries’ are those that focus 
“primarily or solely on the commercialisation 
of pure expressive value”. His creative core is 
thus distinguished from those industries that 
do the commercialisation; it is not a distinct set 
of industries, but merely the general source of 
‘creative input’. As such Hutton’s model separates 
the creatives and the creative process from the 
industries in which they are set to work. Cultural 
industries are thus about the commercialisation – 
not the creation – of ‘pure expressive value’, just 
as ‘the arts’ – included in this core but nowhere 
else – can only be about pure expressivity not 
about commercialisation. 
There are then severe shortcomings with this 
model. Not only does it mean that the arts 
cannot be an industry – just pure creativity – it 
presents creativity as providing the raw material 
subsequently ‘commercialised’ by the cultural 
industries. But as we noted above, these 
creatives are employed within the creative 
industries (directly salaried or as sub-contracted), 
and these industries actively commission, seek 
out, produce, co-develop – as such co-create 
– much of the content that they commercialise. 
This separation of a creative core from the 
industries, which is then commercialised, 
fails to register neither the real position of the 
arts nor the actual operation of the creative 
industries. The model might be accused of 
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suggesting an individual genius, rather than 
collaborative approach to creative production; 
it certainly ignores the active role of industry 
in the generation of that creative product, 
and consequently evades some of the very 
real conflicts between creative labour and the 
conditions in which it is put to work.
Compare this with Throsby. His ‘core creative 
arts’ – suitably expanded to include contemporary 
forms of digital/on-digital practices – are industries 
not just ‘creative input’. 
“Each of these art forms on its own can be regarded 
as an industry, and is frequently referred to as such, 
although such a usage usually embraces more 
than just the original producers…. [T]he ‘music 
industry refers to an enormous range of participants, 
including composers, performers, publishers, 
record companies, distributors, promoters, retailers, 
collecting societies and so on”131.
That is, Throsby’s core identifies a group of 
industries that centre on the creative arts. In 
this sense they might be seen precisely as that 
extension of the traditional arts to embrace 
new forms of contemporary popular culture to 
which Williams and others looked. There seems 
no reason why computer games might not fall 
within this sector. The creative arts core therefore 
includes the traditionally state subsided arts and 
those more commercial sectors which rarely 
receive such funding. 
Cultural industries as partially 
non-cultural?
Throsby’s designation of the ‘core creative arts’ 
as a distinct set of industries is thus much more 
useful than KEA or Staying Ahead. Throsby then 
goes on to distinguish between the ‘core creative 
arts’ and the ‘cultural industries’ on the grounds, 
not of industrialisation, commercialisation or 
mass reproduction (all of which can exist within 
these creative arts industries), but according to 
the proportion of ‘primarily cultural goods and 
services’ they produce. Thus book and magazine 
publishing, television and radio, newspapers and 
so on are cultural industries because they mix 
cultural commodities with the ‘non-cultural’. 
But Throsby’s distinction is not entirely clear. 
Television or newspapers provide cultural and 
non-cultural commodities. What might this non-
cultural commodity be? On the one hand this 
could be those information and communication 
services which characterise ‘the media’. That is, 
they are non-cultural in the aesthetic sense but 
they are part of that circulation of information, 
knowledge and opinion – the media - which 
is central to the workings of complex modern 
societies, including that ‘public sphere’ which – as 
we saw in chapter 1 – grew up with them. They 
are also – as we saw in chapter 2 – central to the 
creation of economic and cultural value within ‘art 
worlds’. 
For this reason both the ‘aesthetic-cultural’ and 
the ‘media-cultural’ are both legitimately part of 
cultural policy though, as we noted, these have 
been historically split into a distinct policy areas 
(art as opposed to broadcasting, communications, 
media, etc.). This is not spelled out by Throsby: his 
‘non-cultural’ can easily fall into an older division 
between art and ‘entertainment’. 
Throsby places film within ‘cultural industries’ but 
he expresses uncertainty. 
“Some would place film clearly in the core arts 
group, others would see it falling into the media and 
entertainment category; in reality a division into types 
of film would be required to assign sectors of the film 
industry into one category or another”131.
Here the grounds seem not to be that film 
produces ‘non-cultural’ content (in the sense we 
use it above – maybe documentaries, or current 
affairs) but that it also produces ‘entertainment’. 
In what sense is entertainment ‘non-cultural’? The 
suggestion of a case by case basis indicates that 
this is a qualitative category in which judgements 
of ‘art’ or ‘entertainment’ establish a line between 
the ‘cultural’ and the ‘non-cultural’. One of the 
most powerful thrusts of cultural studies has 
been that art/entertainment is either not a tenable 
distinction, or one that requires high levels of 
reflection and justification. It certainly cannot 
be used to establish lines between different 
industries, where the ‘non-cultural’ element 
is clearly about mere money making or ‘easy’ 
culture. We may want to make case by case 
distinctions between films – as we do with music 
or theatre – but these are about ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
cultural products not the ‘cultural’ and the  
‘non-cultural’. 
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We suggest that we can use the idea of the 
cultural industries as a mix of cultural – conceived 
as aesthetic or ‘expressive’ product – and ‘non-
cultural’ – as media, communications, information 
and knowledge. This means that television 
companies can produce and distribute art of the 
highest quality (The Sopranos, for example) but 
that this is not the only concern of the companies 
involved; they produce news, chat shows, games 
shows etc. In this sense film companies, along 
with music and with computer games, should all 
belong to core creative arts. (The position of the 
television production company, which sells drama 
to broadcasters, will be discussed below). 
The creative industries as non-cultural?
Throsby’s ‘related cultural industries’ correspond 
to Hutton and KEA’s ‘creative industries’. They 
“operate essentially outside of the cultural sphere 
but some of whose product could be argued 
to have some degree of cultural content”131. 
Throsby adds that they are included in the cultural 
industries134 “only if a very broad definitional 
basis were adopted”. KEA describes the creative 
industries as “non-cultural”, but suggests “they 
employ creative skills and creative people i.e. 
people who have been trained in the arts”. These 
definitions are both problematic. 
It is one of the problems with the concentric circle 
model that it sees the creative core “radiating 
outwards as those ideas become combined 
with more and more other inputs to produce a 
wider and wider range of products”. The model 
has a tendency to see this radiation weakening, 
becoming more mixed, more applied, less 
cultural, more functional as it proceeds outwards. 
However, though we might say that creative 
industries involve more functional elements, this 
is not the same as saying either that their creative 
input derives from the arts or that their creative 
input is somehow less artistic/cultural. 
In what way can fashion design be deemed 
‘non-cultural’ or operating ‘outside of the cultural 
sphere’? The KEA model implies that, rather than 
having distinct design skills, creative inputs have 
to be imported from those trained in the arts. 
Presumably only artists can supply the inputs 
into a building, a new collection or an interior that 
prevents it from being merely functional. This 
approach simply does not capture the aesthetic 
and cultural literacy that operates within these 
specific industries, or the fact that its exchanges 
with other art worlds are conducted at the 
highest levels. It would come as a shock to the 
participants of a contemporary design seminar, 
with aesthetic theory coming out of their ears, to 
know that they were operating outside the cultural 
sector. This categorisation therefore confuses 
the functional with a low aesthetic priority, or as 
merely derivative from the ‘pure arts’ sector135. 
Hutton tries to avoid this: the creative industries 
are “analytically first cousins to the cultural 
industries; distinct while belonging to the same 
family of activity”, and they create both ‘expressive 
and functional value’. That is, they are both 
aesthetic-cultural and functional; it is not a zero-
sum game where the more functionality means the 
less cultural, or that the creative inputs are a long 
way from the sun of the arts. Hutton’s suggestion 
that they produce both expressive and functional 
value does not suggest that therefore the former is 
either derivative or compromised. These industries 
must deliver both, and of the highest quality. They 
are frequently plugged into the cutting edge of 
cultural debates within which they are clearly a 
major force. That the dress should not fall apart 
in the rain, or the building leak, requires functional 
skills which give this sector special characteristics, 
but does not forcibly eject it from the palace of 
culture. 
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Art-media-design
Intersecting policy sectors
Based on the above definitional discussion we 
might now approach the different relationships 
within the creative industries by identifying three 
broad, inter-related sectors: art, media and 
design. These are not meant to be hard and fast 
lines but they allow us to be more aware of their 
particular dynamics and structures. The sectors 
are organised around the combination of art (in 
our wide sense of art-popular cultural forms) with 
other social and cultural functions. 
Art designates those activities/industries 
concerned primarily/exclusively with the creation 
of these expressive-symbolic values – music, 
performing and visual arts, computer games and 
‘digital art’. What media companies call ‘content’. 
Art overlaps with media – parts of book publishing 
and television/radio production are clearly 
concerned with art. It also overlaps with design 
– parts of craft, graphic design and photography 
for example, have been seen as art. Art would 
include the industries within which this production 
is organised – the music industry or computer 
games publishing, for example – and those public 
or non-commercial institutions which also facilitate 
the production of both cultural and economic 
value; that is, the GLAM sector and parts of media 
and publishing.  
a) They are all ‘industries’ 
They all mobilise a range of economic resources, 
produce commercial and non-commercial outputs 
and involve ‘non-creative’ specialists and functions. 
b) They all produce artistic or 
aesthetic value 
There is no reason to believe that the artistic skills 
involved in design are somehow lesser than those 
in, for example, the visual arts. The production of 
material culture – in architecture, fashion, interiors 
– often assigned to the merely ‘decorative’, not 
only represents some of the greatest works of 
art, but has been a central part of that aesthetic 
impulse to ‘change life’ which we have outlined. 
Nor need we spell out that television and 
publishing and so on are responsible for some of 
the very best things done in contemporary art.
c) They mix artistic, cultural and 
social values
The concentric circle model implies a hierarchy 
based on an increasing mix (or watering down) of 
culture with non-culture; we suggest rather that the 
mix should be seen in terms of artistic (or aesthetic) 
values with other cultural and social values/
functions. Media and design do other things than 
produce artistic value; they combine this value with 
social and cultural values/functions both in terms 
of specific productions and services (a programme 
schedule, an iPhone) and the mix of business 
interests involved (communications infrastructure 
providers, engineering firms, service delivers, etc.).
d) Intrinsic/instrumental mix operates 
across all three sectors
The concentric circle model also implies a 
hierarchy based on increasing commercialisation 
or industrialisation. It then ascribes policy 
responsibility based on the respective priority 
of cultural and economic value within each 
sub-sector. We suggest rather that a mix – and 
indeed often a conflict – of cultural and economic, 
‘intrinsic’ and ‘instrumental’ value operates 
across all three sectors. All three have elements 
of mass reproduction, high capitalisation and 
conglomeration; all have high numbers of 
freelancers and micro-businesses operating 
within them.
 
e) Judgements of value operate across 
all three
Judgments of artistic quality are constantly made 
in all three sectors, and quite clearly there’s a 
lot of rubbish pumped out in music and film, art 
galleries and computer games, just as there is on 
television and gracing the landscapes of our cities 
and shelves. These judgments are not the same 
in each sector – there are different standards and 
requirements, and there are other social, cultural 
and political grounds for such judgments. And 
of course there are different ‘regimes of value’ 
within each sector (chapter 6). But judgements 
also speak across the sectors, just as there are 
many overlaps and transfers (think of fashion 
photography becoming ‘visual art’, telephone 
boxes becoming design icons, abstract art 
becoming advertising or furniture). 
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There are different intensities of inter-relationships 
across these sectors. Some parts barely 
communicate (computer games and classical 
music, product design and dance?) others have 
long standing symbiotic connections (music 
and radio, architecture and visual arts). These 
intensities differ between places (art, fashion and 
pop music can be distinct or closely fused in New 
York or London). 
All three form the horizon of our contemporary 
culture. They all partake of that public sphere in 
which cultural values – and thus economic values 
– are established and contested. As such they are 
all legitimate objects of public policy. The nature of 
that public sphere is now much more fragmented 
and complex as we noted in chapters 5 and 6. 
Nevertheless, though the economic potential 
of contemporary culture has been increasingly 
recognised through the notion of cultural and 
creative industries, we cannot uncouple this 
economic dimension from the cultural. 
 
Media and design industries
These three broad sectors have different 
dynamics, different mixes of value, different 
histories. Thus, in relation to art, media have much 
more explicit social and political priorities, as 
design has social and material-functional priorities. 
They also have different policy histories. We have 
already discussed art-media links in chapter 4; art 
and design relations also have complex histories, 
which, like media, differ between countries136. 
Nevertheless, the creative industries as art-media-
design are closely intertwined in their production 
of cultural, economic and social values. Together 
they form the horizon of our contemporary 
culture and it is hard to think of these policy 
constituencies operating in isolation.
Media industries 
Media industries do not just make art. They 
provide the space within which arts and 
information/discussion about arts circulates. They 
also do current affairs, documentaries and reality 
TV shows. They provide community information 
and access. They do education. They also provide 
the infrastructure and the software to allow such 
communication137. The central role of the media, 
deriving from the inevitable fact of mediated 
communication in modern societies marked by 
complex divisions of labour, includes a range of 
cultural, social and economic functions which go 
beyond what we have called art, but which make 
much of that art possible. For this reason media 
policy has always involved more than an ‘arts’ 
policy, and indeed more than a ‘cultural’ policy (for 
example, it is central to democratic government 
and economic exchange). But arts and cultural 
agendas have a legitimate stake in helping 
determine such media policies. 
We have suggested above how art and media have 
emerged together and have long been intertwined. 
The connections remain between nation-building 
and privileged narratives, images or music: the 
ways in which the ‘aesthetic subject’ has been 
linked to the creation of responsible citizenship. 
Both emerge in the context of complex modern 
societies in which traditional art forms tend to 
be challenged. In this context the desire for new 
forms of social communication, forms of social 
being together, have historically seen art and 
media mutually informing one another (Brecht and 
Benjamin stand out again here). More concretely, 
the social, cultural and economic foundations of art 
worlds are inconceivable without the media sphere.
The growth of the internet has transformed 
much of established media structure in ways we 
cannot outline here. It challenges media business 
models because it disrupts many payment 
mechanisms, but it also opens up distribution 
channels; anyone with a connection can 
distribute to anyone else who is connected. The 
internet also impacts on the possibilities of social 
communication – ‘social media’ – extending 
possibilities, which were merely latent in older 
technologies. It is a media with possibilities 
not just for the distribution of ‘content’ (a film 
on You-Tube), nor only for new kinds of artistic 
production (a collaborative ‘open source’ music 
piece), but for new kinds of social and cultural 
connections. All these have been part of arts 
concern with media, and for this reason the 
internet falls within the legitimate concern of arts 
agencies in certain areas. A new broadband 
network has profound cultural consequences. 
Design industries
Design industries are not solely concerned with 
aesthetics but also with functions – of objects, 
spaces, services and social organisations. 
Functionality needs to be distinguished from 
commerciality. Commercial imperatives and 
‘bottom lines’ are present in all three sectors, 
in a music show, in a TV mini-series, in a new 
building. Functionality involves a set of technical 
and conceptual skills concerned with use-value. 
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As ‘craft’ (‘techne’, ‘artisanship’) these have 
always been associated with, though often subtly 
distinguished from, ‘art’ and ‘artistry’. 
We saw in chapter 2 how part of this distinction 
concerned the different status of artistic and 
manual labour – where one was ‘transcendent’, 
freely creating, and the other dominated by the 
necessity of work. The constant tussle between 
art and craft (nicely outlined by Becker in Art 
Worlds) was often about the status of ‘artistic 
vision’ versus ‘mere technique’, between the 
‘pure’ and the ‘applied’ (or ‘decorative’). However, 
this conflict was offset by a continuing shared 
sense amongst artists and artisans of being true 
to the material and the tools at hand, of a certain 
fitness-for-purpose embodied within the material 
world, which Heidegger evoked in his critique 
of technology as domination of nature. Richard 
Sennett’s recent book The Craftsman develops 
this notion of craft and extends it to the work of 
the hand and eye involved in surgery, in design 
drawing and in software development138.
Though 19th century aesthetics frequently asserted 
the art/craft distinction, there were also powerful 
counter-currents that valued the ‘craft’ in art and 
the social-ethical responsibilities of art to connect 
with and transform ‘everyday life’. From William 
Morris (or before him William Blake) through the 
avant-garde (Bauhaus, Constructivism), craft skills 
became part of a future oriented conception of 
‘design’ for living in which the ‘aesthetic’ played 
its part. So too, though modernism is often 
castigated for being a new version of ‘art for art’s 
sake’ (see chapter 4) another avant-garde strand 
stressed the new socio-political functionality of art 
for re-inventing modernity. 
Design involves planning and craft; it also involves 
the aesthetic quality of how it looks, feels and 
sounds. Famously the Roman architect Vitruvius 
suggested three aspects of design – firmitas, 
utilitas, venustas. The first concerns structure – 
the province of the engineer; the second is the 
programme – province of the planner; the third, 
form or beauty, the province of the artist. In this 
conception ‘aesthetic’ – pertaining to the sense, 
to perception – becomes the look, the allure 
and the surface. How these three aspects are 
put together involves engineering and craft skills 
(some cutting edge, some often long acquired, 
locally embedded and tacit), planning skills 
(‘what is this thing trying to achieve and with what 
means’ can be a visionary or mundane question) 
and ‘artistic’ or ‘creative’ skills. These are not 
strictly separated. In particular, the ‘aesthetic’ is 
frequently restricted to this surface allure – and 
hence the label ‘designer’ in the 1990s acquired 
the sense of an object that transcends its basic 
function to appeal to an (upmarket) ‘artistic’ 
appreciation. However, the ‘aesthetic’ as we have 
discussed it – the tradition of modern art since the 
18th century – is not confined to ‘beauty’ in this 
way. It has aspirations to articulate and transform 
experience, giving it an ethical and political charge 
that formed the intent of William Morris, Bauhaus, 
Le Corbusier, and Buckminster-Fuller – maybe 
even Steve Jobs. Thus the ‘aesthetics’ of design 
has rarely been simply decorative allure (venustas, 
after Venus), but always an intrinsic part of the 
social, cultural and political vision of firmitas 
and utilitas (as in the Acropolis, or Pantheon, for 
example). 
Chapter 6 illustrates how the increasing 
importance of the non-functional ‘expressive’ or 
‘symbolic’ or ‘cultural’ aspects of consumer goods 
and services has been seen as a main driver for 
the creative industries as a whole. This is part of 
the wider extension of the notion of culture from 
‘the arts’, or even popular ‘entertainment’ forms, 
to the anthropological notion of culture as ‘a whole 
way of life’. Featherstone’s (1996) “aesthetisation 
of everyday life” and Lash and Urry’s (1994) 
“culturalisation of the economy” register this rise in 
‘cultural consumption’. We have shown how this 
equation of ‘aesthetics’ and ‘cultural value’ with 
the allure of individual ‘expressive’ consumption 
is problematic, and flattens out much of what 
‘aesthetic art’ has attempted to articulate139. 
On the other hand, the utilitas of art cannot be 
reduced to its ‘allure’ for consumption. The social 
function of melody, rhythm, movement, line, shape 
and image and their role within the everyday 
meaning and social interaction – elements never 
eradicated by ‘aesthetic art’ – are also part of the 
concern of design. 
Design has now a higher prestige than at any 
time in the last 200 years. Designers increasingly 
distrust aesthetics as allure and look to its 
wider social and cultural function. Designers 
have become increasingly reflective about their 
practice, its core mission, skills and ethics. In 
doing so they often claim not to be ‘artists’. This is 
true to a degree; at the same time such impulses 
to wider social responsibilities are by no means 
alien to the art tradition as we have outlined it. 
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124 Interestingly in China, ‘cultural industries’ is a term reserved for the more sensitive areas of content (national identity and heritage, ethical  
 values, current affairs) subject to cultural policy considerations; creative industries is allowed for non-sensitive areas (‘entertainment’,  
 animation, fashion, design) subject to economic policy priorities. 
125 ‘Experience economy’ has been used as a descriptor, but it derives from a service industry perspective, which would include the full range  
 of everyday culture in its purview – children’s parties, tourism, hotels and catering, and even the experience of dealing with a financial services 
 institution. C.f. Richard Lanham (2006) The Economics of Attention: Style and Substance in the Age of Information. Chicago: University of 
 Chicago Press. Others use ‘attention economy’; this points to the fact that they are not necessities but appeal to other ‘non-tangible’ aspects 
 of ourselves. They are also in competition with all other such attention goods that are infinite and thus they have to be ‘attention grabbing’.  
 The term is far too wide, describing general economic transformations, rather than specificity of this sector. C.f. Joseph Pine and James  
 Gilmore (1999) The Experience Economy: Work is theatre and Every Business a Stage. Boston, Mass: Harvard Business School Press.
126 Another school of thought saw creativity as the creation of novelty or unknown economic value per se. But this definition, aiming to directly 
 link the creative industries to the innovation system, ends up with a definition which can include nanotechnology and early bicycle  
 manufacturing – anything that is of unknown value. At the same time it excludes known cultural value – including the arts – from the creative  
 industries.
127 Some use the term ‘symbolic value’, but this has less specificity, as mathematics is a symbolic system, so too business information systems,  
 and of course, language itself.
128 Will Hutton, (2007) Staying Ahead. The Economic Performance of the UK’s Creative Industries. London; The Work Foundation
129 John Holden (2004) Capturing Public Value: How Culture has Become a Tool of Government Policy. London: Demos.
130 The problem with ‘expressive value’ has already been raised in connection with John Holden. It can easily be identified with individual  
 enjoyment and preference – Holden’s ‘intrinsic value’ – and with ‘identity building’ conceived as the upmarket consumption of status goods.
131 Throsby, D. (2001) Economics and Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p112-113
132 KEA (2006) The Economy of Culture in Europe. Report prepared for the European Commission, Directorate-General for Education and 
 Culture, Brussels.
133 Similarly, though their products might be protected by copyright, they do not necessarily own these or do? the profit extraction from  
 them. confusing
134 As Throsby defines the whole sector, rather than the now more usual ‘creative industries’
135 Alan Scott calls the whole sector ‘cultural commodity production’. However he uses a service/manufacture distinction to separate two  
 different kinds of commodity. Service outputs focus on ‘entertainment, edification, and information’ (e.g., motion pictures, recorded  
 music, print, media, or museums); manufactured products are those through which consumers construct distinctive forms of individuality,  
 self-affirmation, and social display. This not a sustainable distinction; not only do ‘services’ get embodied in a variety of manufactured objects 
 (what Lash and Lurry (2007 Op.Cit.) call the ‘thingification of the media’) but objects themselves are saturated with ‘service’ – i.e. ‘creative’, 
 ‘artistic’ or ‘design’ – input. The service/manufacture distinction is unhelpful, especially when the latter are equated with identity construction  
 and social display – as if this is not involved in the consumption of music or books, for example. Alan Scott (2004) ‘Cultural products  
 industries and urban economic development: Prospects for growth and market contestation in global context’, Urban Affairs Review, 
 39 (4) pp.461-490
136 Art and design have been much more opposed in Anglo-Saxon countries than in many continental European countries; the claim that the  
 art-industry divide has collapsed thus has special resonance for those countries that saw them as separate worlds in the first place. 
137 This is where the term ‘content’ comes from. At one level it serves to mark off these two distinct aspects of media industries (Telstra from  
 Foxtel, for example); but its increasing use to describe all symbolic products and services is less than useful. 
138 Richard Sennett (2008) The Craftsman London: Allen Lane 
139 The issue this throws up for cultural policy is less that of Adorno’s industrialisation of ‘the arts’ but the industrialisation of everyday culture.  
 That is, the increasing reach of goods and services with high levels of design-culture appeal does not mean an end to the arts-industry  
 separation – often an Anglo-Saxon problem – but its transposition to a new register.
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Conclusion
Creative industries policy
The conclusions of this report suggest that a 
contemporary democratic cultural policy must 
deal with all three broad creative industries sectors 
– art-media-design. 
Such a cultural policy must engage with the 
economic dimensions of these sectors, and 
this implies a new set of policy tools and visions 
which take us beyond the subsidy of individual 
artists and institutions. It needs to do so in a way 
that provides a clear rationale and the evidence 
for the cultural and social value of these sectors 
both in relation to and separate from purely 
economic goals and indicators. The imposition of 
overarching economic objectives and indicators in 
the creative sectors not only misses these wider 
cultural and social goals but fails to acknowledge 
the crucial significance of these for the economic 
success of the sector.
The very real economic importance of the 
creative industries should not result in a divided 
constituency – the high growth with the economic 
agencies, the low growth/subsidised with the 
cultural – but to an integrated approach. The 
mutual recognition of the different cultural, social 
and economic dimensions of this sector is the 
basis for their ‘triple bottom line’ sustainability in 
the coming years.
Such a creative industries policy demands that 
the agencies concerned with each sector – and 
these can be multiple – collaborate closely 
with one another. A key task of such a policy 
would thus be to identify the policy stakeholders 
involved and clarify the different goals and 
responsibilities within such a policy coalition. 
In the case of design the lack of a significant 
national policy body capable of engaging in such 
a forum is currently a problem. It does not have a 
policy champion despite its growing significance 
within the sector as a whole.
A creative industries policy should recognise 
the legitimate interests of arts and cultural 
policy agencies within the areas of media and 
design – and vice versa. The convergence of 
telecommunications, widespread computer use 
and broad- and narrow-cast media has profoundly 
altered the landscape of the creative industries. 
The levels of intersections between art-media-
design as well as between cultural-social-
economic policy suggests a new level of mutual 
engagement is required. 
However the very real power asymmetries 
between such agencies needs to be recognised. 
Equally, the capacity of national arts and cultural 
agencies to engage in such a creative industries 
policy may demand significant structural change 
and enhanced capacity in these areas. 
 
The grounds for 
public intervention
Subsidy and market failure
In chapters 4 and 5 we discussed issues around 
the subsidy of ‘the arts’ and other interventions 
within the cultural industries. We suggested that 
subsidy, a tentative model in the case of the 
Arts Council of Great Britain, became almost 
exclusively associated with arts policy as such, 
and those art forms that received such subsidy 
came to be identified with ‘the arts’ as such. It led, 
by the 1970s, to a classic cultural policy default 
position – public funding for the arts, the market 
for the cultural industries. It is based on tautology: 
the arts are most ‘purely’ creative because not 
commercialised, but they are identified as ‘the 
arts’ precisely on the grounds of their not being 
part of a commercial ‘industry’. Translated into 
everyday cultural policy: if you are commercially 
viable you do not qualify for subsidy, and if you 
do qualify you must by definition be more purely 
creative.
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Policies developed around the cultural industries 
challenged this approach in a number of ways. 
Cultural industries policies involved non-subsidy 
based tools. Public finance was used (various 
degrees of direct/indirect funding) but also 
regulatory interventions (content restrictions, 
granting of monopolies, tax breaks). These were 
usually aimed at large national institutions, but 
from the late 1980s, these interventions became 
more driven by cities and regions. 
The ‘arts and cultural’ policies generated in 
Australia, Europe, the UK and North America in 
the 1980s and 1990s involved an increasingly 
sophisticated set of policy tools. As we saw in 
chapter 5, these tools intervened in economic 
and cultural dynamics because they combined 
economic and cultural objectives. Local economic 
development was seen to be closely linked to local 
cultural development. Cultural policies for cities 
treated them as ecosystems to be understood 
in holistic fashion – this was the ambition behind 
Franco Bianchini’s ‘cultural planning’ or Charles 
Landry’s ‘creative city’140. The post-1998 creative 
industries agenda has built on these initiatives; it 
did not start from ground zero. 
‘Market failure’ as a justification within cultural 
policy (see discussion in chapter 4) does not 
suggest that the market as a whole has failed 
and we should move to wholesale subsidy. 
For cultural economists such as Bruno Frey 
or David Throsby, there are certain aspects of 
art and culture that the market does not serve 
well141. For example, the increasing expense of 
older art forms and their difficulties in increasing 
‘productivity’, or the need for ‘investment’ in new 
and unknown ventures. Indeed, given the wider 
definition of ‘the arts’ used in this report and 
now fairly standard (Throsby includes the music 
industry, as does the recent Australia Council 
report on arts participation), the idea of an arts 
and cultural policy that does not involve the 
market in some way is unfeasible. 
Chapter 5 outlined Nicholas Garnham’s 
contention that commercially produced culture 
now has a predominant place within most 
people’s cultural consumption and a democratic 
policy must address this. Further, the market was 
increasingly accepted on the social-democratic 
and socialist left as the best tool for the allocation 
of cultural goods and services in a post-scarcity 
situation. That is, there is an over-supply of 
cultural goods in competition for one’s time, and 
the market mechanism works to facilitate choice 
between these. This has been more or less 
accepted since the days of Keynes at the Arts 
Council of Great Britain. 
The more intractable questions of ‘market failure’ 
do not concern the false polarity between the 
abstractions of subsidy (government choice) 
versus the market (consumer choice) but relate 
how real markets (and the industrial structures 
that grow with) them operate. Any acquaintance 
with the political economy of culture and media 
will show that the ‘free market’ simply does 
not describe the tendencies of monopoly, 
agglomeration, cartels, restrictive practices, 
exploitation and unfair competition which mark 
the cultural industries. Whatever shade of black or 
grey we might want to paint these tendencies, to 
ignore them completely is the height of naivety. 
For this reason governments have been 
concerned to regulate these markets. This 
regulation may be about protecting national 
industries for national-cultural reasons 
(local content versus Hollywood) as well as 
encouraging local industry (local music content 
to support the local music industry). In reality 
these two intertwine. And though national 
identity has become more fragmented, multiple 
or loose, and though globalisation has impacted 
on ‘local industries’ these two cultural and 
economic concerns remain key foundations 
of cultural policy and form a part of the third 
foundation – not just national industries which 
produce relevant local content, but a healthy 
cultural ecosystem within which creatives can 
make a living producing cultural values. Thus, 
if we believe creative industries are part of 
an ‘innovation system’, then this too behoves 
intervention if ‘market failure’ means that local 
production is placed at an unfair disadvantage. 
In this sense policy concern for ‘cultural 
diversity’ and for ‘creative innovation’ face similar 
challenges. 
Market failure happens all the time; one of the 
functions of government is to try to avoid this142. 
Subsidising those cultural (or other social or 
economic) activities deemed valuable, but that 
can’t entirely make it on the market, is one aspect 
of this; active involvement in its regulation and 
management is another. The association of arts 
policy exclusively with the former has positioned 
them as ‘welfare’ – John Holden has outlined how 
debilitating this can sometimes be. Engaging (pro-) 
actively with markets – regulating, managing, 
growing – is cultural policy as public policy. 
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Cultural policy as public policy 
Public funding in the form of direct subsidy has 
a clear role here. The survival of the older art 
forms and the institutions – including educational 
– with which they are associated is inconceivable 
without this subsidy. There is no reason why 
these art practitioners should not be encouraged 
to find new markets and new kinds of income, 
within reasonable limits. There is no reason why 
direct financial support cannot be made more 
sophisticated. There is a growing body of work 
looking at how new kinds of smart finance – soft 
loans, trust funds, the abolition of restrictions (a 
company can go out and put their money on the 
stock exchange) – and on other ways in which 
public funding and commercial activities can be 
combined143. This report cannot go into these 
details; we merely suggest that there is nothing 
intrinsic to ‘the arts’ that makes subsidy the only 
model. 
Subsidy can be a blunt instrument and needs 
improving. It is also in short supply, it is 
cumbersome to administer and it fails to deal 
with the proliferation of individuals and micro 
businesses who now make up the majority of the 
arts sector. In addition, industries and art worlds 
involve a range of non-creative functions and skills, 
as well as social and spatial infrastructure, which 
need to be approached in a holistic or ecosystem 
approach. The development of infrastructure, 
common skills, network in and other kinds of 
facilitation, bespoke IP or marketing agencies 
(often public or public-private). These are all 
ways in which art and cultural/creative industries 
policies have grown together. 
If it is accepted that cultural policies can have 
cultural and economic objectives, as well as 
cultural and economic forms of interventions, 
then this is to be encouraged. It is increasingly 
difficult for arts agencies to concern themselves 
only with direct subsidy and only with the non-
commercial. Not only does this radically narrow 
the notion of ‘art’ it also leaves all the rest purely 
to the logic of the market and subject to the 
priorities of economic agencies.
 
The relationship between cultural and economic 
(social too, though this is less pointed) priorities 
is frequently marked by tension (as it is within 
creative businesses themselves). We suggested 
that the creative industries argument itself was 
launched as a pragmatic way of securing more 
credibility (and money) from the UK economic 
departments, and that this line has been a 
predominant tactic since. The problem has not 
just been to undermine the specific cultural 
arguments. Thus creative industries have been 
used in urban regeneration in ways that have led 
to rapid escalation of rents and the driving out of 
production by consumption and local by national/
international chains. It has been very difficult for 
cultural agencies to make a coherent case as to 
why this might not be a good thing. The argument 
is not just that economic value cuts against 
cultural value, but that in so doing this economic 
value cuts against itself. That is, its economic 
success cuts off the very source of that success. 
It is for this reason that we need to be very clear 
about the cultural values at stake in cultural 
policy, how markets can be used and how they 
can be developed and sustained. The economic 
outputs can be clearly identified and pursued, 
but if they become the dominant logic, then we 
have problems. Art-media-design have economic 
implications, and, as industries, economics has 
implications for them. Cultural policy requires the 
technical knowledge to address these implications 
and the values on which to make hard judgments 
about our response. 
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Ecosystems
Creative milieu and the city
We suggested that the lines between art-media-
design were not meant to be hard and fast. The 
overlaps between them are fairly extensive. A TV 
drama production company, a graphic design 
studio and a digital media design company – 
and so on. Where these sorts of lines get even 
messier is when we look at the actual connections 
between these within specific ecosystems. 
As we outlined in chapter 5, the rise of freelancers 
and micro-businesses in this sector is not just an 
organisational shift but part of a wider socio-
cultural transformation. The inter-connections 
we have traced between art and popular culture 
took place at the ‘molecular’ level of these 
‘independents’ or ‘creative entrepreneurs’. They 
were embedded in local tacit knowledge and 
quality of place. They sought to make a living 
through a mix of economic, cultural and social/
ethnical values. They operated in networks of 
trust, reputation and informal knowledge. The 
spaces they inhabited were overlapped in both 
social and economic senses. Ann Markusen has 
shown how creative moves between subsidised, 
not-for-profit and commercial sectors on a regular, 
even daily basis144. Elizabeth Currid has described 
how different industries overlap in the informal 
social places of the city, which are also the main 
spaces of networking and deal making145. 
How the spatial dynamics of creative ecosystems 
work, how different factors of production 
intersect with place and space, is a major area 
of academic and policy enquiry at the moment. 
The spatial scale of an ecosystem varies, as does 
the specific mix of local and global, and of kinds 
of industries in each locale. The mix of the film 
industry in Sydney, or Vancouver, or Shanghai 
operate against a much more integrated global 
industry than the music industries in these cities. 
The intensity of contacts between art, music and 
fashion will differ between London, New York 
and Brisbane. The cultural industry policies of 
the 1980s onwards attempted to intervene in 
these local sectors for cultural and economic 
reasons. Whilst there were many successes, 
there were always limits to what was possible. 
In particular, there was often a disjunction 
between local interventions and national policies. 
Local authorities tended to lack resources and 
were constrained by national policy areas of 
responsibility; national governments lacked the 
fine-grained approach to cultural policy required 
to really engage with the ecosystems of creative 
industries. 
Cultural policy coalitions
On the other hand, it is at local levels that arts 
agencies and institutions have often taken 
the lead within creative industry strategies. 
First, the infrastructures of arts and cultural 
institutions (including GLAM) are essential to 
the ‘creative ecosystem’; it is hard to think of 
a broad creative industries sector operating 
in a city without arts activity. These arts 
infrastructures have become much more linked 
to urban development strategies in the last 
20 years; (some) arts agencies have become 
highly skilled in understanding the potentials 
of their specific contributions. Second, (some) 
arts agencies have taken a lead in acting as 
champions for the creative industries on the 
grounds of cultural and economic potential of 
these for their own ‘constituents’. That is, they 
see the creative industries agenda as offering 
new markets for creative skills and services. 
Third, (some) arts agencies have put themselves 
forward as possessing the specific knowledge 
and understanding required to lead policy 
development in this area. Though other economic 
development agencies have tended to assert 
leadership over this new economic constituency, 
without the ‘cultural’ input these have tended 
to be over-economistic and ultimately counter-
productive. 
That is to say: there is a resource of arts and 
cultural policy development both in Australia and 
elsewhere that can be applied to the creative 
industries. The stakeholders already involved 
in such a constituency – national arts funding 
bodies, local authorities, local arts/cultural 
agencies, urban planners, social welfare agencies, 
local economic development agencies, local 
education authorities, cultural consultants – have 
long track records in many places. To these have 
been added agencies concerned with innovation, 
the knowledge economy, and – with Austrade – 
international links. 
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Final words
The creative industries agenda does have great 
cultural, social, economic and environmental 
potential. This potential has been hampered by 
both confusion and a polarisation. Confusion as 
to the values at stake in the creative industries 
– was it about the recognition of culture or its 
annexation by economic development? This led 
to a polarisation of art and industry, culture and 
economics, ‘intrinsic’ and ‘instrumental’, and 
dominated the agenda. 
This report does not suggest that such a struggle 
is completely misplaced – the benign narrative 
where culture and economics go hand in glove. 
This report suggests that there are – and always 
have been – tensions between culture and 
economics (and between these and ‘the social’), 
this is part of our modernity. It suggests however 
that there are long-standing social, cultural 
and economic understandings, narratives and 
policy resources whereby these tensions can be 
managed and made culturally and economically 
and socially productive. Contemporary 
developments have redrawn the lines and set 
new challenges, but these resources allow us 
to address these tensions without complete 
polarisation or subsuming one under the other (art 
as a floating world; art as an input into economic 
growth).
This report has attempted to make a contribution 
by trying to clarify what is at stake in the heated 
debates between arts and creative industries. It 
suggests that the creative industries need not be 
– indeed should not be – counter posed to cultural 
policy; they are a development of it. This does not 
mean that economic objectives should not be part 
of this: just that they should not dominate. Indeed, 
economics should be seen as a means to cultural 
ends, though this is currently an almost utopian 
aspiration. 
Cultural policy at its broadest is about how we 
become citizens. The nature of this citizenship 
and what rights and responsibilities come with it 
have expanded enormously since the democratic 
revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries. Not 
only does it now include our rights as cultural 
consumers but also – in the age of ubiquitous 
digital creativity – our rights as cultural producers. 
We have suggested that these new dimensions 
of cultural consumption and production have 
transformed our notion of art and culture and the 
possibilities and parameters of cultural policy. 
The creative industries are absolutely central 
to these transformations; but to give them a 
purely economic inflection would be to miss the 
challenges, the dangers and possibilities that are 
at stake. To conflate economic and cultural value 
in a benign narrative of ‘creativity’ as a universal 
social resource is to misunderstand the nature 
and dynamics, as well as the malfunctions, of the 
cultural or creative industries. Equally to equate 
the absolute rule of the market with the apotheosis 
of individual choice and creative self-definition is 
not to extend our conception of citizenship but to 
extinguish it. 
It is for this reason that questions of cultural 
value – how it is established and within what 
kinds of social and political frameworks – is so 
unavoidable. We have uncoupled this question 
from the need to take privileged art forms out of 
the squalor of the market. We have suggested 
the complex range of social and economic 
dynamics involved in its support, and that support 
for infrastructure and the enabling of creative 
producers to produce is a more appropriate 
direction for any cultural policy. But this does not 
move us from the terrain of cultural value judgment 
to mere technical managers and facilitators; these 
judgements of value need to be made. They 
are now made at the level of a landscape, of an 
ecosystem rather than specific productions. 
We have used ‘art’ to describe a broad 
range of activities producing cultural values – 
encompassing ‘the arts’, popular culture and 
entertainment, including public and private, 
commercial and not-for-profit. We stated that 
we did not want to use terms such as art or 
entertainment or popular culture to define lines 
between industries. But judgements are made all 
the time within the different parts of the arts sector 
– pop and classical music, computer games, 
films, TV drama and dance. ‘Art’ is one of the 
most important ways in which such judgements 
are framed. This report has outlined how such 
judgments have been linked to all sorts of social 
distinctions – and they still are. But it is more than 
this. 
Art does not refer to a particular set of rules or 
forms or practices or materials as it once did. It 
might mean pure sensory allure or delight; it might 
mean a kind of mastery (the art of painting or 
playing a piano); it might mean an ability to do the 
job, hit the right spot at the right time – to express 
an occasion, an individual feeling, a communal 
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moment. All these elements of art still resonate. 
But it also means a moment of transcendence 
or autonomy – self-determination, freedom 
and play – where the material, the subject is 
presented through a “sensorium different to that of 
domination”, as Ranciere puts it. It’s in that space, 
or distance, in which a work creates its own rules, 
gives itself it own reason for existing, that art takes 
place. 
Cultural policy cannot ensure such artistic works 
through sanctified art forms or its criteria of 
judgment. As Keynes wrote:
“The task of an official body is not to teach or 
to censor, but to give courage, confidence and 
opportunity. Artists depend on the world they live in 
and spirit of the age….New work will spring up more 
abundantly in unexpected quarters and in unforeseen 
shapes when there is universal opportunity for 
contact with traditional and contemporary arts in their 
noblest forms”146.
Following the experiences of the last thirty years, 
policy should not just ensure ‘contact’ with art but 
the ability to practice and produce it. Art does not 
have to be professional, and we cannot ignore or 
patronise the amateur, especially in an age where 
the tools are so readily available. But much art 
and media and design is necessarily professional 
(though it includes amateur input); they form 
a significant sector of the economy and have 
profound cultural, social and political impacts. 
How they are organised as cultural economies is 
of great importance. They are ‘industries’, markets 
within which creative producers should be given a 
reasonable chance to make a reasonable living. 
